# MIPB

## Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin

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INSCOM

NGIC

HQ 518th MI Bde

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# Echelons Above Corps

UNITED STATES ARMY · DEPARTMENT OF · UNITED STATES

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ALWAYS OUT FRONT

# From the Editor

This issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)* focuses on the operations of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), its subordinate the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), and the support provided to the Army by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). It also looks at the Reserve Components' support to echelons above corps (EAC) and counterdrug intelligence support.

INSCOM units and organizations execute theater- and Department of Defense (DOD)-level intelligence operations and missions that contribute to the security of our nation. Without fanfare, INSCOM personnel worldwide conduct counterintelligence investigations, collect human source information, process signals parametric data, exploit imagery, analyze foreign materiel, and produce all-source ground intelligence products. These operations, coupled with those of Military Intelligence (MI) professionals at corps, division, brigade and battalion, support the Army in training, fighting, and winning against any potential enemy.

As indicated, INSCOM units play a significant role in enabling the strategic response of the U.S. Army. INSCOM's sustained collection, processing, and production of intelligence contribute to our understanding and preparation for operations against potential enemies. In times of conflict, INSCOM units provide the personnel, equipment, intelligence, and infrastructure that assist the Army in rapidly transitioning between operations and acting decisively against threats to our national security and interests.

INSCOM's organization reflects the diverse and worldwide nature of its operations. Some INSCOM units support DOD intelligence operations and missions. Others provide operational and tactical intelligence that supports the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC), subordinate U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR), and joint force commander executing the land component portion of theater campaigns or major operations.

NIMA, with headquarters at Bethesda, Maryland, and the NRO, with headquarters at Chantilly, Virginia, support these INSCOM operations with high-resolution, state-of-the-art mapping and digital imagery products. As we enter the 21st century, INSCOM, NIMA, and NRO will all play an increasingly active role in the Army's Transformation and its ability to address the asymmetric and transnational threats posed by terrorism. This issue of *MIPB* will address a sampling of INSCOM units and organizations as well as NIMA, the NRO, and others.

Feature articles published in this issue include—

❑ Colonel Donald Langridge presents an overview of the Army-NRO relationship and the NRO's mission.
❑ Dr. Robert O'Connell and Lieutenant Colonel John Steven White (U.S. Army Retired) introduce the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) mission and organization.
❑ Mr. Jeffery Reichman comments on NIMA's role in supporting the Army.
❑ Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Mitchell discusses the structure and mission of the Multi Component Contingency Support Brigade (MCSB), a possible future MI organization.
❑ Mr. Jerry Jones addresses the sometimes-confusing functions of CI and HUMINT soldiers and potential changes for linguists and interpreters.
❑ Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Iwicki discusses of the organizations and challenges of the National Counterdrug Intelligence Community and the Services' active participation in its operations.
❑ Mr. Chet Brown looks at the use of the All-Source Analysis System's relationship with command and control and intelligence in the EAC and Joint environments.
❑ Warrant Officer One John Berry provides an overview of the 513th MI Brigade.
❑ Ms. Jamison Jo Medby provides a look at strategic urban intelligence considerations.

This issue also includes our recurring Department articles, an expanded Enduring Freedom section, and a new section called "Our MI Heritage" that addresses the contributions of MI soldiers. We also introduce a new section that provides an overview of foreign weapons and U.S. intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) equipment.

As a final note, *MIPB* is your magazine. Without your support and participation in its development we would have little to offer the MI professional. You can support MIPB by writing articles on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), doctrine, operations, MI history, and other aspects of the MI soldiers performing their jobs. This sharing of information is critical to the success of the Military Intelligence Corps. Contact information is on the table of contents page in this issue.

*Michael P. Ley*

Michael P. Ley

# MILITARY Professional INTELLIGENCE Bulletin

ALWAYS OUT FRONT

## FEATURES

## DEPARTMENTS

By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:

*Joel B. Hudson*

**JOEL B. HUDSON**
*Administrative Assistant to the
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**ERIC K. SHINSEKI**
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# Always Out Front

By Brigadier General James A. Marks
Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

"Mud to space!" You've heard this expression before. It simply describes intelligence support to warfighting commanders that combine elements of information and intelligence derived from all echelons…from mud to space…and across the full spectrum of military operations.

Integral to our ability to provide adequate intelligence support to our commanders—to answer our commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR), to paint the picture of the threat on a canvas of weather and all dimensions of the battlespace environment, to include the threat's cyber access—intelligence soldiers must leverage all forms of intelligence produced from "mud to space." It is your duty to get the most out of everyone and everything that is available to assist in the fight. As a good, demanding track coach would say, "*get 60 seconds of hard running out of every minute*." Don't hold back; throw everything you've got at your mission.

Let me put this another way. In a tactical fight, a commander would never consider picking a time, a place, or a scheme of maneuver that was not to his advantage. He may not always be able to pick the "when or the where," but when the fight starts, he will throw the entire might of the joint and Army team's warfighting arsenal at the threat. The fight will be swift and vicious. Our forces will seize the initiative, strike rapidly, maintain the momentum, and finish decisively. The fight will be characterized by violence from all dimensions and from all battlefield operating systems. The Air Force will participate. Artillery will not be left silent. Naval gunfire, if the fight is in the littorals, will pound threat formations. Air defenders will protect the third dimension from threat air attacks. Engineers will blow gaps in barriers, and armor will roll through these gaps and into the depth of the threat formations. Infantry will clear trenches.

Our intelligence support to that fight should be equally unrestricted. We must portray what our fellow warriors can expect to see and contend with in this fight. Therefore, we must leverage all available intelligence that will enable us to paint the picture of the threat. Would you use only a few colors to paint a picture? Would you use only a portion of the canvas? Would you use stick figures when full figures would tell a more compelling story? No, of course not. Then why would you consider not using all available intelligence from "mud to space"? You wouldn't!

What is fundamental to this intelligence imperative of using "mud to space" intelligence is how to do it. For example, how do you as an infantry brigade S2—unquestionably a tough job and arguably one of the toughest jobs in a brigade—access and leverage all relevant intelligence, *tailor that intelligence to task and purpose*, and disseminate it in a timely manner? The answer to this is what I call "intelligence readiness," the power of intelligence.

Essential to intelligence readiness is knowing what is available. At echelons above corps (EAC) are the Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) and the Joint Analysis Center (JAC), which provide valuable, finished intelligence products to the theater commander. On the Army side, soldier from the subordinate brigades and groups of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) staff the JICs and JAC. INSCOM also includes such organizations as the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), the Army Imagery Center (AIC), and the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), which provide critical technical intelligence support to users in the JICs and JAC.

In addition to the EAC support provided by INSCOM, such national organizations as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) provide the requisite terrain and

# CSM Forum

by Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich
U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps

Congratulations to the newly selected Sergeants Major (SGMs) and Command Sergeants Major (CSMs), and to those MI Master Sergeants (MSGs) selected to attend the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA). This year's SGM list is an indicator of promotions and the increase in the size and importance of Military Intelligence (MI) in general. Again, our congratulations to those newly selected SGMs, for they are the Generals of our Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps.

Our soldiers represent what is best about our Army, our values, and beliefs. It is our soldiers who serve as the nation's ambassadors in uniform, whether they are conducting peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, fighting the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan and the Philippines, or providing Homeland Defense in U.S. airports and other facilities. Our soldiers, our sons and daughters, serve at the point of the bayonet.

This past year, as your MI Corps CSM, I visited several units and installations and saw our soldiers. In my travels, I often heard comments pertaining to our Army and soldiers such as, "our soldiers and Army are not what they use to be," "the Army is changing," and "the old Army was better." My response is that we are the best-trained soldiers and Army in the world.

Three weeks ago, I talked with the recruiters in Sierra Vista, Arizona, and then the career counselors at the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) in Phoenix, Arizona. Not only did I see our sons and daughters enlisting in our Army but also I envisioned myself as I was 26 years ago. Those young men and women enlisting into our Army are no different than I was then. I saw the past before my eyes, I saw myself as a soldier, and I saw the future of our sons and daughters where the "soldierization" process begins. Our soldiers are an investment in our Army.

Our Army is a standards-based institution. We, the Army's NCOs, must enforce those standards and secure our investment: the soldier. This is done through mentoring and counseling our soldiers. In our past service, all of us have had at least one great NCO who mentored and counseled us through our careers.

We NCOs have to get out and walk the terrain, embody our Army Values, and lead by example. **Leadership by E-mail is a "Non-Starter"!** Our professional code must be our values. The NCO must have his or her finger on the pulse of the formation; if not, then that NCO has failed. We work with the best and the brightest soldiers the Army has ever known. The bottom line is that our Army and soldiers are the best, and it is the NCO who will make that happen. General Patton once said, *"If I do my full duty, the rest will take care of itself."* As long as we do what is right, we have nothing to fear, and it is important to keep in mind that we are the best Army in the world.

As always, let's take care of each other and our families. You train hard, you die hard; you train easy, you die easy. Peace needs protection.

## ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

# The 513th Military Intelligence Brigade in Support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

**by Warrant Officer One**
**John F. Berry, USAR**

On September 11, the day terrorists flew hijacked planes into the Pentagon and World Trade Center, nearly 120 soldiers belonging to the 513th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade were already stationed in the Middle East and operating a number of intelligence systems that would prove critical in the days ahead. "*As fate would have it, these units would have been among the first to be called upon to increase our intelligence collection effort,*" according to the Brigade's Deputy of Operations. "*It was a fluke, but it gave us some breathing space.*"

Within weeks of the President's declaration of the War on Terrorism and specifically in operations directed at Afghanistan's Taliban and the Al Queda, the 513th began deploying 200 additional MI soldiers into its assigned area of responsibility (AOR) in Southwest Asia. These soldiers proved ready for the challenge, in no small part due to the brigade's strict training regime, exercises with allied armies to include the annual Bright Star Exercise in Egypt and Intrinsic Action Exercise in Kuwait, contingency planning, and close relationship with Reserve units.

Based at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and subordinate to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), the 513th MI Brigade provides the Army with the intelligence soldiers, expertise, and technology required to support a wide variety of missions. The brigade's soldiers are divided among its four intelligence battalions, the 201st, 202d, 204th, and 297th. Employment of the 513th provides significant reinforcement to the organizations and systems already in theater as well as bringing new systems and additional analysts into play. Following President George W. Bush's directive, the brigade altered existing plans and focused instead on the fight against terrorism and in supporting force protection missions in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

Within weeks of the September 11th attack, the Brigade's staff identified many of the specific skills needed from the Reserve Component (RC) to bring the 513th to a wartime footing and in late September 2001, a by-name list went to the Pentagon. The Reservists, mostly military occupational specialty (MOS) 98G (Cryptologic Linguist), with focus on the Farsi and Arabic languages, in-processed at Fort Gordon and fully integrated into the brigade. "*There was a great cry for linguists,*" said, the Brigade's Reserve Liaison Officer. "*There simply weren't enough to meet the additional requirements Operation ENDURING FREEDOM levied.*" He further stated that "*the 513th knew which soldiers to call because RC soldiers are often part of brigade exercises, representatives of the 513th often visit Reserve units during their weekend drills, and the brigade hosts an annual Reserve-integration conference at Fort Gordon.*" Since the 513th was unable to locate soldiers fluent in Uzbek, Pashto, and Dari, it received approval to contract with civilians fluent in these languages.

On Thanksgiving Day, soldiers from the brigade's 202d MI Battalion departed Fort Gordon for Camp Stronghold Freedom in Uzbekistan. There they immediately began preparing to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan; in early December 2001, they entered Afghanistan as part of a mobile interrogation team (MIT). The MIT assisted national-level agencies interviewing captured Taliban and Al Queda detainees being held in Mazar-e-Sharif.

In December 2001, the Army also mobilized the RC's 345th MI Battalion, headquartered in Augusta, Georgia. The 345th added approximately 260 soldiers to the ranks of the 513th while about 100 additional soldiers, many of them linguists, integrated into the 513th from other Reserve units.

Aside from the problems associated with locating sufficient linguists, the commander of the brigade's signals intelligence (SIGINT) battalion, the 201st, said his unit was challenged to provide intelligence to ENDURING FREEDOM because of decisions the Army had made to "*disinvest*" in tactical SIGINT. With his battalion half the size it was a few years ago, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth McCreedy stated, "*we've had to build the capabilities people expect us to have. Before September 11, the 201st had one warrant officer performing collection management, analysis, and dissemination. There was effectively no theater TCAE (technical control and analysis element). This changed following the influx of Reserve and active-duty soldiers and today the 201st MI Battalion has approximately 20 people performing these missions.*" Additionally, LTC McCreedy stated that he feels "*as a result of the 513th's performance in support of ENDURING FREEDOM, the Army may now be reconsidering its decision to eliminate echelons above corps (EAC) and theater SIGINT units.*"

*WO1 John Berry is a 352C and a reservist. In civilian life, he is a newspaper reporter and columnist with the **Press-Enterprise** in Riverside, California.*

# Freedom's Sentinel In Space— The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

**by Colonel Donald L. Langridge**

President Dwight D. Eisenhower secretly established a small, civilian-run office in the Pentagon in August 1960 to oversee a fledgling, experimental, military satellite reconnaissance program. Eisenhower thus set into motion a chain of events that, a year later, resulted in the founding of the organization known today as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), with responsibility for all U.S. national-level overhead reconnaissance activities.

Operating in near-total anonymity for the next four decades, the NRO succeeded in developing for the United States an unprecedented global capability to conduct sophisticated signals and photographic reconnaissance from space. This capability remains unmatched by that of any other nation to this day.

As the United States' "eyes and ears" hundreds of miles overhead through the darkest days of the Cold War and beyond, NRO satellites have logged more than 40 years of distinguished service to the nation. As the country fights the War on Terrorism and faces new challenges in the 21st century, the NRO stands proudly as "freedom's sentinel in space." It is leading a revolution in global reconnaissance, creating new, more remarkable, space-based intelligence collection systems to satisfy the information needs of national policymakers and military and civil officials during periods of peace, crisis, and war.

Publicly acknowledged for the first time in 1992, the NRO is a separate operating agency of the Department of Defense and one of the 13-member agencies of the national Intelligence Community. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence jointly manage the NRO. The NRO Director also serves as the Undersecretary of the Air Force.

The NRO's mission is to provide global information superiority to U.S. decision-makers during periods of peace, crisis, or war. It is responsible for—

❑ Identifying and developing innovative technology.

❑ Accomplishing large-scale systems engineering, development, and acquisition.

❑ Operating the space reconnaissance and related intelligence systems needed to achieve information dominance.

## The NRO-Army Partnership

Since the Gulf War, the Army and the NRO have greatly strengthened their partnership. They are working hard to improve the support the NRO provides from spaceborne reconnaissance assets to the combat forces planning for contingency operations, engaged in stability operations and support operations, and in actual combat. The Army now has three structures that work directly with and for the NRO. The Army Coordination Team, the Army Element, and the Army Support Group work in the areas of facilitating Army-NRO issues and internal NRO missions, and directly addressing Army Component requirements to meet the challenges of the future, respectively.

The **Army Coordination Team** stood up in September 2001 as a result of a visit to the NRO by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki. He wanted a team that understood Army and NRO issues and could interface with crucial leaders. This mission includes connecting Army leaders with the right people in the NRO and providing an awareness of the NRO's priorities. This bridging of the Army and the NRO is a two-way street and each lane is critical for success. General Shinseki provided guidance to the team that it should concentrate on linking transformation and acquisition issues during its first year. Other areas the team is working to improve include linkage with the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command and the Objective Force Task Force. The team reports to the CSA and the NRO Director and is in a good position to assist both organizations to achieve results.

The Chief of the **Army Element** leads the Army personnel assigned to the NRO. He manages the placement of Army personnel, assists in the soldiers' development, and ensures their duties support Army interests. The Chief is also the Army member on the Deputy Director for Military Support (DDMS) staff within the NRO and advises the DDMS on items related to the Army. One area in which the Chief, COL James J. Ward, has taken the lead for the DDMS is support to Homeland Security. He stated that *"21st century soldiers must understand the advantages offered by spaceborne assets and leverage them in planning and conducting military operations."*

The **Army Support Group** is an organization within the Operations Support Office, DDMS, in the NRO. The Group directly supports Army Component requests for education, equipment familiarization, and preparation for deployments. For example, the team has supported units going to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. They

have also supported Army units with Warfighter exercise preparations and providing Army personnel with new equipment orientation. Products created on the NRO's Joint Targeting Workstation—which merges more accurate national imagery with up-to-the-minute theater-level reconnaissance photography to derive precise geographic coordinates of potential targets—have proven invaluable to mission planners during the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Army Support Group responds as the Army support office, serving as the focal point for the Army units in the field for direct support issues.

These three organizations provide the Army with a dedicated approach to leveraging NRO capabilities. However, exactly what can the NRO provide to the Army that makes a difference? Where does the NRO provide a value-added capability that the Army should maximize to meet the current mission or as the Army transforms?

## Advantages the NRO Provides

NRO reconnaissance satellites offer five major advantages to the combat forces. These include—

❑ Persistence. NRO reconnaissance satellites are considered "persistent assets" because they are enduring and have proven to be incredibly reliable sources of information.

❑ Perspective. Space holds the ultimate high ground and reconnaissance satellites offer an unmatched view of a theater of operations.

❑ Range. The range of spaceborne assets far exceeds that of their ground-based or airborne counterparts. Not only can satellites collect at extended ranges but, since they orbit at 16,000 miles per hour, they can rapidly shift focus within minutes from one continent to another.

❑ Speed. In addition to the speed of the platforms, the NRO can move information at the speed of light.

❑ Access to denied areas. The NRO's reconnaissance satellites do not require permission to over-fly an area, and satellites are immune to the defenses that threaten conventional airborne assets.

The NRO has been using these unique advantages of space reconnaissance to provide for the nation's security for more than 40 years. It continues to improve its capabilities, even now deploying a post-Cold-War architecture of satellites that will provide the user with information at a higher resolution, faster transmission rate, and in a form that is easier to exploit. Demand for the information the NRO collects continues to expand. In fact, government, military, and civilian customers call on the NRO's space-based systems every day to provide critical information. NRO data, for example, enables officials to—

❑ Monitor the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

❑ Track international terrorists, drug traffickers, and criminal organizations having the potential to threaten U.S. citizens and our way of life.

❑ Develop highly accurate, military targeting data and bomb damage assessments.

❑ Increase crew safety during combat operations.

❑ Support noncombatant evacuations and international peacekeeping.

❑ Monitor humanitarian relief operations worldwide during earthquakes, floods, fires, and other natural disasters.

The NRO's space-based assets have a global reach, and have greatly enhanced the military's ability to gather timely intelligence, rapidly identify targets, and strike targets with precision. NRO systems, with other military satellites, provide global communications, precision navigation, early warning of missile launches, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and near-real-time imagery to U.S. forces wherever they deploy and whenever they plan for a deployment. The information these satellites collect is also used to program precision-guided weapons and to identify friendly troop locations relative to the enemy and other friendly forces.

## Wide-Ranging Missions for Varied Customers

These space-based "eyes and ears" of the national security team collect data that analysts fuse with information from other sources to support national policymakers, as well as law enforcement agencies charged with defending U.S. interests at home and abroad. NRO information frequently provides warning of hostilities, helps track international arms shipments, and supports peacekeeping missions and international diplomacy. The NRO has liaison officers and technical support representatives on the staff of every Army commander in chief (CINC) and it provides additional people, equipment, and training to ensure success on the battlefield. The NRO's information and structure clearly provide an advantage and a tool for the Army to consider.

NRO satellites perform a range of missions. Increasingly, the United States has employed these satellites in support of non-intelligence-related issues, such as disaster relief and environmental research. Today, whenever disaster strikes—in the form of floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, or manmade calamities—NRO information forms the basis for products that help officials depict and assess the devastation in affected areas. Satellite-derived information has also been a bonanza for environmental scientists who use NRO imagery to create a global en-

vironmental database. This database will help them predict climatic change, assess crop production, map habitats of endangered species, track oil spills, and study wetlands.

In addition to crucial customers (among the nation's political leaders, the Armed Services, the Intelligence Community, the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, and a number of civil agencies), the NRO also works closely with its "mission partners" to refine, analyze, and distribute the large volume of data it gathers. These partners include the National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Organization (MASINT), and the U.S. Space Command.

The NRO has made great strides in these support areas during the past ten years. For example, the NRO partnered with the Army to develop the Eagle Vision system—a mobile ground station that provides direct access to high-resolution commercial imagery providing military commanders with expanded space reconnaissance products.

## Expanding Army Leadership and Collaboration at the NRO

The Army is not just partnering with the NRO when it comes to space—it is also taking a leadership role. Recently, Army Brigadier General (BG) Stephen Ferrell became the National Security Space Architect, a position never before held by a soldier. In this important post, BG Ferrell will balance the Services' perspectives as he addresses the requirements and acquisition strategy for space.

The NRO is also working very closely with the Objective Force Task Force and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) to address the dynamics of space and incorporate the reality of the NRO systems' capabilities into the Army's training and force structure. It is also working very closely with the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. The NRO is a valuable tool and many areas of the Army must understand and use it well as the Army transforms.

Realizing the important contributions that spaceborne assets will bring to the future battlespace, the Army created an associated officer specialty, Functional Area 40A (Space Operations Officer). In the past year, four space-qualified officers have joined the Army element at the NRO. These officers complement the existing Army Element Team consisting of acquisition officers, intelligence officers and NCOs, and signal officers. For the first time, there are now three Army colonels working Army-NRO issues full time to take advantage of NRO capabilities for unique Army challenges.

The Army provides personnel to NRO ground stations—the heart of NRO space operations. There is also a plan for a civilian Army manager in the NRO's MASINT Office. MASINT is an increasingly important intelligence discipline.

In Bosnia, soldiers from the NRO worked with the 10th Mountain Division (Light) to take advantage of NRO-collected overhead imagery. The Army and the NRO collaborated on the requirements incorporated into the Army's Millennium Challenge Exercise. "*The advantages of space can provide a tremendous force multiplier and the NRO will be there with the Army as it faces the challenges of the 21st century*," according to COL Ward. In addition, the XVIII Airborne Corps and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

so clearly recognize the value of a close, enduring partnership that they have requested full-time NRO support representatives. There are also numerous success stories involving NRO support to operations in Afghanistan and the War on Terrorism.

With the Army's increased presence at the NRO, it joins a group of highly skilled personnel who have ensured the NRO's long tradition of technical excellence. Today, the NRO primarily consists of scientists and technicians in occupational specialties such as systems acquisition, aerospace engineering, communications, computer science, information management, math and physics, meteorology, remote sensing, and systems and software engineering. Together they define, design, build, and integrate the hardware, software, sensors, and communications equipment that comprise the country's operational, space-based reconnaissance constellation.

## Outlook

Facing a future including employment of satellite systems capable of performing any number of critical functions, the NRO is continuing its aggressive development of a new generation of space-based reconnaissance platforms. In the years ahead, the NRO will focus on acquiring more satellites at lower cost and enhancing its capability to collect and more rapidly process greater amounts of imagery and SIGINT against critical targets worldwide. During the last six years, the NRO has increased the amount of money it devotes to advanced research and development to nearly ten percent of its annual budget—a level unprecedented in the organization's history. In all, nearly three-quarters of the NRO budget supports future rather than current activities.

The NRO is basing its effort to revolutionize global reconnaissance on

a set of core operating principles, including a commitment to mission accomplishment, a strong government-industry partnership, teamwork and diversity, innovation and creativity, and customer satisfaction, as articulated in its enterprise-wide strategic plan. The Army is investing in the NRO to maximize the benefits from this revolution. This gain will result in efficiencies to the U.S. forces and advantages in the transformation process. Clearly the Army wants to move forward with the NRO.

The NRO expects the demands on its systems to continue to increase, but is working hard to push the technology envelope to provide our military forces better, faster, more responsive, space reconnaissance support to achieve information superiority. In accomplishing these goals, they remain *"Freedom's Sentinel in Space."*

*Colonel Donald Langridge is currently the Chief, Army Coordination Team, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).*

*He received a Bachelor of Science degree from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and a Master of Science degree from George Washington University. His prior assignments include Commander, Joint Field Support Center, Defense HUMINT Service, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Chief of the Integration Staff, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and Deputy Chief of Imagery Analysis, DIA; Chief of the Imagery Team, Headquarters, Department of the Army; Commander, 743d Military Intelligence Battalion; and Army Fellow to the Director, National Security Agency (NSA). Readers can reach COL Langridge via telephone at 703-808-1015.*

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# MIPB Subscription

# NIMA:
## A Vital Part of the EAC Team

by Lieutenant Colonel
Jeffery S. Reichman, KS ARNG

Historically, one of the most difficult problems for brigade and battalion S2s has been the acquisition of timely and accurate terrain information and products. Until the Gulf War, the highest-resolution terrain information and products were only available at division and corps levels. Following the Gulf War, there was greater emphasis on providing small, often ruggedized computers and tactically functional local- and wide-area networks (LANs and WANs) down to the lowest echelons. Use of these systems now allows S2s at all levels to access a great deal of previously inaccessible terrain information and products, not only through their higher organizational elements but extending into national levels.

In an attempt to consolidate the various mapping and imagery elements into a single organization, the Department of Defense established the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). NIMA's establishment has not only allowed the consolidation of developmental and production assets but also has streamlined the communications and product acquisition processes. This combination of an effective multi-echelon, two-way digital-communications architecture and a single, "one-stop shopping" mapping and imagery organization now provides unparalleled terrain and imagery support to the field.

This article provides a brief overview of NIMA's organization, products for Army units, the ordering process, and points of contact. It expands on the information provided in "Applicable NIMA Products Covering Afghanistan and the Middle East" in the January-March 2002 issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)*. Finally, it also briefly addresses the products of two other agencies with which it has close ties, the U.S. Geological Survey and the Topographic Engineering Units.

## The Organization

Established in 1996 under the *National Imagery and Mapping Act*, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency brought together in a single organization the imagery tasking, exploitation, production, and dissemination responsibilities and the mapping, charting, and geodetic functions of eight separate organizations. Those agencies, which no longer exist under their former names, include the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), the Central Imagery Office, and the Defense Dissemination Program Office in their entirety, and the mission and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). NIMA also includes the imagery exploitation, dissemination, and processing elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO).

Given such a large and complex organization, intelligence analysts and combat forces are often confused as to what products are available. They may not know how to access data which is downloadable directly from the Worldwide Web (WWW).

## The GEODDUC CD—
## A "Must Have" for
## Intelligence Officers

Have you ever wanted or needed to view and manipulate a map, imagery, or elevation data on your computer? Do you want to figure out what is on those NIMA compact discs (CDs) that keep coming in the mail and how to get them to work? Have you ever had trouble obtaining the actual CDs required for your area of interest (AOI)? Do the acronyms ADRG, CADRG, CIB, and DTED[1] make you wonder what those NIMA guys are babbling about? Then the Geospatial Digital Data Users Course (GEODDUC) CD is what you have been seeking.

The Imagery and Geospatical Information (IGA) Branch of the Defense Mapping School (DMS) produces the GEODDUC CD, a compilation of various government off-the-shelf software (GOTS) and freely available software packages, training materials, and information that helps the user exploit NIMA digital data. The IGI originally produced the CD to support the DMS's GEODDUC, a week-long course designed to expose the various digital data types and products that NIMA produces, and to show students how to exploit them in a Windows™ 95/NT/98 environment with little or no cost to the user. IGI's Geospatial Information and Services Team (GIST) now distributes the CD as a training and operational tool for students of other resident courses and for mobile training. The CD includes several GOTS systems and freely available software packages such as Falcon View. With this CD, the user can exploit NIMA digital products (e.g., CADRG, CIB, DTED, VMAP, DNC, AAFIF™, ECHUM,[2] etc.) to perform terrain visualization, produce briefing graphics, conduct mission planning, execute real-time navigation, and calculate datum transformations and coordinate conversions. A tool that allows the user to easily add and edit military symbols and graphics in PowerPoint™ 97 has been recently added to the CD as well. This tool supports both rectangular and diamond-shaped military unit symbols and will save

hours for your operation and planning cells.

All GEODDUC course materials and practical exercises are part of the CD to facilitate data and software training. Additionally, the CD includes information that expedites ordering NIMA CADRG, CIB, and other products and downloading data from the NIMA gateways. The GEODDUC CD is truly a one-stop shop for geospatial information and services (GI&S) information as well as software, which allows anyone to quickly become a general user of NIMA's vast array of digital products and to expedite many operational tasks. For more information or to request the latest version (3.2), contact DMS at (703) 805-2644 or DSN 655-2644.

## NIMA Products and Services for Army Units

NIMA produces the majority of the mapping and imagery products used by the Army (see Figure 1). The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the primary distributor of these products and services, and there is no charge to military customers. Users order mapping and imagery products through supply channels per **Army Regulation (AR) 115-11, Geospatial Information and Services**, although NIMA may provide some directly to you. Additionally, a number of the products are available via the unclassified site (gis.extranet.nima.mil via the Open-Source Intelligence Service or OSIS) and classified website (www.nima.smil.mil) on the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). The following items include information about the most used products and services. We offer digital catalogs conveying all the data display systems.

### Digital Catalogs

The DLA's softcopy CD (NIMA Reference Number CATCDLIMDIS NSN 7644-01-478-4783, 5th Edition, dated December 2001) has replaced the large green catalogs

many of you have seen. DLA also supports ordering online through their website at http://www.dscr.DLA.mil/pc9/G_info/web_intro.htm. A complete list of catalogs may be found on DLA's website at http://www.dscr.DLA.mil/pc9/CATALOG.htm. For assistance on ordering the new digital CD, call the Customer Service Office at 1-800-826-0342.

### Digital Products for Data Display Systems

**ARC Digital Raster Graphic (ADRG)** and **Compressed ARC Digital Raster Graphic (CADRG)**. The ADRG and CADRG are scanned versions of paper maps. The listing of the available ADRG and CADRGs on CD is available in the digital bulletin digest, NIMA Reference Number CATP7QB, NSN 7643-01-429-6984. You may order a complete set (about 90 CDs) or only the CDs addressing your unit's area of responsibility (AOR). NIMA issues new editions of these CDs normally once a year although we also provide a monthly update called the CADRG supplemental disk. This supplemental disk provides frame file updates to the charts contained on the original CADRG CDs and lists new charts not on the original CDs. If you are using a data display system, you should be on automatic distribution for both products.

CADRG, NIMA Reference Number CDRGXALL, contains hardcopy maps of an area scanned and written to CD. The majority of the maps will be 1:250,000 to 1:1,000,000 scale. Map coverage in 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scale is not available for all areas. The monthly CADRG update mentioned above, NIMA Reference Number CDRGAUPD NSN 7644-01-454-5188, provides the latest updates. The only way to receive this product is to be on automatic distribution. The Electronic Chart Updating Manual (ECHUM) files are in this description as well.

The ADRG is a non-compressed digital image of charts. There is one chart per ADRG CD. Command and Control PC (C²PC) can read either ADRG or CADRG although some maps may be available only in ADRG format. If a map was not originally in World Geodetic System 1984 grids, NIMA converts the maps on ADRG or CADRG CDs to WG584 when it produces them, although the grid lines will reflect the maps' original data.

**Controlled Image Base (CIB)**. CIB is a national satellite-imagery product. The processing of the most recent version, CIB5, yields a resolution of approximately five meters. This product is unclassified but with limited distribution (LIMDIS); page 147 of CATP7QB (available on CD) lists the available products. Data display systems can use CIB to substitute for a 1:50,000 or 1:100,000 map product when none is available. A complete set of all available CIB5 products fills more than 300 CDs, so units should order only those needed for support in their AOIs. Spreadsheets showing existing CIB data and stock numbers for ordering the product from DLA are available from members of NIMA's customer support teams.

The **Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED)** is a series of latitude, longitude, and elevation readings at regularly spaced intervals, 100 meters for DTED1 and 30 meters for DTED2. The NIMA Reference Number for DTED1 and 2 is TCDXXALL, and this product provides a general elevation surface of use for fly-through generation, line-of-sight (LOS), perspective scene, and three-dimensional (3D) visualization. To see what DTED products are available, visit the website http://www.Dscr.DLA.Mil/pc9/digital/DTED.htm. Users should only list individual NSNs for DTED1 if DTED1 is necessary (rather than TDCXXALL).

- Advanced Tactical Position/Navigation Technologies
- ARC Digitized Raster Graphics (ADRG)
- Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products E-CATALOG
- Civil Works Digital Project Notebook
- Compressed ARC Digitized Raster Graphics (CADRG)
- Controlled-Image Base (CIB)
- CORPSCON Coordinate Conversion Software
- CORPSMET Geospatial Metadata File Coordinator
- Crisis Response
- Digital Feature Analysis Data Level 1 (DFAD Level 1)
- Digital Hydrologic Analysis Data (DHAD)
- Digital Terrain Elevation Data Levels 0-5 (DTED Levels 0-5)
- Electronic Publication Team
- Environmental Analysis
- GEOTRANS
- GPS Azimuth Determining System (ADS)
- IN-VAL-ADD Software
- Integrated Computer-Generated Forces Terrain Data Base (ICTDB)
- Interim Terrain Data (ITD)
- Joint Mapping Tool Kit
- Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Utility Software Environment (MUSE) 2.1 Software
- Modular Azimuth Position System (MAPS) Hybrid (MAPSH)
- Multibeam Survey
- PC-Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Display Software
- Personal Navigation (POS/NAV) and Reporting
- Rapid Terrain Visualization Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (RTV-ACTD)
- Raster Product Format (RPF) Software
- Survey of Terrain Visualization Software
- Three-Dimensional Modeling System (TDMS)
- Urban Tactical Planner (UTP)
- Vector Map (VMAP)
- Vector Product Format (VPF)
- Vector Product Format (VPF) Exploitation Software (VPFES)
- Vector Product Format Statistical (VPFStat) Software
- Water Detection Response Team (WDRT)
- Water Resources Areal Appraisals (WRAA)
- Water Resources Data Base (WRDB)

**Figure 1. Available Fact Sheets on Imagery and Mapping Products.**

**Map Inserts**. For map inserts to use in briefings, intelligence analysts and combat forces have ready access to limited unclassified NIMA data and maps through the use of NIMA's geospatial engine located on the WWW at http://164.214.2.59/geospatial/digital_products.htm. The web page will convert your images to user friendly formats such as JPG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) and GeoTIFF (Tagged Image File Format). The geospatial engine gives you access to—

❑ Operational Navigation Charts (ONCs) at 1:1,000,000 scale.
❑ Tactical Pilotage Charts (TPCs) at 1:500,000 scale.
❑ Joint Operational Graphics-Air (JOGAs) at 1:250,000 scale.
❑ Digital imagery (10-meter resolution).
❑ DTED level 0 and Vector Map levels 0 and 1 (VMAP 0, 1) data.

**Open Source Intelligence Service (OSIS)**. Intelligence analysts and warfighters with access to OSIS automatically have access to all NIMA's unclassified digital data through the NIMA OSIS geospatial server at http://gis.nima.mil. The OSIS site allows users to download data in NIMA native raster and vector formats for use in freely available software such as that shown in Figure 2 and Falcon View.

**Falcon View**. Falcon View is a free software program originally designed for flight planning. It is an excellent data display tool and has a 3D fly-through capability called Sky View. Sky View is an add-on application to Falcon View that provides a 3D perspective view of an area, including any open overlays in Falcon View. Sky View will run in conjunction with Falcon View versions 3.1.1 and higher and operates on most Windows™ 95/98/NT platforms, but it performs best on systems with a joystick and 3D graphics acceleration. Sky View requires a separate download and installation.

Falcon View Version 1 contains the Falcon View software (available through http://www.nima.smil/sw-tools/falconview/index.html), four scales of Tiros (Television and Infrared Observation Satellite) maps, and NIMA Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF) data current as of the latest CD. This file is approximately 48 megabytes (Mb). Version 2 contains the Falcon View software, one scale of Tiros maps, and no NIMA DAFIF data. This option is for users with a slow download capability. This file is approximately 16 Mb. The software CD is available from DLA and is LIMDIS because it contains not only the software but also a wealth of NIMA data, such as CADRGs of various scales for the United States. The NIMA Stock Number is SFTWRFALCONVIEW Edition 311 and the NSN is 7644-01-479-2118.

Imagery courtesy of the author.

**Ten-Meter Image of Fort Irwin.**

## Crisis Response Information

NIMA employees around the world are hard at work updating products for areas of concern. Full or nearly full coverage of some products is already available, and more are under development. Users can check NIMA's secure sites on SIPRNET and the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) for more information and contact the customer support staff for specifics. On SIPRNET visit http://www.nima. smil.mil and see the link for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Operations Support and the link to "Directors Military Intelligence Board and NIMA Readiness Assessments." This shows the status of NIMA products for various AORs.

## Requesting Imagery

Intelligence analysts and warfighters with access to SIPRNET also have access to an abundance of imagery data through NIMA's Commercial Satellite Imagery Library (CSIL). The CSIL contains classified Ikonos (1 meter resolution), Landsat, SPOT (Systems Probatoire d'Observation de La Terre) imagery, and several types of unclassified imagery. You may gain access to the CSIL from a web browser such as JDISS. Currently, electronic access is available only to users from Intelink (via JWICS) and Intelink-S (via SIPRNET), either directly or through NIMA's Intelink (http:// diaimagery.dia. ic.gov/CSIL) and Intelink-S (http://diaimagery.dia. smil.mil/CSIL). You can contact the CSIL staff at (202) 231-2004 (unclassified) or DSN 428-2004. Their unclassified facsimile number is (202) 231-5683 or DSN 428-5683.

## Assistance for Army Intelligence Analysts and Warfighters

You can contact NIMA's Army Customer Support Division at (703) 264-3001 or DSN 570-3001. NIMA's technical representatives support Army installations and units at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Lewis, Washington; and the NGIC in Charlottesville, Virginia.

### Non-NIMA Products

**The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).** NIMA purchases USGS products to provide coverage of the United States in locations not covered by NIMA, such as areas outside military bases, and provides them at no charge to military customers for exercises and training. The quality and quantity of mapping products available for the United States and other "First World" countries may not be available for less industrialized states. Make sure your unit allows the use of USGS products for exercises. You can visit the USGS website at www.usgs.gov and obtain the stock numbers of the products you need. Contact the NIMA Army Customer Support Division at (703) 264-3001 if you need USGS products. For areas out-

side the United States, contact your customer support team.

**Topographical Engineering Center (TEC).** Yet another source of terrain data and products is the Topographic Engineering Center, located just outside Fort Belvoir, Virginia. TEC's mission is to provide the intelligence analyst, cartographer, and maneuver forces with a superior knowledge of the battlefield. They also support many of the Nation's civil and environmental initiatives. TEC employs a variety of hardware systems and software including many NIMA-generated products. Their website is at http://www.tec.army.mil/what.htm.

Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and since September 11, in Afghanistan have placed increased focus on urban operations. Although limited to a few specific urban areas within those countries, one of the most valuable tools has proven to be TEC's Urban Tactical Planner (UTP), a single, easy-to-use CD that incorporates a combination of maps, imagery, and 3D graphics of a specified urban area. You can obtain TEC assistance in ordering these products by calling (703) 428-6838 or DSN 328-6838.



**Bushehr Reactor in Iran.**

**Endnotes**

1. The expansions for these acronyms are ADRG (ARC Digital Raster Graphic), CADRG (Compressed ARC Digital Raster Graphic), CIB® (Controlled Image Base®), and DTE® (Digital Terrain Elevation Data).

2. These expansions include ADRG, CADRG, CIB®, DTED®, and VMAP (Vector Map), DNC® (Digital Nautical Chart), AAFIF™ (Automated Air Facility Information File), and ECHUM (Electronic Chart Updating Manual).

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❑ ESRI (Environmental Systems Research Institute) ArcExplorer http://www.esri.com/software/arcexplorer/download2.html

❑ Autometrics, Inc., Edge Viewer™ http://164.214.2.59/edge_viewer/Edge_Viewer.htm

❑ NIMAMUSE (MC&G (Mapping, Charting and Geodesy) Utility Software Environment) http://164.214.2.59/geospatial/SW_TOOLS/NIMAMUSE/

❑ TerraBase II/MicroDEM http://www.wood.army.mil/TVC/MicroDEMV5/microdem_ver_5.htm (The U.S. Army Engineer School produces TerraBase and provides it on its own CD. It is an easy-to-use terrain visualization tool and comes in a two-CD set complete with a tutorial.)

**Figure 2. Data Available for Download from the OSIS Site.**

# NGIC: Penetrating the Fog of War

**by Robert O'Connell, Ph.D., and Lieutenant Colonel John Steven White (U.S. Army, Retired)**

The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) is a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and constitutes the Department of Defense's primary producer of ground forces intelligence. The NGIC is in Charlottesville, Virginia, housed in a new 260,000-square-foot facility specifically designed for the organization's mission needs. We dedicated this facility to the memory of Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., the U.S. Military Liaison Mission member killed in the line of duty in February 1982 in Pottsdam, East Germany.

The NGIC's capabilities primarily lie in the skills and corporate knowledge of its unusually well-educated and experienced work force, normally numbering around 850 full-time scientists, engineers, intelligence analysts, and soldiers. (Since September 11, our work force and our mission have expanded, as you will see later in the article.) Formed in July 1994 from two highly respected Army organizations, the U.S. Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Center and the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, the NGIC constitutes a true synthesis of general Military Intelligence (GMI) and scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI), a one-stop shopping experience for the ground forces intelligence consumer, including those in echelons above corps (EAC).

## NGIC's Mission

"Produce and disseminate all-source integrated intelligence on foreign ground forces and supporting combat technologies to ensure that U.S. forces have a decisive edge on any battlefield." Think of this twenty-seven-word mission statement as a "burst transmission," not encoded but radically compressed. Nevertheless, we can unfold this message to provide an accurate roadmap of what we do, where we are going, and how we do business. Take for example the phrase "produce and disseminate all-source integrated intelligence"; this says a lot about us. It means that when you get an NGIC product, you can rest assured the analysts responsible have searched the U.S. Government's intelligence holdings from top to bottom, from open source to the most sensitive classified information, brought that data together, weighed it, cross-checked it, considered it in light of their own professional competence and experience, and then put it together in a product that makes sense in a military context readily accessible by those with a need to know. That is the NGIC guarantee, one we stand behind with an audit trail and analysts ready to collaborate with customers and provide follow-up material.

The second portion of the statement, particularly the terms "forces," "technologies," and "on any battlefield," also provides important cues to the NGIC organization and how we approach our mission. Armies take a long time to build. Because the NGIC plays a unique and critical role in the application of U.S. Code: Title 10, Armed Forces, the responsibility to organize, train, and equip the nation's primary ground component, we must address the threat not only in terms of its human and weapons capabilities on the contemporary battlefield but also on battlefields stretching across the future.

## Inside NGIC

If you were to dissect the organization, you would not only find that we have an unusually high "tooth-to-tail ratio" but also the guts of NGIC relate directly to the words "forces" and "technologies." This is captured in the roles of our two main production directorates, the Forces Directorate and the Ground Systems Directorate. Additionally, NGIC has a large foreign materiel exploitation program and an Imagery Assessments Directorate.

The **Forces Directorate** represents the human element with civilian and uniformed staff members; a combination primarily made up of area and military specialists studying foreign ground forces from the operational level down through the small unit level. They maintain detailed knowledge of current foreign ground force capabilities as well as a future focus on a time horizon with niches at 5, 10, and 20 years into the future. They examine foreign armies in the context of demographic and budgetary constraints to generate in-depth portraits of the ground forces threat in both conventional and unconventional combat environments from a perspective that includes:

- Battlefield operating systems (BOSs).
- Doctrine.
- Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
- Training.
- Maintenance.
- Logistics.
- Order of battle (OB).

This work is in collections of modules that comprise comprehensive battlefield development plans, conceptual portraits of foreign armies that focus on current and future doctrinal, operational, and tactical planning for combat. Additionally, in the more numerically oriented country force assessments, these modules' orientation is on specific tables of organization and equipment (TO&Es) and modified TO&Es as well as modernization projections tailored to support wargamers, modelers, and force developers. In addition to these very comprehensive roll-ups of ground forces of major interest, forces analysts maintain a regional perspective and are continually conducting research and producing products on a variety of topics, states, and transnational players. By inclination, they are generalists, analytic "Swiss Army knives" packed with practical tools enabling them to size up any ground force and project its fighting capabilities in ways that are eminently usable to those plotting the course of future U.S. ground forces development.

Consequently, Forces Directorate and its products serve a wide range of customers in the national arena and the upper echelons of the Army. For example, the country force assessments and concepts of operations for foreign ground forces are integral to the gaming of the Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) illustrative planning scenarios and excursions, which aid in analyzing the costs and benefits of billion-dollar defense programs. The Directorate's ground assessments have proven useful to Quadrennial Defense Reviews in their comprehensive examinations of the mid-term national defense horizon. Forces Directorate also plays a significant role at the commander in chief (CINC) level, where its near-term data and analysis support Army Theater Command elements at the Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) and the Joint Analysis Center (JAC).

At the Army level, the Directorate's detailed foreign ground force breakouts constitute the "gas" that keeps models from the Center for Army Analysis running, exploring notional combat at the corps level and above, including army-on-army and theater-on-theater combat. They also have a close relationship with the Army Staff, providing, among other things, regional assessments and in-depth analysis for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) in support of its role in the national intelligence estimate (NIE) process. Among the Army's major commands, the Forces Directorate has its most direct relationship with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). We have always worked closely with the command's DSCINT to define the threat profile against which future force development transpired, and the Directorate and NGIC as a whole are now deeply engaged in supporting Army Transformation, meeting the challenge of providing meaningful validated intelligence for a force structure in transition. At a more detailed level, Forces Directorate provides OB, TO&Es, and equipment characteristics and performance data to support the excursions of TRADOC Analysis Command at Fort Leavenworth (TRAC Leavenworth) at the corps and division levels and TRAC White Sands' parallel efforts to model small units, functional systems, and analysis of alternatives.

In short, Forces Directorate has a role in support of virtually every level of Army force development. Yet it would be completely misleading to leave the impression that the Directorate somehow exists as an entity unto itself within the NGIC. Any GMI assessment of foreign ground forces must take full cognizance of science, technology, and weapons capabilities. This is probably NGIC's greatest strength. Perhaps more than any other member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, NGIC has succeeded in integrating GMI with S&TI; by the very nature of the process here, no military projection can go out the door without having full vetting through the technology and weapons departments. Even if this were not the rule of the road, GMI analysts would be crazy not to avail themselves of their services.

**Ground Systems Directorate** is the land of highly skilled specialists and advanced degrees. In parts of the NGIC's Nicholson Building, one sometimes gets the feeling someone hijacked an entire engineering school, compacted it, then wedged it into the NGIC. From the perspective of skills and subject matter, that is not far from the truth. We have physicists, chemists, computer scientists, mathematicians, and engineers galore—aeronautical, automotive, chemical, electronics, energetics, industrial, mechanical, nuclear, materials, robotics, structural, etc.—as well as assorted modelers, simulation experts, and other technical specialists evaluating virtually everything that could or might be used to threaten our soldiers.

The sheer volume of subject areas covered is extraordinary (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, rocket launchers, helicopters, gun-based air defense systems, chemical weapons, small arms, mines, trucks, military engineering equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), command and control systems, radios (every kind you can imagine), radars (battlefield surveillance, fire control, air defense, and more), electronic countermeasures, camouflage, concealment and deception equipment (CC&D) (smoke, decoys, sensor-defeating appliqués), along with all associated munitions. Behind this "spear-tip" of military systems-oriented work, there stands a phalanx of in-depth backup focused on components and technologies, to include advanced armor, guidance, explosives, fusing, signals analysis, engines, transmissions,

and virtually every other element that makes a vehicle roll or a helicopter hover, not to mention soldier support and ergonomics, microelectronics and information technologies, and many others. Because so much of this work relies on the latest techniques of modeling and simulation, NGIC has developed a series of unique and highly specialized facilities and capabilities to support its work including:

- [ ] A dedicated electronic intelligence (ELINT) laboratory.
- [ ] The Compton Compact Radar Range.
- [ ] The Simulated Infrared Earth Environment Laboratory.
- [ ] The Joint Assessment of Catastrophic Events (JACE) modeling effort (a singular asset for Homeland Defense).
- [ ] The Geographical Information Systems initiative and the Digital Imagery Operations Center (of particular interest since they form the backbone of NGIC's imagery support to the Force) providing visual data in a geospatial context that is both convenient to use and maximizes a commander's situational awareness).

The specialists at NGIC provided all of this and more to technical intelligence (TECHINT) consumers. Not surprisingly, many of their customers are from EAC. The weapons developers are significant TECHINT customers of the Ground Systems Directorate. In the Army, they comprise a chain leading from the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Logistics and Technology, to the Program Executive Officers (PEOs), and to the specific systems' Project and Program Managers (PMs) and Army laboratories. We feed specific and detailed projections of adversary systems capabilities in the appropriate future timeframe to the Army weapons developers and the parallel organizations in the other Services. Getting this right is an awesomely difficult task, but repeatedly Ground Systems Directorate and the NGIC have demonstrated the capacity to generate timely and accurate technical threat projections for the Army's arsenal of the future.

Demonstrating the confidence we have earned in this sphere is "Tech Watch," a project undertaken by NGIC at the direct request of the Army DCSINT to analyze whether the Army will have the necessary overmatch against all opponents when the Army Transformation is complete. If there was ever an effort dedicated to bringing it all together, this is it. The NGIC plays an important role within the Intelligence Community's technical arena, with a ground systems member acting as the Army's representative to the Weapons Systems and Space Intelligence Committee, our Chief Scientist chairing the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, and NGIC Ground Systems analysts at all levels making vital contributions to national defense intelligence projections of the technical threat.

Amidst this sea of conceptualizers, we also have our "hands on" personnel, the "hunter-gatherers" of military intelligence, characteristically found on recent battlefields or other places foreign materiel may be available, looking down hatches, and kicking tires. Under the auspices of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), the NGIC is the primary agency within DOD responsible for the acquisition-requirements management and exploitation of foreign ground systems materiel and helicopters. If the members of the NGIC's **Foreign Materiel (FM) program** had a motto, it would be "*bring 'em back intact.*" This is an extremely complex process that involves the adept juggling of factors such as materiel availability, prioritized customer requirements, funding, and test-site availability and scheduling before the "take"—in the form of a foreign tank or helicopter or radar, or systems upgrade—even arrives.

Upon receipt of the item, the first thing done is a safety inspection; nothing gets driven, flown, or shot unless the FM Office is certain it does not pose a hazard to those working with it or to the environment. Once they certify it is safe, they prepare an initial report informing senior Army and government officials of the acquisition, its condition, a preliminary threat assessment, and the anticipated gains from its exploitation. Detailed analysis and testing then goes forward, and at each stage the test agencies prepare reports for review by NGIC to ensure that they satisfy all technical requirements. The results go to the PEOs, PMs, and commands with immediate need for the information; they also integrate these results into other all-source analysis products.

Finally, upon completion of the project, the Directorate prepares a final report for the DOD that is composed of significant test data, observations, and assessments. No statistics are available on how many U.S. soldiers' lives or helicopters and tanks they saved because of the NGIC's FM programs. To an Army that depends on decisive overmatch, knowing as much as possible about the weapons in foreign arsenals is and will continue to be a significant advantage leading to decisive victories. So you can bank on our FM programs to continue hunting and gathering what you need.

While phrases like "seeing is believing" and "a picture is worth a thousand words" have been around a long time, they still "cut to the bone." Visualization is critical to military intelligence, and NGIC's **Imagery Assessments Directorate (IAD)**, headquartered at the Washington Naval Yard, is singularly capable of providing the pictures the Army and combatant commanders need. Due to its unique talent pool combining highly experienced imagery analysts

and imagery scientists specializing in physics, chemistry, and mechanical and electrical engineering, IAD is able to develop and produce a range of sophisticated imagery intelligence (IMINT) products simply unmatched elsewhere.

Within the NGIC, IAD provides synergy, leveraging the Center's technical strengths with precise visualization and imagery-based modeling tools, exemplified by the Integrated Assessment of Chemical Production Facilities, a program with customers at the highest levels of government. Similarly, IAD has proven a valued partner within the Intelligence Community, teaming with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) on programs as varied as embassy studies and the Joint Digital Keys program (an electronic visual reference—and NIMA's most visited website—providing analysts with multiple angles and views of a wide range of military equipment).

IAD is among NGIC's most direct links to the Army and the warfighter. In addition to serving as the Army's voice for imagery collection management, IAD's readiness training (REDTRAIN) program is critical to the training of Army imagery analysts, providing hands-on experience with our sophisticated equipment and giving them the opportunity to pursue tasks while at the NGIC that are relevant to the daily work of their own units. That is just one aspect of IAD's support to Army training; IAD's imagery can help to develop problem sets and add reality to exercises at the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and at theater level. Yet of all the things IAD does, the most critical is its support to soldiers actually engaged in operations. Whether it is supplying commercial imagery for force protection, pre-deployment area studies, analysis of specialized in-country facilities such as hospitals, the best way to get from Point A to Point B, three dimen-

sional (3D) visualizations, and fly-throughs, or longer-term analysis unavailable elsewhere, NGIC's IAD is dedicated to backing up the CINCs and their intelligence arms with the imagery support they need to orient our Army forces and help them perform their missions.

No article this length can capture the full breadth of what is done at the NGIC, except to say we do a great deal more. NGIC—

❑ Develops intelligence analysis tools like Pathfinder.
❑ Manages the transition to digital production.
❑ Leverages world-class expertise under our University Expert Program.
❑ Improves intelligence access and visualization in urban terrain.
❑ Monitors threat mines and anti-mine technology, creates Minefield Geospatial Digital products, and provides aid to worldwide de-mining efforts.
❑ Supports DOD databases and builds our own such as SPIRIT (Systems Parametric Information Relational Intelligence Tool) and FIRES (Facilities, Infrastructure, and Engineering Systems).
❑ Enhances productivity through our close relationships with sixteen U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Military Intelligence Detachments.

Yet nothing is certain except change, and because of that there is one area that demands detailed explanation.

## Since September 11

Like all U.S. citizens, we have adjusted our priorities. NGIC has always supplied integrated all-source intelligence to our warriors, traditionally around 35 percent of our customer base. That has now intensified. On September 12, the NGIC Commander presented a new vision to help focus our efforts. NGIC's primary mission for the duration of the crisis is support of U.S. and Coalition forces engaged in the

worldwide campaign against terrorism.

The campaign against terrorists may prove to be a marathon and not a sprint, but we have already covered a lot of ground. NGIC is a relatively small organization, so we have the flexibility to task-organize to address operational requirements directly, it has also helped that we have been able to activate more than 140 reservists who are now an integral part of our team. Production of actionable intelligence has surged. In the first three months since September 11, the augmented NGIC workforce generated nearly 500 products; while they are short and to the point, they also constitute nearly three years' worth of normal production. These are available on our Crisis Homepage. Available on both the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) by the middle of December, the Crisis Homepage had received more than 80,000 hits. In another example of NGIC's support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, our Geographic Information System (GIS) program has accelerated to the point that in three weeks, we were producing material originally targeted for two years. It has not been easy. Long hours have become the norm for many. All of us have surged at one point or another. However, our morale remains high, and so does our determination to do all we can to help end the scourge of terrorism.

## Getting in Touch

Because we are in the business of serving your ground forces intelligence needs, we can be reached on many levels. For example, you can call us at (434) 980-7000, our main telephone number. For more sensitive information, the NGIC is part of SIPRNET (http://www.ngic.army.smil.mil). Finally, on JWICS we are on INTELINK at http://www.ngic.ic.gov. If you have an in-

telligence production requirement, you should submit it through the Community On-line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers (COLISEUM).

Although we are busy, we still welcome visitors (we had 1,100 in October alone). To visit NGIC, you will need a point of contact (POC) here at the Center. NGIC's entire facility is a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF). To have unescorted access, you must pass the appropriate clearances and ac-cesses with a need to know. We accept Intelligence Community badges for Top Secret with some special access. If additional accesses are necessary for a meeting or conference, have your security officer pass your clearance and the appropriate accesses. If you are attending a meeting that does not require special access, then pass just the appropriate level of clearance. You can send collateral clearances to Commander, U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center, 2055 Boulders Road, Charlottesville, Virginia 22911. Gaining entrance to the parking lot and building requires that you follow the instructions provided by your POC. Welcome to NGIC!

❉

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# The Challenges and Organizations of the National Counterdrug Intelligence Community

Intelligence is the key to effective supply control. We need the clearest and most comprehensive understanding of drug markets to attack them strategically; that is, to attack them in a manner that reduces supply and thereby reduces drug use. We are not interested in coping with the drug problem, we want to make it smaller as rapidly as we can. We can only do this if we get the intelligence mission right.

*John P. Walters*
*Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy*

**by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen K. Iwicki**
Drug-related intelligence support presents us with many difficult challenges and diverse interactions between a variety of intelligence organizations and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). Unlike the national intelligence community interactions we are accustomed to in the military, personal interaction between individuals is the primary method of sharing information in the anti-drug arena. More than twenty federal or federally funded organizations have the primary responsibility to collect, analyze, and produce drug-related intelligence. Additionally, numerous state and local agencies also collect and produce drug-related intelligence. The General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP)[1] and a General Accounting Office (GAO) report[2] delineate the overall management structure, organizational structure, and organizational missions of the agencies involved in this unique effort. The GCIP provides a system for law enforcement and intelligence organizations to resolve drug-related intelligence issues and to aid in accomplishing the overall goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. The difficulty lies in the wide variety of governmental functions that drug-related intelligence supports (see Figure 1) and the various federal statutes and executive orders that restrict an organization's ability to collect and share information.

## United States Intelligence Activities

There are also different views on the definition of "intelligence information." **Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,** defines "intelligence" as information resulting specifically from intelligence community collection actions and relating to capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons. Law enforcement defines "intelligence," also known as "investigative information," as sensitive information that is part of a law enforcement inquiry, matter or case, usually developed as a by-product of law enforcement investigation and interdiction efforts, and subject to divulgence to support the arrest and prosecution of the subjects of an investigation. While there are some elements common to both definitions, there are two major differences in how these communities

**Figure 1. Functional Areas Supported.**

approach intelligence. First, the intelligence community views intelligence collection operations as proactive and focused on a crucial decision point, while law enforcement investigative collection tends to be reactive to an event which has already occurred. Second, the law enforcement community has no methodology for analyzing operational information and producing intelligence reports disseminated to a larger community.

There are also differing standards and procedures for safeguarding information. The intelligence community has an inherent responsibility to safeguard classified information, sources, and methods. The law enforcement community operates under a different set of regulations, which obligate them to protect sensitive, undercover, and legally restricted law enforcement sources, information, and techniques. These varying classification or sensitivity levels and the lack of a common, secure information network significantly inhibit information sharing. Law enforcement has varied levels of restriction placed on their information, but with very few exceptions, the information is not classified. The intelligence community is just the converse. The inherent security problems associated with linking these two communities via a secure, automated network are staggering. We are slowly making progress on rectifying this situation. The recent changes in Homeland Security missions are forcing federal agencies to move away from stand-alone agency networks and toward joining a broader, secure government infrastructure network.

Finally, the full spectrum of conflict this environment spans from local and state agencies to the forum of combined operations and international diplomacy makes any information sharing difficult. Most local and state law enforcement agencies focus on obtaining particular arrests and often do not recognize the "bigger picture" potential of the information they may uncover, particularly as it relates to the federal and international counterdrug efforts.

The remainder of this article will provide an overview of the major governmental and military organizations involved in producing drug-related intelligence, their missions, and some of the analytical intelligence approaches used in support of the anti-drug effort. While the focus will be on the offensive nature of drug interdiction operations, please note that our government's anti-drug efforts also include many other aspects such as demand reduction, education, and treatment. It is the combination of all these different multi-echelon avenues of attack that we collectively call *"the anti-drug effort."*

## A Community Effort

Commissioned in September 1997, a White House Task Force (TF) conducted a review of the U.S. counterdrug-related intelligence centers and activities. The primary finding of the TF was the need for clear, consistent intercommunity and interagency coordination of the counterdrug-related intelligence effort. As a result, the GCIP went beyond discussing the government agencies and organizations that carry out intelligence activities for the U.S. Government and agreed on coordinated mission statements for the four primary national-level centers with drug-related intelligence responsibilities.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) **Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC)** is the principle center for strategic foreign counterdrug analysis. CNC moni-

| Intelligence and Security Command | Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (XOI) | | Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) | Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) |

| Joint Interagency Task Force - West (JIATF-W) | Joint Interagency Task Force - East (JIATF-E) | Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) |
| Alameda, CA | Key West, FL | El Paso, TX |

| USCG Intelligence Coordination Control (ICC) | DIA Office of Counterdrug Analysis (TWD) |
| Washington, DC | Washington, DC |

**Figure 2. Military Intelligence Assets.**

tors, assesses, and disseminates information on international narcotics trafficking and international organized crime to policymakers and the law enforcement community. CNC staffing includes representatives from all four directorates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and includes the direct participation of most intelligence community, countercrime, and counternarcotics law enforcement and policy agencies. CNC assesses drug flows to the United States and is responsible for estimating the annual cultivation and production for major coca- and opium-producing countries worldwide. CNC also is responsible for ensuring the employment of all relevant technologies in supporting analytic, collection, and operational efforts throughout the counterdrug community.

The Department of Justice's **National Drug-Related Intelligence Center (NDIC)** is the primary center for strategic domestic drug-related intelligence that focuses on illicit drug production, trafficking, and consumption trends and patterns inside U.S. national borders and territories. NDIC analysts provide U.S. federal agencies with foreign-related investigative leads identified during its domestic analysis efforts. NDIC is the lead agency for the production of an annual domestic drug threat assessment for the United States. NDIC recently expanded its role in document exploitation support to LEAs related to document and computer information seized during investigations, searches, and arrests. A limited number of active duty and U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) military personnel serve in NDIC. NIDC also maintains a close relationship with ARNG units responsible for conducting counterdrug-related intelligence training.

The **El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)** is the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) center for operational and investigative intelligence analysis of illicit drug movements in support of interdiction activities and U.S. law enforcement. EPIC's activities focus on the timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence on illicit drug and alien movements, and the criminal organizations responsible for those illegal activities. The regional focus extends from the Caribbean region, across the U.S. border with Mexico and into the eastern Pacific Ocean. EPIC maintains a fully resourced, 24-hour watch office function. It monitors the land, sea, and air approaches to the United States in order to identify and report on drug trafficking trends and patterns.

The U.S. Department of Treasury's **Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)** is the principal center for strategic analysis of narcotics-related and other financial crimes. FinCEN supports law enforcement investigative efforts and fosters interagency and global cooperation against domestic and international financial crimes. The organization provides U.S. policymakers with strategic analysis of domestic and worldwide money-laundering developments, trends, and patterns. As reflected in its name, the FinCEN is a network, a means of bringing people and information together to fight the complex problem of money laundering. Through cooperation and partnerships, FinCEN combats money laundering domestically and internationally. FinCEN works toward those ends through information collection, analysis, and sharing, as well as technological assistance and innovative, cost-effective implementation of the *Bank Secrecy Act* of 1970 and other Treasury legislation and regulations.[3]

It is important to note that almost every federal agency has some form of organic intelligence capability that may address some aspects of drug-related intelligence. The DEA, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Border

Patrol, and the Department of State are all major players in the drug-related intelligence community.

## The Role of the Military

The U.S. military Services play an active and critical role in the nation's counterdrug efforts. The five primary military organizations include the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), Joint Interagency Task Force–East (JIATF-E), Joint Interagency Task Force–West (JIATF-W), Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), and the Office for Counterdrug Analysis (Transnational Warfare-Drugs or TWD) at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Intelligence personnel from all five of the Services are active participants in these organizations (see Figure 2).

The U.S. Coast Guard's **Intelligence Coordination Center** produces and disseminates information derived from national sources to enhance Coast Guard performance and to support U.S. policymakers. The ICC supports all USCG missions to include operations and maritime safety, antiterrorism, drug interdiction, and force protection. The ICC supports these functions by serving as the intelligence communications hub between the USCG and the rest of the national intelligence community and the law enforcement community.

The **Joint Interagency Task Force–East (JIATF-E)** and **Joint Interagency Task Force–West (JIATF-W)** are both international, interagency task forces reporting to regional Unified Commands based on their respective geographic areas of responsibility. JIATF-E, located in Key West, Florida, is responsible for the Atlantic and Caribbean regions and reports to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). JIATF-W, located at Naval Air Station Alameda, California, is responsible for the Eastern Pacific Region and reports to the CINC, U.S. Pacific Command (PACCOM). Both organizations have representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, DIA, DEA, USCG, and allied militaries conducting and supporting counterdrug operations. Each TF is responsible for interagency detection, monitoring, and sorting of air and maritime drug smuggling activities within the transit zone areas of the Atlantic, Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific Oceans until appropriate apprehending authorities or international LEAs complete interdiction missions. The result for both of these JIATFs is a fully integrated, international organization that capitalizes on the capabilities of the various U.S. agencies and foreign countries involved in Western Hemisphere counterdrug efforts.

**Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6)** is a subordinate element of U.S. Joint Forces Command; its headquarters is in El Paso, Texas. JTF-6 plans and coordinates military operations and training along the U.S. Southwest border in support of counterdrug activities by federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations. JTF-6 is a multi-Service command comprised of approximately 164 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilian employees. JTF-6 synchronizes and integrates Department of Defense (DOD) operational, training, and intelligence support to domestic LEAs' counterdrug efforts to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the United States. JTF-6's area of responsibility includes the entire continental United States.

The Defense Intelligence Agency's **Office for Counterdrug Analysis (TWD)** is responsible for managing and coordinating DIA's counterdrug-related intelligence efforts. TWD oversees DOD counterdrug-related intelligence production and dissemination activities and it provides comprehensive DOD plans for analysis, production, and dissemination of drug-related intelligence. TWD also produces a broad range of products on drug issues worldwide and participates in developing Intelligence Community estimates and products under the direction of the DCI and the DCI CNC.[4]

## Analytical Approaches

Many of the approaches we apply to the drug-related intelligence effort are similar or the same methodologies that we use in our military intelligence doctrine. Intelligence preparation of the

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**Tactical** - Information that is of immediate use in supporting an ongoing drug investigation; positioning federal assets to monitor the activities of suspected drug traffickers; or positioning federal, state, or local law enforcement assets to interdict, seize, and/or apprehend a vehicle or other conveyance and/or person suspected of trafficking in drugs.

**Operational/Investigative** - Information that can aid in providing analytic support to an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution or useful in resource planning. The data is highly perishable, raw or analyzed information derived from any source that supports immediate interdiction or law enforcement actions.

**Strategic** - Information concerning broad drug-trafficking patterns and trends that U.S. policymakers can use, including department and agency heads, for strategic planning and programming purposes.

Figure 3. Drug Intelligence Categories.

battlefield (IPB) occurs, but under a slightly different set of battlefield definitions. The terms **tactical**, **operational**, and **strategic intelligence** have slightly different focuses as described in Figure 3.

The terms used to describe the battlefield also differ. Drug-related intelligence approaches this in terms of "Source", "Transit", and "Arrival Zones." The "Source Zone" is the geographic area, often a group of countries, where they grow, manufacture, or produce a particular drug. The Andean Region (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia), known for it production of cocaine, is one example of a source zone. The "Transit Zone" is the geographic area through which the drugs move from the time they leave the source zone until the time they arrive at the border of the United States. The "Arrival Zone" then is the port of entry the illicit drugs pass through to gain entry into the United States.

Drug-related intelligence uses the same all-source fusion processes we are accustomed to in MI, but there is a much heavier reliance on a variety of link analysis techniques. The same basic link analysis techniques used primarily by our counterintelligence soldiers are essential tools in analyzing drug organization structures, telecommunications analysis, event charting, commodity flow diagrams, money laundering, and drug transportation networks.

Analysts use link analysis to understand better the telephone records of contacts between telephones, cellular phones, pagers, computers, and fax machines. Association matrices help to identify key individuals, places, and businesses involved in illicit drug trafficking. Commodity flow diagrams visually display the known and suspected drug movements by quantity and organization. These various intelligence products help to identify intelligence gaps for further collection and analysis. Drug-related intelligence products also help law enforcement focus interdiction efforts, provide evidence needed to obtain search warrants and wire taps, and they are often evidence to link guilty parties during court cases.

## Summary

There are many benefits the military brings to the anti-drug effort. The single most important benefit is the integrated campaign approach that we are accustomed to using when planning major military operations. This methodology provides structure and process to our methods for intelligence analysis, command and control, integrated information networks, and joint and combined operational experiences, and it truly helps bring order to this endeavor. In the post-September 11 environment, government agencies are learning the positive benefits of joint operations and information sharing. Our government is beginning to follow and benefit from the military's model for joint operations.

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### Endnotes

1. General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP), dated February 2000 (http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/gcip/).

2. United States General Accounting Office Report NSIAD-98-142, Subject: Drug Control: An Overview of U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Activities, dated June 1998 (http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/ns98142.pdf).

3. Summary of mission statement provided on the FinCEN website (http://www.ustreas.gov/fincen/af_mission.html).

4. Appendix C: Missions of Counterdrug-Related Intelligence Centers and Activities (http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/gcip/appendixc.html).

*Lieutenant Colonel Steve Iwicki is currently working in the Executive Office of the President as a Senior Intelligence Analyst in the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). His significant prior intelligence positions include: Chief of Current Intelligence, U.S. Army Central Command during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; Chief, Joint Intelligence Center Rear for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY; Deputy Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Chief for Task Force Hawk (Operation ALLIED FORCE); V Corps ACE Chief; Commander of the Army's first Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Ground Station Module Company; and S2, 82d Aviation Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. LTC Iwicki earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Decision Sciences and Computers and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence. He is a graduate of the G2/ACE Chief Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Postgraduate Intelligence Program. Readers can reach him via E-mail at Stephen_K._Iwicki@ondcp.eop.gov and telephonically at 202 395-6653.*

# I'm A Line Battalion S2, Why Should I Care About What The J2 Wants?

by Chester F. Brown, III

All ground combat operations are inherently joint, regardless of whether we in the Army have always recognized or advertised this fact. The Army does not act in isolation: we will operate with at least one of our sister Services. When you think Army operations, you should also think "Joint."

What about tactical operations? All too often we espouse the position that the "tip of the spear" is at the tactical level. For most of us, the tactical level is definitely at echelons corps and below (ECB); others are of the opinion that including those folks at division and corps in the definition of tactical is humorous. Reality, however, paints a different picture. Additionally, our sister Services look at the definition of "tactical" differently. They believe that "tactical" starts at the forces controlled by the commander in chief (CINC) of a joint task force (JTF), theater, or Unified Command. CINC-controlled theater assets are currently putting steel on target, or preparing to put steel on target, in hostile environments. Is this not also the tip of the spear? It is slightly ironic that the Army Military Intelligence (MI) element supporting the Joint tip of the spear is an echelon above corps (EAC) unit, a unit that we do not categorize as tactical.

Okay, now we know that EAC MI units provide tactically relevant intelligence, what does that mean to you at ECB? It means that you have an implied, if not already specified, responsibility for providing the enemy situation to your commander as well as to the operation's overall CINC. The CINC's J2 can only obtain a comprehensive enemy situational awareness by fusing your depiction of the enemy situation with that from other sources. The challenge now becomes how you can provide this picture to the CINC without impacting on your primary responsibility, supporting your commander engaged in the close fight. This is where automation, specifically the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), can help.

The ASAS at each echelon, whether it be an ASAS-Light (ASAS-L), ASAS-Remote Work Station (RWS), or ASAS-All Source (AS), maintains the current enemy situation for the commander at each respective echelon. The Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) and battlefield functional area (BFA) use ASAS to provide the enemy situation picture to the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) (see Figure 1).

## ASAS and GCCS

We also use ASAS to provide the enemy situation picture to the CINCs' Global Command and Control System (GCCS). ASAS is interoperable to varying degrees with several GCCS and GCCS-based systems. The techniques and modes of interoperability are a direct reflection of how the CINC will use the information ASAS provides. Your unit's U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) field support personnel know the specific interoperability capabilities and techniques applicable for your systems and intelligence architecture.

The method most closely aligned with doctrine is ASAS sending the enemy ground situation in a message to the GCCS-Army (GCCS-A). GCCS-A then sends the data contained in that message to the GCCS



**Figure 1. Army Battle Command System.**

**Figure 2. ASAS to GCCS-A to GCCS-Joint.**

(see Figure 2). GCCS-A maintains the highest Army echelon's consolidated enemy and friendly situation pictures, referred to as the common tactical picture (CTP).[1] Similarly, the other Services maintain a CTP on their respective GCCS platforms (GCCS-Air Force, GCCS-Maritime) as well.

## MCS and GCCS-A

A more detailed explanation of the ASAS to GCCS-A procedure is necessary. The ASAS-RWS operator builds and sends an Army Command and Control System (ACCS) S309 (Enemy Interoperability [ENE INTEROP]) message, to the External Transaction Manager (ETM) of the GCCS-A. The GCCS-A operator processes and stores the data elements of the S309 message in the Army Global Data Base (AGDB) and then implements a GCCS Unified Build application to transmit the enemy situation data elements via message data exchange (MDX) in an Over-The-Horizon-Gold (OTH-Gold) message format to the common operational picture (COP).[2] The CINC's COP resides on the GCCS Track Data Base Manager (TDBM), which is on the Track Management Server. OTH-Gold is the message system used by the Navy's Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS), the GCCS' genesis system.

**ASAS to MCS and GCCS-A.** ASAS sends the enemy situation ("Red") picture not only to the GCCS-A but also to the Maneuver Control Station (MCS). MCS transmits the friendly situation ("Blue") picture to

GCCS-A. The merging of the Red and Blue pictures at the Service component level—in this case the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) level—constitutes the CTP. The JTF CINC then merges the CTPs from the Service components to form the COP. Subordinate Service components can view the COP, but by definition, it truly exists only at the JTF or Unified CINC level.

**ASAS to GCCS.** If required, the ASAS-RWS can bypass the GCCS-A and send an S309 message directly to GCCS (see Figure 3). The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) built an S309 Decoder Segment (a software patch) that is part of the current GCCS unified build. The segment allows GCCS to receive and autoparse the S309 message directly into the GCCS TDBM. This allows the ASAS-RWS to update the GCCS COP.

## ASAS to GCCS-I3

The Global Command and Control System-Army is one of the ARFOR commander's ABCS systems. As previously mentioned, GCCS-A is the ABCS point of entry into the Joint GCCS architecture. Depending on the composition, roles, missions, and functions of the ARFOR G2, he or she may also have the GCCS intelligence application: GCCS-Integrated

Imagery and Intelligence (GCCS-I3). GCCS-I3 is poised to become, if not yet employed at your Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) or Joint Analysis Center (JAC), the common intelligence processing system at the Joint level. It is evident that ASAS must be interoperable with GCCS-I3.

The concept of operations for GCCS-I3 is currently under development. Additionally, each JIC and JAC is revising it; however, the GCCS-I3 is acknowledged as the system that maintains the common intelligence picture (CIP) for the CINC or J2.

> ASAS should not at this time integrate GCCS-I3 as the other Services have done

In addition to sending the S309 message, ASAS can also send order of battle (OB) information to the COP through the GCCS-I3. Currently, ASAS can send the USMTF, C103 OB Report (OBREP) message, and the ACCS S309 ENE INTEROP message to the GCCS-I3. (We have advocated adding an USMTF S309 capability to RWS-to-GCCS interoperability. This will necessitate a change in GCCS so that it can autoparse the newer message.) The GCCS-I3 then fuses the intelligence pictures from the Services and maintains a common intelligence picture (CIP).

The J2, who controls the GCCS-I3, can then send the CIP (or portions of it) to the GCCS COP. We use the OBREP message to up-



**Figure 3. ASAS Direct to GCCS.**

**Figure 4. ASAS to GCCS-I3 Interoperability.**

date the GCCS-I3 intelligence database (IDB). The most critical aspect of this function is to support the J2's targeting efforts. Previously, only the ASAS-AS could build OBREPs. However, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J2-directed Intelligence Interoperability Senior Steering Group's Proof of Concept (ISSG POC) initiatives, Team ASAS modified, through two Technical Bulletins, the Block I ASAS-RW Version 2.5.1 so that it too can build and send the OBREP. The ISSG POC initiatives (see Figure 4) continued into the Block I RWS Version 2.6 and the Block II RWS Version 4.6.0.1. In a recent interoperability test, the 4.6.0.1 version of the RWS also successfully sent both the S309 and OBREP messages to the U.S. Marine Corps' intelligence systems (the Intelligence Analysis System and the Intelligence Operations Server).

## Replacing ASAS With GCCS-I3?

Why don't we achieve seamless interoperability by replacing ASAS with GCCS-I3? The GCCS-I3 does not currently provide the comprehensive intelligence processing capabilities that ASAS now provides to the tactical-level (ECB) ground component commanders. Although the other Services have jumped on the GCCS-I3 bandwagon, GCCS-I3 cannot currently provide the intelligence support that the Army's corps, divisions,

brigades, and battalions need. The Army remains the only Service that has not integrated GCCS-I3 functions into its Service-specific intelligence system, as this would reduce our current intelligence capabilities. ASAS should not at this time integrate GCCS-I3 as the other Services have done.

GCCS-I3 is, and will be, integrating ASAS functions. The GCCS-I3 Executive Agent is incorporating ASAS segments because of the specific capabilities ASAS can provide that GCCS-I3 cannot do now. Do not misinterpret this as an indictment of the GCCS-I3. As GCCS-I3 matures to support the functions that ASAS currently requires, it is conceivable that ASAS will incorporate portions of GCCS-I3. Regardless, we are committed to ensuring interoperability not only with GCCS-I3 but also with the entire GCCS family. We are not only directed to be interoperable, it is the right and logical thing to do to support intelligence analysts and ultimately the warfighter in the best possible way.

## Final Thoughts

While we realize that current ASAS Joint interoperability is not totally seamless, Team ASAS[3] is continually looking at expanding the capabilities of the system. If you have identified ASAS shortcomings or you have a "software tweak" you wish to see implemented, please feel free to let the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System

Manager (TSM) ASAS know or submit a Software Problem Report (SPR) through channels. The TSM-ASAS is the users' representative, and your feedback is essential to modifying ASAS to meet your current and projected needs.

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**Endnotes**

1. The **Common Tactical Picture (CTP).** Is the current, anticipated, projected, and planned disposition of hostile, neutral, and friendly forces that includes amplifying data (e.g., Intelligence, Air Tasking Orders, etc.) for a single operation focused to support the echelon commander. (The CTP requirements for a brigade commander are normally significantly different from those of a theater CINC.) Real-time, near-real-time (NRT), and non-real-time data from national, theater, and tactical sensors feed the CTP via available communications links (Link 11/16, Global Broadcast System [GBS], Secure Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET], etc.) provided by the Service components and other organizations. This collection of data combined with any final amplifying data (planning, weather, etc.) produces a CTP.

During operations, JTF echelons and below generate the CTP and submit it to higher headquarters. If a crisis occurs in an area of responsibility (AOR) before JTF deployment, the CINC or his designee can create a CTP using applicable portions of the Common Tactical Dataset (CTD) and other overlays (including plans information) that depict the area of operations (AO) related to that specific crisis or operation. CTP data will go from its CINC-designated origination point down to the tactical level and up to the CINC. Users will be able to create, edit, store, and share display "filter packages" for the CTP that can enable all users to simultaneously view identical displays, thereby guaranteeing a common picture. The data source for the CTP is the Joint Common Data Base (JCDB).

**JCDB,** although not discussed in this article, supports all of ABCS and will be

**Figure 2. ASAS to GCCS-A to GCCS-Joint.**

(see Figure 2). GCCS-A maintains the highest Army echelon's consolidated enemy and friendly situation pictures, referred to as the common tactical picture (CTP).[1] Similarly, the other Services maintain a CTP on their respective GCCS platforms (GCCS-Air Force, GCCS-Maritime) as well.

## MCS and GCCS-A

A more detailed explanation of the ASAS to GCCS-A procedure is necessary. The ASAS-RWS operator builds and sends an Army Command and Control System (ACCS) S309 (Enemy Interoperability [ENE INTEROP]) message, to the External Transaction Manager (ETM) of the GCCS-A. The GCCS-A operator processes and stores the data elements of the S309 message in the Army Global Data Base (AGDB) and then implements a GCCS Unified Build application to transmit the enemy situation data elements via message data exchange (MDX) in an Over-The-Horizon-Gold (OTH-Gold) message format to the common operational picture (COP).[2] The CINC's COP resides on the GCCS Track Data Base Manager (TDBM), which is on the Track Management Server. OTH-Gold is the message system used by the Navy's Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS), the GCCS' genesis system.

**ASAS to MCS and GCCS-A.** ASAS sends the enemy situation ("Red") picture not only to the GCCS-A but also to the Maneuver Control Station (MCS). MCS transmits the friendly situation ("Blue") picture to GCCS-A. The merging of the Red and Blue pictures at the Service component level—in this case the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) level—constitutes the CTP. The JTF CINC then merges the CTPs from the Service components to form the COP. Subordinate Service components can view the COP, but by definition, it truly exists only at the JTF or Unified CINC level.

**ASAS to GCCS.** If required, the ASAS-RWS can bypass the GCCS-A and send an S309 message directly to GCCS (see Figure 3). The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) built an S309 Decoder Segment (a software patch) that is part of the current GCCS unified build. The segment allows GCCS to receive and autoparse the S309 message directly into the GCCS TDBM. This allows the ASAS-RWS to update the GCCS COP.

## ASAS to GCCS-I3

The Global Command and Control System-Army is one of the ARFOR commander's ABCS systems. As previously mentioned, GCCS-A is the ABCS point of entry into the Joint GCCS architecture. Depending on the composition, roles, missions, and functions of the ARFOR G2, he or she may also have the GCCS intelligence application: GCCS-Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (GCCS-I3). GCCS-I3 is poised to become, if not yet employed at your Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) or Joint Analysis Center (JAC), the common intelligence processing system at the Joint level. It is evident that ASAS must be interoperable with GCCS-I3.

The concept of operations for GCCS-I3 is currently under development. Additionally, each JIC and JAC is revising it; however, the GCCS-I3 is acknowledged as the system that maintains the common intelligence picture (CIP) for the CINC or J2.

> ASAS should not at this time integrate GCCS-I3 as the other Services have done

In addition to sending the S309 message, ASAS can also send order of battle (OB) information to the COP through the GCCS-I3. Currently, ASAS can send the USMTF, C103 OB Report (OBREP) message, and the ACCS S309 ENE INTEROP message to the GCCS-I3. (We have advocated adding an USMTF S309 capability to RWS-to-GCCS interoperability. This will necessitate a change in GCCS so that it can autoparse the newer message.) The GCCS-I3 then fuses the intelligence pictures from the Services and maintains a common intelligence picture (CIP).

The J2, who controls the GCCS-I3, can then send the CIP (or portions of it) to the GCCS COP. We use the OBREP message to up-



**Figure 3. ASAS Direct to GCCS.**

**Figure 4. ASAS to GCCS-I3 Interoperability.**

date the GCCS-I3 intelligence database (IDB). The most critical aspect of this function is to support the J2's targeting efforts. Previously, only the ASAS-AS could build OBREPs. However, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J2-directed Intelligence Interoperability Senior Steering Group's Proof of Concept (ISSG POC) initiatives, Team ASAS modified, through two Technical Bulletins, the Block I ASAS-RW Version 2.5.1 so that it too can build and send the OBREP. The ISSG POC initiatives (see Figure 4) continued into the Block I RWS Version 2.6 and the Block II RWS Version 4.6.0.1. In a recent interoperability test, the 4.6.0.1 version of the RWS also successfully sent both the S309 and OBREP messages to the U.S. Marine Corps' intelligence systems (the Intelligence Analysis System and the Intelligence Operations Server).

## Replacing ASAS With GCCS-I3?

Why don't we achieve seamless interoperability by replacing ASAS with GCCS-I3? The GCCS-I3 does not currently provide the comprehensive intelligence processing capabilities that ASAS now provides to the tactical-level (ECB) ground component commanders. Although the other Services have jumped on the GCCS-I3 bandwagon, GCCS-I3 cannot currently provide the intelligence support that the Army's corps, divisions,

brigades, and battalions need. The Army remains the only Service that has not integrated GCCS-I3 functions into its Service-specific intelligence system, as this would reduce our current intelligence capabilities. ASAS should not at this time integrate GCCS-I3 as the other Services have done.

GCCS-I3 is, and will be, integrating ASAS functions. The GCCS-I3 Executive Agent is incorporating ASAS segments because of the specific capabilities ASAS can provide that GCCS-I3 cannot do now. Do not misinterpret this as an indictment of the GCCS-I3. As GCCS-I3 matures to support the functions that ASAS currently requires, it is conceivable that ASAS will incorporate portions of GCCS-I3. Regardless, we are committed to ensuring interoperability not only with GCCS-I3 but also with the entire GCCS family. We are not only directed to be interoperable, it is the right and logical thing to do to support intelligence analysts and ultimately the warfighter in the best possible way.

## Final Thoughts

While we realize that current ASAS Joint interoperability is not totally seamless, Team ASAS[3] is continually looking at expanding the capabilities of the system. If you have identified ASAS shortcomings or you have a "software tweak" you wish to see implemented, please feel free to let the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System

Manager (TSM) ASAS know or submit a Software Problem Report (SPR) through channels. The TSM-ASAS is the users' representative, and your feedback is essential to modifying ASAS to meet your current and projected needs.

### Endnotes

1. The **Common Tactical Picture (CTP).** Is the current, anticipated, projected, and planned disposition of hostile, neutral, and friendly forces that includes amplifying data (e.g., Intelligence, Air Tasking Orders, etc.) for a single operation focused to support the echelon commander. (The CTP requirements for a brigade commander are normally significantly different from those of a theater CINC.) Real-time, near-real-time (NRT), and non-real-time data from national, theater, and tactical sensors feed the CTP via available communications links (Link 11/16, Global Broadcast System [GBS], Secure Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET], etc.) provided by the Service components and other organizations. This collection of data combined with any final amplifying data (planning, weather, etc.) produces a CTP.

During operations, JTF echelons and below generate the CTP and submit it to higher headquarters. If a crisis occurs in an area of responsibility (AOR) before JTF deployment, the CINC or his designee can create a CTP using applicable portions of the Common Tactical Dataset (CTD) and other overlays (including plans information) that depict the area of operations (AO) related to that specific crisis or operation. CTP data will go from its CINC-designated origination point down to the tactical level and up to the CINC. Users will be able to create, edit, store, and share display "filter packages" for the CTP that can enable all users to simultaneously view identical displays, thereby guaranteeing a common picture. The data source for the CTP is the Joint Common Data Base (JCDB).

**JCDB,** although not discussed in this article, supports all of ABCS and will be

the information source for a layer of common applications that will generate the Army's CTP. The JCDB will be the primary file-sharing tool to support interaction and synchronization of the commander and staff at each echelon from corps to battalion. The JCDB will allow commanders and staffs access to real and NRT information in the full spectrum of military operations. Staff elements and subordinate units will provide digital source information through their associated ABCS systems to update the JCDB. The objective ABCS will use the JCDB to create a graphical display (with geospatial data, battle resource data, and intelligence data products) tailored in content, size, area of coverage, and overlay features to provide the commanders with a common picture of the battlefield.

2. The **GCCS Common Operational Picture.** Is the NRT video display of the CINC's depiction of the battlespace for his AOR. This depiction includes the current disposition of threat ("Red"), unidentified ("Yellow"), and friendly ("Blue") forces as they pertain to U.S. and allied and combined operations ranging from peacetime through crisis and war.

Since there can be multiple operations within each CINC's AOR, the theater level constructs the COP from one or more CTPs. The CTP is the picture common to the component's highest headquarters echelon. The COP combines the force disposition and planning and amplifying data from each CTP with any additional information produced by the commander's intent, battle plans, projections, overlays, etc., to provide the CINC with a complete depiction and visualization of the AOR. Appropriate users worldwide can access the COP.

The CINCs, Service components, JTF commanders, JTF components, logistics and supporting units all share the COP, which the GCCS Track Database Manager (TDBM) maintains. The COP provides each of these elements and other coalition supporting forces (releasability dependent) with a common awareness of the location of enemy and friendly forces and other relevant objects. It also provides information on environmental conditions within the AO. The theater CINC shares a broadcast of the COP with the Joint Staff, and, as required, to forces and CINCs outside the theater, to the National Military Command Center (NMCC), supporting CINCs, Services, agencies, other Component commands,

etc. Users will be able to create, edit, store, and share display "filter packages" for the COP to enable all users to simultaneously view identical displays, thereby guaranteeing a common picture. The COP enables commanders in different geographical locations and Services to collaboratively communicate and assess the military situation, make decisions for future operations, and transmit those decisions to the proper forces.

3. Team ASAS consists of soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers who employ ASAS, and personnel from the offices of the PM-IF, TSM ASAS, ASAS New Equipment Training Team (NETT), CECOM Software Engineering Center, and field support organizations.

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# IPB CONSIDERATIONS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

by Jamison Jo Medby

Soldiers at the tactical level rely on their superiors to conduct mission planning thoroughly and thoughtfully. They deploy trusting that their leaders are aware of the risks and have prepared for all possibilities. A crucial part of this planning is intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). IPB conducted at all levels of combat should describe the terrain, weather, and threat conditions that exist in the area of operations (AO) and the associated area of interest (AOI). At the tactical level, details are important. How wide are the streets? What do building interiors look like? Who is shooting at me, with what, and from where? Logically, IPB at echelons above corps (EAC) and strategic levels needs to be broader in its scope, address a wider variety of topics, and investigate more po-

tentialities. Details will still be important, but they are details of a different kind.

IPB at the strategic level in particular should describe what impediments exist to thwart the higher political and military objectives defined by our leadership. It is critical then that IPB first identify the complexities of the AO and AOI, delineate the most relevant factors in these areas, and describe how each factor exists and interacts with the others. Strategic IPB builds upon the foundations established at the tactical and operational levels, provides the overall contextual description of the operational area, and identifies those conduits that Intelligence "Reach" can support. Finally, it seeks to determine the identity and characteristics of each of the possible threats a strategic political or

military objective may face and how each may have a compounding or canceling effect on the overall operation.

This article addresses the strategic level, where the questions asked and answered directly relate to **what** to do. Provided below are three of the most critical subject areas at the strategic level and some basic reasoning as to why they are important.

## Population Analysis

Regardless of the type of operation, an AO/AOI contains a variety of population groups that can affect mission accomplishment. As a result, strategic planners must have a basic understanding of the cultural, political, and religious aspects of each of these population groups. Once those aspects are understood, then analysts can

make a determination of the impact of each group. Will they help or hinder the operation? Particularly at the strategic level, the answer to this question means more than a simple parsing of the population into only three categories—the doctrinal friendly, neutral, and enemy. Rather, analysts should assess each group against its capabilities and interests and in the context of the current situation and ultimate objective. Armed with this information, planners and analysts can determine how we can actively influence each of the many population groups within the objective areas to contribute to mission success, or at a minimum, how to minimize their interference.

We can also use the information to assess and predict which groups would most likely impede mission objectives. A brief example will help make this clear. During World War II, the U.S. Navy acquired the help of the New York Mafia to help protect that city's port facilities. They initiated and tolerated the collaboration due to the Mafia's capability to provide the required protection and its willingness to portray the patriotism of its members. In this case, the U.S. Government had to overlook some of its biases against this criminal group in order to serve the greater good—the protection of our largest seaport from an Axis threat.[1]

At the strategic level, the intent of **population analysis** is to develop a good understanding of the culture and context of the operational area. This will ensure that by the time the information reaches the tactical level, it is consciously part of plans, force protection measures, rules of engagement, and all instructions to individual soldiers.

## Threat Identification

Step three of the IPB process focuses on threat evaluation. At the strategic level, the onus will be on the intelligence organizations to **identify** the real and potential threats. In any given operation and location, there are often diverse population groups and other elements that may impact our ability to operate there. In a worst case, these population groups may pit two or more ethnic or religious groups against one another and fight in the midst of drought, disease, or economic collapse. Any demographic mix, especially if compounded by additional environmental threats, can threaten the ability to successfully complete our mission. IPB at the strategic level, therefore, needs to evaluate the big picture, the national or at least regional capabilities and limitations of each potential threat, and identify those most likely to threaten the mission. Once we have identified these strategic capabilities, limitations, and threats, the more focused IPB conducted at the tactical and operational levels can fill in the necessary details.

## Media Analysis

All U.S. soldiers are aware of the media's impact on U.S. and world opinion during U.S. military operations in Vietnam and Somalia. There is no longer any doubt that the U.S. audience has the proven ability to force the withdrawal of troops from an area because of its intolerance for casualties and collateral damage. The U.S. citizenry is not alone in this regard. Depending on how one employs it, local media has the potential to be either a great stabilizing force or a debilitating factor on the local audience. For example, during U.S. operations in the Balkans and the Middle East, we quickly found that the locally controlled newspapers and television and radio stations had the power to make U.S. troops either heroes or villains. Because of this potential to impact ongoing military operations, strategic planners must ensure they consistently relay the mission's objectives and methodology to the relevant domestic audiences. Accomplishing this requires an understanding of the culture, as discussed above, to ensure that animosity is not bred by accident. It also requires extensive investigation into **who** controls the media and **how** they propagate messages throughout a population. For instance, does the population draw most of its information and perceptions from locally owned newspapers or electronic media or do they rely on the international media such as CNN or Al-Jazeera satellite TV? Is there one person or a few in the locale that help mold these messages? What is the current theme to which the population adheres or listens, and, if necessary, how can we counter this theme?

## Final Thoughts

There are many more considerations that analysts could and need to investigate during the conduct of strategic level IPB. The three identified above are among the most important and except for threat, there is little approved supporting doctrine. Therefore, the author hopes that the mention of these subject areas will at least spark some thought in the mind of the analyst conducting strategic level IPB.

#### Endnote

1. For a more detailed account of this unlikely collaboration, see Carlo D'este, **Bitter Victory: the Battle for Sicily 1943** (Glasgow, Scotland: William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd, 1988).

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# CI and HUMINT Or
## HUMINT and CI Or
### CI/HUMINT Or
#### TAC HUMINT

### (Confusing, Isn't It?)

by Colonel Jerry W. Jones
(U.S. Army, Retired)

**The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Department of Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.**

*Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation. Now there are five sorts of secret agents...: native, inside, doubled, expendable and living. When these five types of agents are all working simultaneously and none knows their method of operation, they are the treasure of a sovereign.... He, who is not sage and wise, humane and just, cannot use secret agents. And he who is not delicate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them.... It is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you and to bribe them to serve you.... And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret agents are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move.*

*—Sun Tzu, The Art of War*[1]

We are relearning these lessons taught by Sun Tzu. Since Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the U.S. Army has been in transformation. The known Warsaw Pact foe is gone and the uncertain, asymmetric, and asynchronous foe now dominates much of our thinking. The Army's mission is to fight and win wars. Thus, while the Army trains for major theater wars (MTWs), it executes military operations other than war (MOOTW) (see Figure 1). In Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, and other less advertised deployments, tactical commanders learned that "foreknowledge" and situational awareness that leads to situational understanding depend on people talking with people. While the technical sensors available provided valuable insight, it was the low-technology "analog" aperture that gave commanders the opportunity to "see" and act inside their adversaries' decision cycles. It was people talking to people.[2] Now the Army's Military Intelligence (MI) community is engaged in its own decision-making.[3] In some ways, Army MI is on the horns of a dilemma. Who is the right person in our tactical formations to execute Sun Tzu's trea-tises? What is the right set of skills? Do we require two specialties, or one, or three? What is the right answer for the future operations that we cannot predict? What can we afford? Does anyone have the "right" answers to these questions? Many think they have the answer, but they only have opinions shaped by their experiences, and those require polishing.

Requirements drive the Army Transformation. Thus, this article will begin with some ideas on where the Army needs certain specialists and why. It will also offer some thoughts on the human intelligence (HUMINT) discipline and the intelligence function of counterintelligence (CI). The article will conclude with a proposal for restructuring the HUMINT and CI military occupational specialties (MOSs). This article focuses more on tactical operations than operational and strategic efforts, but much of this discussion applies to and impacts on our theater, Service, and national capabilities.

## Requirements Determination

In MTWs and small-scale contingencies (SSCs), the Army requires individuals who can interrogate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or

| Military Operation | General U.S. Goal | | Offense | Defense | Stability | Support |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| War | Fight and Win War | M T W | | | | |
| Military Operations Other Than War | Deter War and Resolve Conflicts | S S C | | | | |
| | Promote Peace | P M E | | | | |

**KEY**
**MTW - Major theater war**
**PME - Peacetime military engagement**
**SSC - Small-scale contingency**

Figure 1. Range of Army Operations.

detainees in a foreign language, and determine the most effective technique to obtain information from these EPWs. This requirement is not resident at all echelons. In fact, it is required most at the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) or Joint Debriefing Center (JDC) organic to a Joint Task Force. At tactical echelons we need soldiers who can quickly screen EPWs for information of immediate tactical value before moving them to a JIF or JDC. Individuals trained in tactical questioning can accomplish this requirement. They do, however, require language skills or an interpreter.

In war and MOOTW, the Army will require—

❑ Individuals trained to debrief U.S. persons who encounter adversaries. This requirement—which requires no language skills— exists at all echelons, but is most common at the theater and Service levels.

❑ Individuals who can plan and execute contact and source operations. The purpose is to obtain information regarding an adversary's order of battle (OB), capabilities, plans, attitudes, and intentions. Effective operations using non-English-speaking persons require a linguist, either as the operator or guist, either as the operator or

interpreter. The focus is to ensure that commanders and other decision-makers understand the situation.

❑ Soldiers with the ability to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize an adversary's attempts to obtain information about U.S. capabilities, OB, plans, and intentions. The Army must detect, investigate, arrest, convict, and punish those who commit national security crimes, such as espionage. Espionage did not end with the Cold War. There are still soldiers like James Hall, III, and Albert Sombolay (U.S. Army) and others like Harold Nicholson (CIA) and Earl Pitts (FBI) (who were all charged with espionage). The Army requires soldiers and civilians to bring such individuals to justice using its many investigative capabilities, including polygraphs, technical measures, and informants. This requirement exists at all echelons. While having a language capability enhances our ability to be successful, soldiers can accomplish this task using an interpreter.

❑ Soldiers dedicated to the protection of sensitive Army programs. Force protection starts with the research and development

cycle, at institutional training sites, and in major Army headquarters. If we do not protect the information in our labs, concerning our special mission units, or our operational plans, then force protection suffers and combat soldiers will pay the price.

❑ A technical control and support element to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize all HUMINT and CI activities in the area of intelligence responsibility while providing an analysis capability that provides predictive intelligence products for the AOIR, area of influence, and area of interest. This requirement exists from Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to Service level.

## The Discipline

**Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**, defines HUMINT as "*a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.*" However, that is not sufficient as it leads the reader to believe that anyone can execute HUMINT. This is not true. The following is my draft definition:

*Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is derived from the analysis of foreign positive information collected by a trained HUMINT Collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human contacts and informants as a tool, and a variety of collection methods to gather information that satisfies the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and cues other collection resources.*

HUMINT is a foreign intelligence activity focused on the penetration of an adversary's decision-making



**Role**

Determine
❑ Capabilities
❑ Order of Battle
❑ Vulnerabilities
❑ Intentions

Target

Adversary decision-making architecture

**Function**

Collection
❑ Debriefings
❑ Interrogation
❑ Tactical Contact Operations
 • Level 1
 • Level 2
 • Level 3
❑ Source Operations
 • Overt
 • Overt Sensitive
 • Controlled
❑ Document Exploitation

**Focus**

Shape Blue's understanding of Red.

**Figure 2. Human Intelligence.**

**Figure 3. Counterintelligence.**

architecture to obtain information regarding capabilities, vulnerabilities, dispositions, plans, and intentions. HUMINT entities employ human sources or contacts (controlled and not controlled), exploit documents, and execute reconnaissance and surveillance activities to satisfy requirements regarding the adversary (see Figure 2). As Sun Tzu's essays attest, HUMINT is the oldest of our intelligence disciplines.

## The Function

**FM 34-60, Counterintelligence**, defines CI as—

*Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.*

The CI and HUMINT Integrated Concept Team (ICT) chartered by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), will recommend a new definition. Currently, the draft definition reads—

*Counterintelligence counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts through collection, investigations, operations, analysis and production, and technical services. CI includes all actions taken to detect, identify, track, exploit and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries and enemies, and is the key intelligence community contributor to protect U.S. interests and equities.*

In essence, CI entities have the mission of detecting, identifying, exploiting, and neutralizing our adversaries' intelligence activities. The function of countering an adversary intelligence service is also old. Archaeologists unearthed a clay tablet in Syria written in the 18th century B.C.E. with an inscription from one ruler of a city-state to another complaining that they had released spies for ransom but that payment had not come.

Doctrinally, CI is a functional area that obtains and consumes information from all sources concerning an adversary's intelligence activities (see Figure 3). Some believe that CI is a subdiscipline of HUMINT. However, if that were true, CI would only focus on counter-HUMINT operations. To provide the commander and

senior decision-maker with the right intelligence, CI must look beyond HUMINT to determine the adversary threat. CI personnel detect and identify adversary intelligence activities by planning and conducting collection missions and analyzing information collected from all sources. The Army's departmental CI organization executes operations to exploit adversary intelligence activities and gather additional information, support theater and tactical objectives, and set the conditions for neutralizing the effects of adversary intelligence services. Army CI agents conduct investigations to gather the evidence required to neutralize a threat intelligence service and prosecute individuals for national security crimes, such as espionage. As CI entities execute the functions of collection, operations, investigation, and analysis, commanders receive intelligence vital to their force protection programs.

## Interrelationship

There is confusion regarding who executes the discipline of HUMINT and the CI function. Army CI agents will use many of the same techniques and skills a HUMINT operator employs. This is especially true at the tactical level where CI soldiers will execute tactical HUMINT (TAC HUMINT) operations teamed with linguists and HUMINT collectors. The confusion mounts when we use the Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) regulation[4] to justify HUMINT contact and source-collection activities. This fact is the root of confusion in some people's minds that CI and HUMINT are the same thing. While both employ the same types of sources and use many of the same techniques, the product is different. While both satisfy the CCIR, the intent is different. The HUMINT collector obtains data germane to the adversary's organization, disposition, capabilities, and decision-making. The CI agent

collects data relevant to the adversary's intelligence activities that will influence decision-making. While the HUMINT collector's task is complete with reporting the required data (including follow-up meetings with the source or contact), the CI special agent's tasks expand after detecting and identifying adversary intelligence activities.

CI must either exploit, neutralize, or do both. Its activities span passive collection to active countermeasures. CI soldiers engage the adversary intelligence service in a battle for data and information. According to Sir Winston Churchill, *"The great thing is to get the true picture, whatever it is."* Of course, commanders must not follow the model of Byzantine Emperor Justin II who, when given solid intelligence about the defenses of a besieged city, ignored it and fired his spies. Commanders and adversaries seek information to eliminate uncertainty in the conduct of operations or to gain an advantage. The BCT relies on "the true picture" to gain a positional advantage over an adversary. HUMINT and CI are shaping operations for the commander. While HUMINT contributes to information superiority by providing data and information about the adversary, CI contributes by affecting the data and information obtained by the adversary. HUMINT shapes the "Blue" forces' understanding of the "Red" forces while CI affects the Red forces' knowledge of Blue forces.

## Future MOS Actions

The Army is at a crossroads with regard to its CI and HUMINT force. The catalyst is TAC HUMINT. The term "TAC HUMINT" refers to those operations planned and executed by U.S. Army tactical intelligence formations to satisfy requirements levied by their maneuver commanders. In today's force structure, TAC HUMINT is not a single MOS or set of skills. TAC HUMINT is the task organization of skill sets for a tactical commander.

TAC HUMINT elements consist of CI agents, HUMINT operators, and linguists. These operations focus on developing contacts and informants who provide timely, relevant, and specific information to the combatant commanders. In most cases, the contacts and informants fill a void in the HUMINT continuum by providing excellent information relevant to the combatant commanders' CCIR that theater and national elements do not or cannot satisfy.[5] The debate is over who the TAC HUMINT soldier is. The suggestions include the ideas that—

❑ We should combine the HUMINT Collector MOS (97E) and the Counterintelligence Agent MOS (97B) to create a soldier who can be all the Army needs.

❑ Both skill sets must be able to merge capabilities to satisfy tactical requirements while maintaining a separate ability to work theater- and national-level requirements.

❑ We should merge the specialties at the -10 and -20 skill levels, but allow a split into tracks at the -30 level.

❑ We should not resource a force above the tactical level.

❑ The only path to success is separate, but equal, MOSs.

## A Course of Action (COA)

The following are my suggestions to enhance mission success and perhaps cut the confusion. If you agree, share your thoughts with the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), USAIC&FH (please see the contact information below). If you disagree, tell DCD why. If you do neither, accept any future decision from the MI Proponent at Fort Huachuca with a smile and the knowledge that you had a chance to influence the decision.

In today's Army, the easy solution would be to merge 97E and 97B into a single MOS or to eliminate one and have the other assume all the critical skills. This is the easy solution because that is what we do in today's Army—eliminate and consolidate to achieve increased efficiency, sometimes at the risk of effectiveness. The Army needs soldiers who can execute contact and informant operations, perform interrogator and strategic debriefer functions, and execute CI tasks from tactical to national levels.

MOS 97L (Translator/Interpreter) exists only in the Reserve Components (RC). We should eliminate the 97L MOS. RC soldiers currently holding this MOS would migrate to either MOS 97E or 97B. New RC recruits would enlist for MOS 97E and receive language training as part of their initial entry training (IET). They would track in the same manner as Active Component (AC) soldiers.

*Editors Note: See the discussion of Military Linguists and the 97L MOS on page 55 of this issue of* **MIPB.**

The CI and HUMINT ICT will explore various COAs associated with MOS 97E, MOS 97B, Warrant Officer areas of concentration (AOC) 351B and 351E (CI Technician and HUMINT Collection Technician), and the Officer AOC 35E (Counterintelligence Officer). The ICT's goal is to define CI and HUMINT requirements for the Objective Force. Results of the ICT will include a series of requirements documents to drive Objective Force organizations, material solutions, and soldier MOS recommendations. One COA combines 97E and 97B at skill level 10. The current "thinking" is to use MOS 97E as the combined initial entry MOS.

Training soldiers in this initial entry MOS would focus on conducting contact and informant operations, recognizing information of CI value,

executing tactical questioning of civilians, and screening EPWs and detainees with the assistance of an interpreter. We must differentiate between HUMINT contact operations and CFSO to ensure both receive adequate training.

Concurrently, the field units must ensure that they conduct both types of operations to satisfy the CCIR. The career model shown in Figure 4 will eliminate the language requirement for MOS 97E at skill level 10. It allows soldiers to select a track at skill level 20. Soldiers will have a choice of staying tactical with language training, moving to HUMINT operational assignments as Strategic Debriefers, or applying as CI Agents. Soldiers would receive additional institutional training, such as the Basic Counterintelligence Agents Course, Strategic Debriefers Course, and language training. Beginning at skill level 30, assignments would be to either MOS 97E (HUMINT Collector) or MOS 97B (CI Agent). Figure 4 reflects an official consideration. The author, however, looks at it somewhat differently.

The COA depicted in Figure 4 combines two Warrant Officer AOCs as well.[6] This COA requires the Warrant Officer to be able to conduct and technically control TAC HUMINT operations, interrogations, strategic debriefings, investigations, counterespionage operations, CI analysis and production, CI surveillance activities, and computer-network protection operations, as well as to perform CI technical services (such as polygraph). This is "being all you can be" or using today's slogan, creating a real "army of one."

Figure 4 reflects an official consideration. The author, however, looks at it somewhat differently. In my opinion, we must retain the separate Warrant Officer tracks to ensure the development of technical experts. Warrant Officers are the technical leaders in our MI organizations. They mentor and tutor junior enlisted personnel and NCOs on the proper planning and execution of operations. They provide the unvarnished, technically correct advice to commanders and senior intelligence officers (the "2s"). We need these technical experts to focus on specific critical skills and tasks. Combining these AOCs may be most efficient from the perspective of the number of available and qualified personnel but it will dilute the individuals' capabilities and adversely impact their effectiveness.

The Officer AOC, 35E (Counterintelligence Officer), will expand to include skills focused on leading HUMINT soldiers. In addition to serving as a CI officer, the 35E officer must be able to plan and lead Army HUMINT collection operations at all echelons.

## Some Arguments Against This Proposal

Force Developers will ask, *"What does this do to the MOS pyramid?"* I do not have all the empirical data required to respond to this query. We are expanding the quantity of HUMINT and CI soldiers at the tactical level while not decreasing the quantity required at theater and national levels. The consolidated MOS at skill level 10 and the expected expansion will help create a better base for the MOS pyramid. Given a few exceptions, the 97B pyramid will start at E-5.

Others may ask, *"Can we recruit sufficient Warrant Officers to maintain two areas of concentration?"* I believe the answer is "yes" if we concurrently scrub the requirement and authorization document with the intent of converting some Warrant Officer positions to Senior NCOs (E7). We must get the ratio between Warrant Officer and enlisted closer to 1:6 or 1:8 rather than the current 1:4 ratio. The expansion of the enlisted ranks will also help solve recruitment and ratio issues.

*There will be no wars when we have the earth digitized and soldiers trained to speak the language in all countries because we only go to war where we have no maps and no linguists.*

—Brigadier General John W. Smith [7]

Some individuals may say, *"Nethertheless, we must have linguists in our tactical units."* The Army will never have sufficient linguists for all HUMINT and CI missions; therefore, why have a HUMINT language-dependent MOS? In the future, units



Figure 4. Proposed Future Career Model.

must code those 97E (E-5 and above) positions that require a language. The question we must answer is, *"Will the soldiers be required to maintain language proficiency to be MOS qualified?"* That said, to receive language proficiency pay, the standard should be 3/3 rather than 2/2. The 97E-trained soldier will be skilled in working with an interpreter and using an automated translation device.

There may be concern that the "dual" tracks inside the 97E MOS will create an unfair situation for promotions. This issue requires additional study. However, we may resolve this issue with specific guidance to promotion broads and selection criteria documented in Department of the Army (DA) pamphlets.

Some will raise the issue that current recruitment criteria for 97B and 97E are different. What will be the criteria for enlistment when all skill level 10 soldiers are in 97E? The easy answer is that the more stringent requirements of the two MOSs will apply in the future. For example, 97B requires that an individual be eligible for sensitive compartment information (SCI) access while the 97E does not. We would therefore apply the SCI requirement to all enlistees.

## Final Thoughts

*To reach decisions, a President needs more than data and information. A President needs real and current knowledge and analysis of the plans, intentions, and capabilities of our enemies. The last several months have shown that there is no substitute for good intelligence officers, people on the ground. These are the people who find the targets, follow our enemies, and help disrupt their evil plans. The United States must rebuild our network of human intelligence.*

—**President George W. Bush, 11 December 2001**[8]

While some will argue that the President's comments at the Citadel on 11 December targeted the national HUMINT organizations, some of us know that tactical formations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo collected and reported information that found its way to the White House. Now and in the future, military operations exist in an interdependent environment where tactical formations initially depend on the information provided by national agencies to establish, update, and maintain situational awareness. On the flip side, as the operation develops and deployed personnel grow in experience, the strategic entities will grow increasingly dependent on the information tactical elements provide to develop the fine-grain resolution necessary to gain a more complete understanding of the situation.

HUMINT and CI activities support shaping operations that, in turn, assist in establishing the conditions required to achieve the success of the decisive operation. HUMINT and CI are force multipliers that will make a difference to the commander's scheme of maneuver and force protection. HUMINT and CI will deliver timely, accurate, specific, and relevant information to the commander. The result is an enabled leader who now has the ability to accurately focus maneuver firepower, protection, and leadership at decisive points, which will decide the outcome of engagements and battles.

In the Objective Force, HUMINT and CI will embrace the "Quality of Firsts." HUMINT and CI will be among the "First to See" so that our leaders can be the "First to Understand." They will enable our maneuver units to be the "First to Act" and ultimately, our battles and campaigns to "Finish Decisively."

### Endnotes

1. Sun Tzu, **The Art of War**, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963).

2. We must wait for the after-action reports to judge how critical HUMINT and CI are to the on-going operations in Afghanistan. We do know from media reports that HUMINT is playing a significant role.

3. The Commanding General, USAIC&FH, recently chartered a CI and HUMINT Integrated Concept Team (ICT) to determine the requirements and write the necessary documents to transform CI and HUMINT for the Objective Force.

4. This regulation is **AR 381-172, Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations and Low-Level Source Operations**, which is classified.

5. Lest someone misunderstand and accuse me of not giving credit to those that serve, be assured that theater and national organizations do respond to the tactical commander's CCIR and do provide timely, specific, and relevant information to the tactical formation. My point is that they are not everywhere and cannot do it all.

6. The proposed single Warrant Officer AOC does not include 351C (Area Intelligence Technician). It combines 351B (Counterintelligence Technician) and 351E (Human Intelligence Collection Technician).

7. Brigadier General John W. Smith (U.S. Army, Retired) during one of many meetings regarding MOSs 97E and 97B when he was the Deputy Commanding General, USAIC&FH.

8. Remarks made by President George W. Bush at The Citadel in December 2001.

*Colonel Jerry Jones completed 30 years with the Army on 1 June 2000. He began his career as an Armor officer with the 1st Armored Division (1AD) at Fort Hood, Texas. After Vietnam, he served with the "Big Red One" at three Reforger exercises, 32d Army Air Defense Command (AADCOM), 1 AD in Germany; special mission units in the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); U.S. Central Command J5 operations in DESERT SHIELD and STORM; and the Allied Military Intelligence Battalion in Bosnia. Colonel Jones finished his Army career at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, as the Commander, INSCOM Training and Doctrine Support (ITRADS) Detachment. He was a 35F (Human Intelligence Officer) with significant 35E (Human Intelligence Officer) experience and a 6Z (Strategist). He served at all echelons from tactical to national. He is currently a DA Civilian at the USAIC&FH. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at jerry.jones@hua.army.mil and by telephone at 520-533-6869 or DSN 821-6869.*

# The MultiComponent Contingency Support Brigade: A Force Multiplier

by Lieutenant Colonel
Jeffrey F. Mitchell, UT ARNG

The Intel XXI Study (also known as "The Hall Study") identified a number of unique, one-of-a-kind military intelligence (MI) assets that have the potential of spanning all echelons of the Army. The idea of a Multicomponent Contingency Support Brigade (MCSB) developed from this study. The mission of the MCSB is to provide increased full-spectrum capabilities at both echelons above corps (EAC) and echelons corps and below (ECB). The concept is to "pool" these unique capabilities to support the Total Force and to provide tailored packages of specific skills from this pool of broader resources. These tailored packages would be modular and flexible in order to meet the specific needs of the Total Force.

## MCSB Design

The vision for the MCSB was further enhanced and refined in January 2000 during the MI Functional Area Assessment (FAA) when the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army (VCSA) approved the recommendation to develop a Force Design Update (FDU) for the MCSB. That decision included establishing an MCSB to "*support Army contingency operations with unique, one-of-a-kind capabilities.*" The approved recommendation also assigned the MCSB to U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) with operational control to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). The reason for this arrangement was to maintain the existing training relationships between INSCOM units and the current elements designated for the MCSB, while giving FORSCOM the ability to "plug and play" the pieces of the MCSB when and where they are most needed.

The initial force structure design included the following elements (see Figure 1):

❏ The 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) as the headquarters element. The brigade headquarters would be multicomponent from the standpoint that it would have representatives from each of the Components (COMPO 1-Active Component, COMPO 2-U.S. Army National Guard [ARNG], and COMPO 3-U.S. Army Reserve [USAR]) within the headquarters.

❏ An electronic warfare (EW) unit which currently resides in two separate Army Reserve units—the 323d MI Battalion and the 368th MI Battalion. The initial plan was to combine these separately located units into one company. This unit currently has the Sandcrab EW system, which the 202d MI Battalion used during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, then turned over to the USAR where it currently resides.

❏ An Active Component (AC) linguist unit that would provide the "first-in" deployment assets. At the time of the Intel XXI study, the Army was reducing its 98G (Cryptologic Linguist) assets and the intent was to use some of this linguist capability in the MCSB for the rapid response linguist capability. One example of their use would be to fill the fourth seat of Prophet (a 98G cryptologic linguist position) in the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).

❏ Nine MI linguist companies in the USAR.

❏ The six National Guard linguist battalions currently subordinate to the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist). These units include:

  ● 141st and 142d MI Battalions, Utah Army National Guard.

  ● 223d MI Battalion, California Army National Guard (one company resides in Chicago as part of the Illinois Army National Guard).

  ● 260th MI Battalion, Florida Army National Guard.

  ● 341st MI Battalion, Washington Army National Guard (one company resides in Boston as part of the Massachusetts Army National Guard).

  ● 415th MI Battalion, Louisiana Army National Guard.

❏ The 203d MI Battalion (Technical Intelligence or TECHINT), which already is a multicomponent unit that supports the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

❏ The 96Hs (Common Ground Station Operators) who support the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS). The concept would be to pool these assets in order to meet a variety of contingencies and serve in multiple roles.

## Where Are We Today?

The original force structure concept of the MCSB has changed quite a bit since the MI FAA. I discuss the status of each of these units as they currently relate to the MCSB below.

**300th Military Intelligence Brigade (Linguist).** The 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) is still the proposed flag for MCSB. The Brigade currently plays a major role in the development of the MCSB.

**USAR Electronic Warfare.** Sources indicate there is still a requirement for the EW capability, although the requirement needs validation. This being the case, these two separate units would combine to form one company. There is no decision on the EW system for this unit as yet. If it remains a unique EW system, we will have to address equipment issues for long-term maintenance. Currently, maintenance is a serious issue for Sandcrab because it is a one-of-a-kind system.

**Active Component Linguist Company.** Currently, there are no "bill-payers" identified for the AC linguist company. The 98G slots were temporarily available until they became bill-payers for other force structure actions. This is bad news if you need linguists within 96 hours, which is the standard based on IBCT doctrine. The Objective Force will most likely have the same or a similar requirement. The fact is that it is almost impossible to mobilize USAR soldiers within

96 hours and it takes even longer to mobilize National Guard soldiers in many cases. Unless there is a paradigm shift in how the RC mobilizes units—like home station mobilizations—this will continue to be a problem. The FDU will consider the feasibility of growing this AC linguist force structure.

**USAR Linguist Companies.** During Total Army Analysis 2009, the USAR linguist companies will be bill-payers for the new Corps Exploitation Battalions (formerly known as Corps Support Battalions) and units for the theater intelligence brigades and groups. However, the linguist capabilities still remain with these units. They will serve in a direct support (DS) role with specific MI and language skills for the assigned theater. Creating these units actually provides more linguists than were programmed in the Army Language Master Plan (ALMP)[1] if they had stayed in the MCSB. Plus, the MI and linguist assets will be in DS to the corps MI brigades and theater intelligence brigades and groups where MCSB units will have to support the whole spectrum of Army operations based on a priority of requirements.

**National Guard Linguist Battalions.** Making up the bulk of the

MCSB are the six National Guard battalions currently subordinate to the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist). Each of these battalions has a mix of the 26 authorized languages in the brigade with a number of languages available that are not required, but still useful to the Army. The 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) is currently reviewing the battalions' language structure to fall more in line with the ALMP. The battalion resourcing includes 97B (Counterintelligence Agent), 97E (Human Intelligence Collector), and 97L (Translator/Interpreter) military occupational specialties (MOSs). These are all linguist slots. MOS 97L—initially intended as an MI feeder MOS—will be unique to the Brigade. The USAR linguist companies (originally 97L linguist companies) will convert to 97E in the Corps Exploitation Battalions and theater intelligence brigades and groups. Most of the battalions have 98G assets, all of which support real-world operations to a certain degree through "reach" to their home stations.

**203d Military Intelligence Battalion (TECHINT).** The mission of the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) is "*to provide the warfighter commanders with technical intelligence on foreign equipment and weapons systems.*"[2] Already a multicomponent unit, with two AC and two USAR companies, the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) is an INSCOM battalion that directly supports NGIC. Because of this very specific mission, there seems to be little benefit to putting this unit under the umbrella of the MCSB.

**Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System—Common Ground Station Operators (96Hs).** The RC 96Hs envisioned for the MCSB would most likely be dual-qualified to operate the Joint Services Work Station (JSWS) as well as perform the 96H functions



Figure 1. MCSB Initial Force Structure Design.

in the Joint STARS airborne platform (E-8). The Joint STARS has current standing missions as well as support to the theater commander with new requirements when conflicts arise. In all likelihood, there would never be a requirement based on doctrine for Joint STARS to operate in all theaters simultaneously. Maintaining a pool of 96H assets for such contingencies falls in line with the MCSB concept. These soldiers could benefit from being in such a pool by having more effective training and readiness. They could also benefit by being a part of what should be a top priority organization.

## Challenges

Creating and maintaining such an organization does not come without its challenges. One such challenge experienced by other multicomponent units is command and control. The brigade commander must truly command the unit for this brigade to be successful. This has historically been an issue in the 300th MI Brigade with its units in states spanning the country, yet the brigade commander really commands only two battalions: the two in Utah. The National Guard faces command issues that the USAR is does not when crossing state lines because of the command structure that exists within states and territories. There will need to be extensive coordination with memorandums of agreement between Components and states in order for the MCSB to command its elements.

Because of its unique mission, the MCSB must have top precedence in equipment fielding, training, and personnel.

❑ If soldiers need to be competent in Prophet operations in order to fill the linguist requirement for the fourth seat, then the MCSB should have sufficient Prophet systems for training.

❑ If Sandcrab or another unique EW asset remains a viable requirement, then the Army should support its maintenance.

❑ If the 96Hs that work the Joint STARS mission need to be dual-qualified in the Joint STARS operations in the air platform and in JSWS, they should receive the best training so they meet the needs of any contingency.

If the MCSB is to provide support to all echelons of the Army, it must have top priority status in order to meet the expectations of the requirements given to them.

What would you do if you were a commander and a 97L showed up at your command track? Would you know how best to put that linguist to work? There is currently no single-source doctrine on the employment of linguists. Proper doctrine will be necessary to support all aspects of the MCSB. Commanders will need to understand when to call on the MCSB for support and how best to employ their assets. With carefully written doctrine and proper training of our commanders, the Army could properly leverage the MCSB assets to support the mission.

## The Road Ahead

The MCSB will be a force multiplier with its tailored "plug and play" capabilities. As a force multiplier, it will be a source pool or network from which to draw the necessary assets or to receive the required support through "reach" to meet the needs of commands at all levels. It is, however, a finite resource and requires judicious employment. The MCSB development team is currently working with the field to define and validate the requirements fully. Only those units that will best benefit and meet the criteria of being a one-of-a-kind MI capability will be organic to the MCSB; this also holds true for new units that meet these criteria. The

intent is to submit the MCSB through the FDU process in 2002 for approval and to compete in the Total Army Analysis 11. The result will be a unit that is responsive to the unique needs of the Army while capitalizing on the strengths of the Active Component, Army Reserve, and National Guard. It will be a model of the Total Army.

### Endnotes

1. The Army Language Master Plan (I and II) is a study that validates the Army-resourced linguist requirements found at Defense, national, Joint, and special operations forces levels. It also describes the changes in linguist requirements resulting from current Army Transformation and modernization initiatives.

2. Hanne, Matthew, Sergeant First Class, "First Multi-Component MI Unit Activates at Aberdeen," *INSCOM Journal*, Fall 2001, page 7.

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
# Know Your Equipment

## T-80U MAIN BATTLE TANK, RUSSIA

Production of the T-80 medium tank began in 1976 in an attempt to remedy problems with the earlier T-64. Between 1976 and the present the T-80 has undergone a number of modifications that included the T-80, T-80B, T-80U (U = improved), and the T-80UD with the Arena KAZT Tank Active Defense System.



### ARMAMENT

☐ 9M119 Rekleks (NATO designation AT-11 Sniper) antitank guided missile system, fired from the main gun.
☐ 125-mm 2A46M-1 or 2A46M-2 automatic smoothbore gun.
☐ Hull-mounted 7.62-mm machine gun and a turret-mounted 12.7-mm machine gun.

### PROTECTION

The tank is protected by a combination of explosive-reactive armor (ERA) at the front and gill-type armor panels elsewhere. During operations in Chechnya, the T-80 proved highly susceptible to the hand-held RPG, which resulted in equipping some of the newer T-80UDs with the Arena KAZT Tank Active Defense System.

### PROPULSION

☐ The T-80U had a GTD-1250 gas-turbine engine but this proved unpopular.
☐ The T-80UD has a 6TD turbocharged diesel engine allowing a maximum speed of 70 kilometers per hour.

### EMPLOYMENT

Several hundred T-80s of various modifications are in use by the Russian Army, and the Russian Government has offered it for sale to various countries.

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## HUNTER UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)



**MODEL NUMBER: RQ-5A**

**NOMENCLATURE: HUNTER**

**PROJECT NAME: HUNTER**

**FUNCTION:** Hunter, as the operational Army UAV, provides a number of capabilities to include a contigency capability for deployments (15th MI Battalion at Fort Hood). Hunter is currently flying missions in support of the U.S. Army operations in Kosovo.

### TECHNICAL DETAILS:

☐ Wing Span — 29 feet
☐ Weight — 1,600 pounds
☐ Range — >200 kilometers
☐ Airspeed — 90 knots cruising speed (106 knots dash)
☐ Altitude — 15,000 feet
☐ Endurance — 9 hours
☐ Payload(s) — Real-time full motion video, Electro-Optical and infrared (EO/IR)
☐ Launch/Recovery — Field size: 200 meters x 75 meters (unimproved)

# Know Your Equipment

## SMERCH-M (9K-58 / 9A-52-2), RUSSIA

The family of Smerch (*Tornado*) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) is one of the later acquisitions in the Soviet Army. Entering service in 1987, the Smerch carries twelve 9K-58 300-mm rockets that can range to 70 kilometers.

## PRIME MOVER

The Smerch's prime mover is the 9A-52-2 launcher based on the MAZ-543 heavy 8 x 8 truck. The 9A-52-2 employs a single V12 cylinder, 4-stroke diesel developing 386 kW at 2,200 rpm and a maximum speed of 60 kilometers per hour.

## WARHEADS

The Smerch's 9K-58 300-mm rocket carries several types of warhead to include the 9M-55F, a high-explosive (HE) fragmentation type, and the 9M-55K, a submunitions warhead. The weight of the rocket is 800 kilograms (kgs) and the kgs of the 9M-55K submunitions warhead (72 submunitions) is 300 kgs. When one fires a 12-rocket salvo of 9M-55K warheads, its 864 HE submunitions can cover between 400,000 and 700,000 meters depending upon the range. Recently a fuel-air explosive (FAE) warhead was added to the Smerch's inventory. The Smerch also has rapid setup and reload capabilities, 3 minutes and 20 minutes, respectively.

## FIRE CONTROL

Each 9K-58 Smerch launcher has a transport and loading vehicle (TVL), the 9T-234, also based on the MAZ-543 truck. The TLV carries the 1K-123 Fire Detection System, believed to be similar to the U.S. Army's TACFIRE systems. The Russians, however, claim their system is marginally superior.

## EMPLOYMENT

The Smerch is found at the Russian Army Group (former Soviet Front level). It is organic to the Group's Artillery Division and Heavy Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL) Brigade. The MRL Brigade consists of four battalions, each with 18 launchers. *(Data from the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity publication, "Soviet/Russian Armor and Artillery Design Practices: 1945-1995, September 1996.)*

## SHADOW 200 TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (TUAV)

**NOMENCLATURE: SHADOW 200 (TUAV)**

**PROJECT NAME: SHADOW**

**FUNCTION:** The U.S. Army's Shadow 200 TUAV will serve as the tactical maneuver commander's primary organic reconnaissance, surveillance, battle damage assessment (BDA), and target acquisition platform. The TUAV will provide a greater situational awareness on the battlefield and support the commander's ability to shape the battle. The Shadow 200 is currently undergoing testing.

## TECHNICAL DETAILS:

- ❑ Wing Span — 13' x 10'10"
- ❑ Range & Endurance — 50 to 200 kilometers or 4 hours flight duration
- ❑ Altitude — 10,000 feet
- ❑ Payload(s) — A color camera is co-aligned with the forward looking infrared (FLIR) system to provide high-quality video and infrared video both day and night
- ❑ Contractor — AAI Corporation (Prime) / Raytheon (Sub) *(Data courtesy of TSM-UAV)*

# Enduring Freedom

## Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Phase II
## The Philippines, Islamic Insurgency, and Abu Sayyaf

### by Captain Christopher A. Parrinello

Through the success of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a new government has replaced Afghanistan's Taliban and has crushed Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization in Afghanistan. Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network is, however, a global organization and remains strong, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. The question of when and where the War on Terrorism would expand remained unanswered initially. On October 7, as the President announced the first U.S. strikes in Afghanistan, he told the nation that *"the battle is broader"* than just Afghanistan and suggested other nations that support or aid terrorism could also come under attack by the United States.[1]

In response to President Bush's declaration, the U.S. Armed Forces went to support the Philippine Government and its war against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). This article will examine the history of the Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, the three primary Islamic groups operating there—the Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Abu Sayyaf Group—and the current U. S. assistance to the Philippine Armed Forces.

### The Philippines and Islamic Insurgency

Beginning in the 12th century, the Arab and Turkish armies introduced Islam by force to conquered peoples throughout Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. In Southeast Asia, however, merchants and Islamic Sufis from Malaysia and Borneo peacefully introduced Islam to the indigenous peoples in the surrounding islands in what are now Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern portion of the Philippines.

Although rapidly accepted in what are now Indonesia and Malaysia, acceptance of Islam in the Philippines (see Figure 1) was initially only in the southern islands; then Islam began its slow, island-by-island march north.[2] In the 14th century, Islam was established in the southern islands of the Sulu Archipelago; in the 15th century it arrived on the island of Mindanao; and by the early 16th century, Islam was growing around Manila on Luzon.[3] This growth continued until the arrival of the Spanish explorers halted it.

In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan discovered the Philippines while searching for the Spice Islands. Magellan claimed the islands in the name of the Spanish King, and



Figure 1. Map of the Republic of the Philippines.

Catholic priests immediately began to convert the native Filipinos to Catholicism. A local chieftain named Humabon was the first native convert. Magellan, seeking to increase Spain's influence, encouraged Humabon to attack a rival chieftain who refused ties with Spain.[4] Magallen died in the ensuing battle, the forces of Humabon were defeated, and the introduction of Catholicism temporarily halted. Nevertheless, by 1571, the stronger Spaniards defeated the forces of the Muslim ruler Rajah Soliman and Spain colonized the Philippines. Muslim resistance against the Spaniards, and then the United States, continued for more than 300 years until 4 July 1946 when the Philippines became an independent, democratic republic.

Under the terms of its independence from the United States, the Republic of the Philippines encompassed the Catholic-dominated northern islands of Luzon and Mindoro, the central islands of Visayan and Palawan, and the Muslim-dominated southern islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The Muslims, referred to as "Moro" by the Spanish, retained a culture separate from other Filipinos. As the Catholic Filipino assimilated into a typical Spanish society, the Moro in the south maintained a separate culture that predated the Islamic and colonial periods. There were cultural differences in dress, music, and political and folk traditions.[5] Despite the cultural differences and blatant discrimination by the dominant Catholic population, who viewed the Moro as socially backward and untrustworthy due to their history of resistance to the Spanish, the groups managed to coexist peacefully until the late 1960s when social ills boiled over.

A central theme to the early U.S. colonial policy in the Philippines was that a diverse nation must develop a unified nationalism that overcame ethno-religious differences, which would limit the threat of insurgency.[6] In the Philippines, the United States hoped that the many nonaligned Muslim groups could unify and support a future independent Philippines which was free of ethno-religious discrimination. The plan backfired for two reasons. First, the dominant Catholic government endorsed official discrimination against poor, rural Muslims. Second, elite Muslim families supported the government in Manila in return for official privileges, while the poor continued to suffer under government-sanctioned discrimination. By the mid-1960s, Muslim separatist groups began advocating autonomy from Manila. These groups primarily comprised young men from non-elite Muslim families who had attended universities in Manila on government scholarships intended to further integrate them into the Philippine nation.[7] Their major grievances were political and social discrimination, poverty, and inequality linked to the forceful displacement of many Moro communities from their lands by Christian settlers.[8] Between 1967 and 1971, Christians under government-sanctioned programs evicted an estimated 800,000 Muslims from their own land and they had, for all practical purposes, become refugees.[9] Throughout the early 1970s, the regime of Ferdinand Marcos continued forceful evictions and heavy-handed Army operations against poor Muslims in response to increasing guerrilla operations. In 1974, one attack by the Philippine Army against Jolo City resulted in 10,000 Muslims missing or killed.[10]

Beginning in 1969, young Moros moved to Malaysia where they received guerrilla training in order to protect their communities from the marauding Philippine Army. Although only small numbers of men received training, the separatist movement gained popular support when, in 1972, President Marcos declared martial law throughout the southern provinces in response to the continued insurrection that gripped Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The separatist movement has continued to operate since the first official organization, the Moro National Liberation Front, began in 1968.

Currently, three Muslim separatist groups operate in the Philippines although only one, Abu Sayyaf, is a target of U.S. forces and one of twenty-nine foreign terrorist organizations[11] identified by the U.S. Department of State. The three groups are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

## Moro National Liberation Front

Abul Khayr Alonto and Jallaludin Santos conceptualized the MNLF in the late 1960s, but it had little public support and was scarcely noticed by Manila until a charismatic university professor took the helm. Nur Misuari was a faculty member at the University of Philippines who argued that *"only through a free and independent state could the Muslims free themselves from corrupt leaders and fully implement Islamic institutions."*[12] A dynamic leader, Misuari was able to gain both political and monetary support from Iran and Libya, using these funds to create a military force of foreign-trained Filipino guerrillas numbering almost 30,000. These guerrillas fought the Philippine Army to a virtual standstill on the island of Basilan, in the process displacing more than one million civilians. In 1976, after government troops had suffered more than 6,000 casualties, the MNLF agreed to cease-fire talks with Manila.[13] With direct involvement from the Libyan Government, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and Imelda

Marcos, the MNLF and Manila approved the *Tripoli Agreement*. Under the terms of the agreement, the Muslim provinces would have limited autonomy in exchange for cessation of armed hostilities. Political infighting within MNLF factions prevented full implementation of the agreement. Although the agreement was never completely executed, the terms of the cease-fire held despite both sides conducting random attacks against targets of opportunity.

After the failed *Tripoli Agreement of 1976*, the MNLF began a slow shift from armed insurgency to a political, popularly based unarmed movement.[14] Between 1985 and 1990, the MNLF lacked clear and consistent policy goals, which prevented any possible political solution to the crisis. In 1985, the MNLF again negotiated a cease-fire with Manila but refused to accept limited regional autonomy, wanting instead complete independence. In 1987, the MNLF finally relinquished its goal of independence for the Muslim regions and agreed to limited autonomy, but talks on its implementation deadlocked without any action. In 1989, an increasingly frustrated Corazon Aquino unilaterally held a plebiscite in the Muslim provinces to measure their support for the creation of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Only the two Mindanao provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur and the two provinces of Sulu and Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago voted for autonomy.[15] In 1990, the Philippines officialy inaugurated the four-province ARMM with the MNLF on the sidelines. The MNLF and the administration of President Fidel Ramos in 1996 held further negotiations. The MNLF accepted an expanded ARMM to include Basilan and Marawi City and agreed to the creation of the special zones where Philippine and MNLF forces would remain sepa-

rate.[16] Although there were occasional skirmishes between Philippine Army forces and members of the MNLF, the MNLF remains largely a political party and today is not viewed as an active terrorist or insurgent force.[17]

## Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Hashim Salamat served as the head of the MNLF political committee between 1968 and 1977. While negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine Government occurred in Tripoli in 1976, a rift developed between Misuari and Salamat over terms of the *Tripoli Agreement*. When the talks collapsed, Salamat left the MNLF and created the MILF, placed greater emphasis on Islamic law, and had numerous Islamic clerics in positions of leadership.[18] Whereas the MNLF derived foreign support from Libya and Iran, the MILF claimed foreign support from Islamic universities and various Egyptian groups.[19] Estimated to number between 2,800 and 8,000 guerrillas, the MILF was well-equipped and organized to conduct guerrilla operations.[20] With the demise of the MNLF as an insurgent force, government forces focused their operations against the MILF. In 2000, a series of lightning attacks by the Philippine Army captured several MILF camps, while the National Police arrested 26 members responsible for urban bomb attacks.[21] Government success forced the MILF to return to the negotiation table. The MILF and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed a cease-fire agreement in August 2001.

## Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani founded Abu Sayyaf ("*Bearer of the Sword*"), in the mid-1980s, aimed at propagating Islam through jihad. Janjalani, who was a former member of the MNLF, was also an Islamic scholar and a veteran of the

Russian-Afghanistan conflict. Janjalani disagreed with the MNLF's negotiations with the government and left the MNLF to form his own organization seeking to create an Islamic state in the southern Philippines based on Islamic law.[22] While serving in Afghanistan, his contacts with Muslim extremists shaped and hardened his views. He developed close ties with Muslim extremists worldwide, especially within the Al Qaeda network. Janjalani rejected the practice of "*Dawa*" (nonviolent mobilization), and believed that only through violent struggle would Islam achieve its goals.[23] Further, he believed that anything less than violent struggle would be a tacit acceptance of the policies of Misuari and the MNLF toward Manila. Janjalani's importance to ASG and to the future of radical Islam in the Philippines was profound. Both the MNLF and MILF recognized that any growth in Janjalani's power base would be at the expense of their own organizations and both distanced themselves from the Abu Sayyaf.

The Philippine Government scored a major, but temporary, victory in December 1988 when the police killed Janjalani during a firefight in the Basilan village of Lamitan.[24] Following his death, a power struggle ensued and the organization splintered with Janjalani's younger brother, Khadafy nominally at the top of the organization. ASG then broke into three to five separate, but operationally connected groups, based on the islands of Mindanao and Basilan and in the province of Sulu.[25] Janjalani's death also created an ideological void that remained unfilled. Except for the stated goal of creation of an Islamic state, Khadafy and the other group leaders have not issued additional policy statements and the group remains elusive.

Operationally, the ASG has conducted bombings, assassinations,

kidnappings, and extortion. Their operations were sensational and usually garnered widespread media coverage. They carried out their first major terrorist operation in 1991 when the group killed two foreign tourists in a grenade attack. The following year, the Group bombed a Christian bookstore in the southern city of Zamboanga and attacked churches and airports. In 1993, they bombed a cathedral in Davao City killing seven civilians; then they conducted their first kidnapping of a foreign tourist.[26] Since then, kidnappings have become the main modus operandi for Abu Sayyaf. Philippine authorities estimate that Abu Sayyaf has received $5.5 million in ransom payments, although other sources put the figure closer to $20 million. ASG uses this money to purchase arms and attract new members. Since 1993, ransoms for western hostages have ballooned from $100,000 to more than $1 million.[27]

On 23 April 2000, ASG members attacked the Malaysian diving resort on the island of Sipadan and seized 21 hostages. They transported the hostages by boat to the Philippine island of Jolo, where they were captive in an Abu Sayyaf

stronghold. After many months of fruitless government negotiations and military operations, they released the hostages but only after intervention by a Libyan envoy and a reported ransom payment of $20 million.[28] According to the Philippine military, such ransom payments only served to embolden the ASG and equip them with modern bazookas, mortars, Uzi submachine guns, and speedboats that are superior to their own equipment.[29] Throughout the remainder of 2000, they kidnapped and held hostage U.S., French, German, Malaysian, and Filipino nationals. Although ASG either released the western hostages or they escaped, they beheaded some Filipino hostages and left their remains along roads.

On 27 May 2001, masked Abu Sayyaf members attacked the Dos Palmas Resort off Palawan Island, 375 miles southwest of Manila. They took twenty civilians hostage, including three U.S. citizens: Martin Burnham and his wife Gracia of Wichita, Kansas, and Guillermo Sobero of Corona, California. The Burnhams, children of Christian missionaries to the Philippines, had served in the Philippines since 1986.[30] ASG spokesman Abu

Sabaya stated to a local Filipino radio station that *"We are admitting it, we are the ones who did it."* He told the radio station that they had divided the hostages into two groups and taken them to different islands in Basilan and Sulu provinces. *"We have the three Americans,"* said Sabaya, adding that the U.S. citizens were in Basilan province and under his supervision. *"If you want to negotiate, it's up to you, we're not pushing for it."*[31] As they made their way to their camps in Baslian, they took additional Filipino hostages including a Filipino nurse named Deborah Yap. ASG subsequently released 13 hostages after receiving ransoms and decapitated ten Filipinos and the U.S. hostage, Guillermo Sobero.[32] After nine months in captivity, the Burnhams and Yap remain the sole hostages held by Abu Sayyaf.

## The U.S. Response

The United States' relationship with the Philippines has seen highs and lows. A century ago, 150,000 U.S. troops fought a bloody counterinsurgency campaign against the Moros during the Philippine-United States War. After three years of conflict, General Arthur MacArthur had subdued the rebels but at tremendous loss of Filipino life.[33] After U.S. forces helped to liberate the Philippines from Japanese occupation in World War II, the United States was again a trusted friend. By the early 1970s, that sentiment again underwent change because of U.S. support for Ferdinand Marcos. In 1992, the Philippines declined to renew long-term leases for U.S. military bases at Subic Bay and Clark Airfield.[34] Military relations deteriorated so badly that in fiscal year 2000, military assistance in the form of Economic Support Funds stood at zero and no military exercises occurred between 1995 and 2000.[35]



Photo by PM2 Andrew Meyers.

**U.S. Forces prepare for joint exercises with Philipine forces. An MH-47E, Echo Company, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), conducts system checks before the exercise.**

Military cooperation between the Philippines and the United States has renewed in light of recent events, including the activities of Al Qaeda, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the ongoing capture of the Burnhams, and continued conflict over the Spratly Islands. President Bush's proclamation to pursue terrorists wherever they are has borne immediate fruit for the Philippines as President Arroyo secured $150 million in counterterrorism assistance, $100 million of which will be in the form of reconditioned military equipment. The United States transferred the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Point Doran* to the Philippine Navy, one C-130 to the Philippine Air Force, and 8 Huey helicopters, 30,000 M16 rifles, 100 trucks, and enough nightvision goggles for two 100-soldier infantry companies to the Army.[36]

In addition to supplying equipment, U.S. military forces will renew direct contact with the Philippine military during annual training exercises. In October and again in December 2001, two dozen military and civilian personnel quietly visited Basilan to assist in training a 100-soldier Light Reaction Company. The Light Reaction Company received training in counterterrorism operations and received the latest military equipment.[37] The U.S. forces were also assessing the Philippine bases and infrastructure for support to the joint Philippine-U.S. exercise known as Balikatan 02-1 (shoulder-to-shoulder) between February and June 2002.

Approximately 660 U.S. soldiers and 1,200 Philippine soldiers were to participate in exercise Balikitan 02-1. Additionally, U.S. troops, mainly logistics, communications, and special forces soldiers, were to provide specialized support to the Philippine Army and Navy Marine Corps as they conducted operations against Abu Sayyaf guerrillas. They were to follow the support model used during the successful U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. At the core of the support package were 85 special forces sergeants, who were to assess the performance and requirements of the Philippine Army engaged against ASG.

The Department of National Defense-Armed Forces of the Philippines Briefing Paper stated that Balikatan 02-1 *"would be held in the Muslim province of Mindanao, would consist of realistic and relevant training scenarios that addressed a worldwide terrorist threat to both nations, and would last through June 2002 at a minimum."*[38] The exercise will occur in three phases:

**Phase 1, Preparation**. In Phase 1, U.S. military forces would arrive at Manila, Cebu and Zamboanga City. Here the U.S. and Philippine forces would conduct cross-training to ensure successful completion of the exercise through condition setting.

**Phase 2, Training and Conduct of the Field Training Exercise**. Phase 2 would enhance the capability of U.S. and Philippine forces to work together. They would receive, process, and effectively use military intelligence; enhance their joint capability to conduct military, civil, and psychological operations, and plan for the conduct of community assistance programs.

Additionally, members of U.S. Army Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) Teams will cross-train with Philippine special forces soldiers in Malagutay and Zamboanga City. U.S. and Philippine special forces elements will follow this training with a joint field training exercise at the jungle training base located in Barangay Limpapa, Zamboanga City. Upon the conclusion of this exercise, the teams will go to the Joint Task Force (JTF) Comet Headquarters (HQ) in Isabela, Basilan.

From Isabela, the U.S. ODA teams will deploy to Task Groups Thunder and Tornado. Within each task group, one 12-man U.S. "A" Team will deploy per selected infantry battalion. Six U.S. trainers will remain at the battalion HQ and two will deploy to each of the battalion's three companies. The U.S. trainers deployed with the Philippine Infantry Company will assess tactical proficiency during actual field operations. This "immersion" with the infantry units at the battalion and company levels, and the deployment of U.S. personnel during the actual operations, is necessary to establish the critical rapport between U.S. and Filipino soldiers as well as to design a meaningful and effective training module for the selected troops. However, the presence of U.S. forces during these combat operations is only to observe host-nation operations and not to engage in combat, unless in self-defense.

**Phase 3, Redeployment.** Phase 3 will conclude with the return of U.S. forces to home stations following the successful neutralization of the ASG.[39] The timeline remains flexible.

## Conclusion

The Philippines, like Afghanistan, has suffered through years of internal insurrection, the loss of life, property and, to some extent, the most basic freedoms. The United States has recognized that it must remain engaged there and elsewhere, otherwise it risks continued development and deployment of violent Islamic terrorist organizations. We tested and proved a model for a military solution to the problem of the Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. Although military operations in the Philippines will adhere to the same premise used in Afghanistan, the final political solution in both nations will remain elusive. The

United States has offered military and political assistance to both nations, but civilian acceptance of the U.S. plans and vision will determine our success by providing it. A unilateral military response to Islamic terrorists may defeat and destroy operational terrorist cells and networks, but it will not prevent the growth and development of future terrorists. Condition setting is crucial. The United States has set the military and political conditions for operations in the Philippines, but now must address the economic and social conditions as well.

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Soldiers from Bravo Company, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from Fort Campbell, KY, prepare to move out after being dropped off by Chinook helicopter at the battle zone during Operation ANACONDA in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Photo by SGT Keith D. McGrew, U.S. Army.



U.S. Army LTC Ronald Corkran (left), Commander of the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), makes a point to COL Frank Wiercinski (right), Commander of Task Force Rakkasan, during a planning meeting prior to Operation ANACONDA. In the center is LTC Paul Lacamera, Commander of the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division (Light). Photo by SPC David Marck, Jr., 314th Press Camp Headquarters, U.S. Army.



During a sensitive site exploitation (SSE) mission, U.S. Navy SEALs explore the entrance to one of the 70 caves they discovered in the Zawar Kili, Afghanistan, area. Used by Terrorist Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, the caves and other above-ground complexes were subsequently destroyed. Photo by U.S. Navy.



British Royal Marines Commandos and U.S. Air Force dog handlers wait to board an oil tanker during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The commandos and Air Force dog handlers are conducting bomb searches of all ships before they are allowed to offload their cargo. Photo by TSgt. C H. Rudisill, USAF.

# "*Kyareses*": Taliban's Death Trap or Escape Route?

**by Timothy Gusinov**

*...An Afghan chief, who lies*
*Beneath his cool pomegranate-trees,*
*Clutches his sword in fierce surmise*
*When on the mountain-side he sees*
*The fleet-foot Marri scout, who comes*
*To tell how he hath heard afar*
*The measured roll of English drums*
*Beat at the gates of Kandahar.*

          —Oscar Wilde, Ave Imperatrix

Now, when complete victory of the Northern Alliance seems to be assured, there is no doubt that the hunt for Osama Bin Laden, and other Al Qaeda leaders will intensify. The majority of the public believes that if they are still in Afghanistan, their most likely hideouts will be fortified caves in the country's remote and almost inaccessible mountainous areas.

I know how true that can be. During my two tours in Afghanistan, I saw the caves, masterpieces of fortification and cornerstones of the entire system of defense in Javara (see Figure 1), Sari-Pul (Ghazni Province), the Zarkeshan Mountains in Zabol Province, and many other places. I have seen a Soviet company commander crying bitterly in rage and helplessness as heavy machine guns firing from the dark cave mouths pinned down his men, while supporting artillery shells harmlessly struck the slopes around the caves. Only a few weapons could destroy the enemy hiding in those caves to include—

❑ Laser-guided "smart" bombs delivered with pinpoint accuracy.
❑ Fuel-air munitions that created a smashing blast wave and inferno inside the caves and their tunnels.
❑ The Shmel ("Bumblebee") portable grenade launcher and its 93-mm thermal warhead grenades (see Figures 2 and 3).

There is, however, a significant disadvantage in defending one of these caves. If the cave does not possess multiple access routes, the defender may find himself trapped, after which it is only a matter of time before he is captured or killed. Given their losses at the hands of the allied forces, the surviving Al Qaeda and the Taliban leaders need a refuge that provides not only cover and concealment but also multiple escape routes. Afghanistan's unique topography provides numerous opportunities for small groups to escape once they have left the caves.

## Kyareses

Much has been written about the caves in Afghanistan. Almost overlooked, however, are the nation's numerous underground irrigation and water supply tunnels, the dreaded "*kyareses*."

Anyone flying over Afghanistan's bleak plains can see long lines of holes on the ground that look very much like miniature craters. These are "*kyareses*" (the singular form is "*kyares*"). The *kyareses* are a typical feature of the Afghan landscape, serving as an ancient but effective irrigation and water-supply system. Some of the *kyareses* are several hundred years old. They were created to prevent water from evaporating under the country's ferocious sun and heat. There is similar construction at Masada, Israel, where a unique combination of channels and cisterns carved from the rocky peaks supplied and protected the water needed to defend that facility against the Romans. In Afghanistan, however, the *kyareses* first served as shelters and later as fortified positions.

At the surface, the opening to the *kyares* is recognizable by the presence of a small crater, usually nine to sixteen feet wide and surrounded by a circle-shaped bank of dug out soil. A typical *kyares* is up to forty feet deep (see the photograph) and a series of the larger *kyareses* may stretch for a mile or more. Depending on their location, they may provide reliable cover from air and artillery attacks, ground and air surveillance, enemy pursuit, movement into an enemy's territory, and a protected storage area for weapons, ammunition, and other supplies. They may also



**Entrance to a Kyares.**

Photo courtesy of the author.

**The Khost, Javara, and Tani area as it appears on the Soviet military map.**

Javara (a.k.a Zhavar Kili) has been one of the largest weapons and ammunition storage and distribution centers for the mujahedin in Southeast Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War. It has been captured twice by joint efforts of Afghan Communist Government and Soviet troops, the last time after a fierce battle in Spring 1986, but both times it was rebuilt. Later, Bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the Taliban developed Javara and nearby Tani into weapons storage and terrorist training centers. Javara had very well-developed defenses, including numerous deep caves fortified by brick and concrete walls and cut rail ceilings, antiaircraft defense, and artillery positions and minefields. The first time Javara was hit in the retaliation strike in 1998 after the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Africa, it caused (as confirmed by later reports) little damage due to the protection offered by the caves. There are two major enemy convoy routes in the area shown as Routes #36 and #35. In the upper part of the map is the city of Khost. Contrary to common belief, there have never been any Soviet units stationed in Khost (only the units of the Communist Government 25th Infantry Division located in and around Khost as shown on the map). The Pakistani border, just 2 miles from Javara, is shown in the thick gray and black-dotted line.

**Figure 1. Soviet Military Map of a Mujahedin Training Camp.**

serve as strongpoints since users can fortify and camouflage them.

## Making Use of the *Kyareses*

During the Soviet-Afghan War, *kyareses* were initially used by mujahedin and the local population to hide from Soviet troops and communist government troops and air raids. Over time, they developed into a sophisticated and interconnected web of

and were hidden in a building of some kind.

The use of *kyareses* became an important part of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan. The mujahedin used them in both offensive and defensive roles. In the defense, they were part of the area's defenses. It was easy to fire a few bursts from one opening on the ground, jump down, go to the next opening, and again fire on the enemy. This had the added benefit of

protection from a hand grenade or other explosive.

The *kyareses* could also support offensive operations. On numerous occasions they were used as underground approach routes in attacks on our positions. In many cases, the assault force arrived undetected, offering the enemy an element of surprise that cost us dearly. Very often snipers used *kyareses*, especially those located close to the roads. They would fire several rounds at our convoys or patrols and then disappear into the dark underground areas where it was virtually impossible to get at them.



Figure 2. 93-mm Shmel ("Bumblebee") incinerating grenade launcher.

fortified underground facilities and lines of communication (LOCs) that spread under vast areas of the rural countryside. Today many of these natural rock *kyareses* have been reinforced through the use of steel-reinforced concrete, timbered sections, and multiple-access tunnels. Many of the original tunnels serving them have been widened to allow the rapid passage of men and equipment to and from selected areas. During my tours in Afghanistan, we found many *kyareses* in use as weapons and ammunition depots, food storage facilities, headquarters, and even underground hospitals.

Additional concealed entrances have also been added, sometimes the materials are from the houses of nearby villages or from water wells, stables, and the like. Some *kyareses* had electricity although for the most part they employed generators located somewhere above ground

deceiving the enemy about the defender's strength.

The approaches and entrances to *kyareses* were often mined. Because the defenders knew the locations of the mines, they would frequently use a visible path that led to the entrance. People attempting to follow along the trail would, however, be at risk because they did not know the locations of the mines. Additionally, the surface openings leading to the tunnels were usually guarded, both on the surface and underground. The guards at the beginning of the tunnel were usually inside pockets dug at a certain angle to increase their

Some ground openings into the *kyareses* were large enough to serve as antiaircraft positions. Here they would emplace and camouflage DShK or KPVT heavy machine guns, usually of Soviet, Chinese, or Egyptian manufacture. The heavy machine guns, with an effective range of up to 1,200 yards, could often reach an unsuspecting aircraft. Should the aircraft attempt to return fire, it would find that it was difficult to destroy such a small target. Usually such a position could only be destroyed by use of pinpoint bombing, salvo firing of unguided munitions, or infantry assault. Even then, if the return fire was too heavy, the weapons' crew could lower the machine gun using an improvised rope winch and escape into a fortified *kyares* or move through a tunnel.

Underground combat in *kyareses* was extremely dangerous and difficult to operate in, and only occa-



Figure 3. 93-mm Shmel ("Bumblebee") incinerating grenade launcher and grenade.

sionally would the elite Soviet Spetsnaz (Special Forces) units take their chances there. Usually such an assault would only occur if the target was considered high priority (an enemy headquarters or weapons depot, for example). Remarkably, during the initial stages of the war, the Spetsnaz units did not have any experience in this environment. In preparing for such missions, Spetsnaz units had to rehearse in the sewage systems of nearby cities. I believe their experiences are comparable with those of the "American Tunnel Rats" in their operations in tunnels and similar fortifications along Vietnam's Ho Chi Min Trail.

## Dealing With the *Kyareses*

In Afghanistan, however, these underground irrigation systems are usually on flat terrain which, with exceptions, was usually less of a risk than those faced by the American Tunnel Rats. Soviet troops learned to deal with the *kyareses* without having to challenge the invisible enemy underground. After securing the area around the *kyares*, we brought a fuel tanker to the surface opening where it would pump fuel into it. The water flow at the bottom, usually from knee to waist deep, would carry the fuel downstream a long way along the tunnels. Throwing a hand grenade into the well then ignited the fuel. The result was quite spectacular, as huge tongues of flame would shoot out of the openings, much like lava from an erupting volcano. The combination of flame, heat, and smoke would most often kill everyone within. Ammunition and explosives were often stored in the *kyares* and in such cases the explosions and fire would often tear the earth apart, creating a gaping crater on the surface. For weeks after the assault, the surface openings would reek of burnt fuel and the charred, decomposing bodies buried in narrow underground tunnels.

Other methods of addressing *kyareses* included booby-trapping the surface openings, using large explosive charges to seal the entrances, and using canisters of "*Cheriomuha*" (bird-cherry tree) tear gas to smoke the enemy out. I must stress that *Cheriomuha* was tear gas, similar to that used for riot control operations. I never witnessed the use of poison gases by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. There was no need for it, the above mentioned methods were at least as effective and did not require that our troops use special equipment or protective gear.

Because water in underground irrigation springs in such tunnels is usually very clean, we looked for muddy or murky water that came to the surface. This often signaled the movement of troops or the construction of facilities below ground. During the Soviet-Afghan War, strong explosions in some of the *kyareses* led to the disruption of underground water sources. In those cases, the water stopped flowing and turned the *kyareses* into dry but comfortable underground catacombs.

I have no doubt that as the hunt for Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders intensifies, these underground irrigation systems will once again become important. Many of them may be larger and much improved from those of the Soviet-Afghan War. I believe, however, that they will be used in much the same way. As many may also be in use as shelters for local noncombatants, their neutralization will require a very special response from the coalition forces.

## Final Thoughts

In summary, the Afghans are tough and stubborn fighters who have an intimate understanding of their environment and maximize their use of the region's natural and manmade features. Focusing specifically on the caves and *kyareses*, the mujahedin employed them to offer an asymmetric threat in an effort to counter Soviet technological advantages. As the war progressed, however, they clung to these methods, even when faced with the almost certain and terrible death of being burned alive or suffocating from high concentrations of gasoline or tear gas. In many cases, Soviet commanders used loudspeakers to warn them about the action they were about to take in the hope of persuading them to surrender. At times this worked, but in many cases, the mujahedin lacked a technical understanding of the effects of these weapons. They truly thought themselves safe in the *kyareses*, not understanding the horrific effects of these weapons. Even though many died there, the Afghans continue into the present to employ them. Any future U.S. involvement in the hunt for Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders must include consideration of the *kyareses*, as they can be a key feature of the tactical environment.

*Timothy Gusinov served two tours of duty in Afghanistan (4.5 years) with the Russian military advisers, Soviet troops, and Spetsnaz (Special Operations) units. He speaks Farsi and Dari languages as well as English, and has earned the equivalent of a Masters degree in linguistics. His duties included facilitating coordination and liaison between Afghan Government units and Soviet troops, and negotiations with local authorities, tribal leaders, and field commanders. He was wounded twice and received the Russian equivalent of two Purple Heart Medals and earned a number of medals including the Order of the Red Star. He achieved the rank of Major at the age of 28. After the 1991 Gulf War he served as a United Nations (U.N.) military observer in the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission and later in the former Yugoslavia. Mr. Gusinov retired in 1993 and moved to the United States; a permanent resident now, he has applied for U.S. citizenship. He teaches English as a second language, works with the computer education industry, and acts as a consultant. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at gticomp@netwiz and by telephone at (415) 989-4733.*

# Extracts from a Speech by President George W. Bush Calling for Military Transformation

by Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service
11 December 2001

President Bush, speaking today at the Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, revealed plans to transform the armed forces to confront the threats of the 21st century.

"We have to think differently. The enemy who appeared on September eleventh seeks to avoid our strengths and constantly searches for our weaknesses so America is required once again to change the way our military thinks and fights. The enemies worldwide got a chance to see the new American military on October 7. Our military cannot and will not be evaded."

Mr. Bush continued, "The great threat to civilization is that a few evil men will multiply their murders and gain the means to kill on a scale equal to their hatred. We know they have this mad intent, and we are determined to stop them. The United States will meet the threats posed by terrorists by every means. We will discover and destroy 'sleeper' cells. We will track terrorists' movements, trace their communications, disrupt their funding, and take their network apart piece by piece."

Regarding the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, the President said that "rogue states are the most likely sources of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons for terrorists. The civilized world cannot condone states that support or harbor terrorists. Those states that violate this principle will be regarded as hostile regimes. They have been warned, they are being watched, and they will be held accountable."

President Bush said the new world has new priorities. "The first is to speed the transformation of the U.S. military. Actions in Afghanistan are pointing the way. These past two months have shown that innovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry can shape and then dominate an unconventional conflict. Service members are rewriting the rules of war with new technologies. Our commanders are gaining a real-time picture of the entire battlefield, and are able to get targeting information from sensor to shooter almost instantly. Our intelligence professionals and special forces have cooperated in battle with friendly Afghan forces. These fighters know the terrain, know the Taliban and know the local culture. Our special forces have the technology to call in precision air strikes, along with the flexibility to direct those strikes from horseback in the first cavalry charge of the 21st century."

Mr. Bush said the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle is showing its worth in the campaign. "The new armed version can circle and watch for enemy activity, then strike targets as they present themselves. Before the war, the Predator had skeptics because it did not fit the old ways. Now it is clear the military does not have enough unmanned vehicles. UAVs will take on greater importance on land, air and sea."

Even before September eleventh, President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld urged transforming the military. "What's different today is this sense of urgency: the need to build this future force while fighting this present war. It's like overhauling a car engine while you're going 80 miles an hour.

Yet we have no other choice. Our military has a new and essential mission. For states that support terror, it's not enough that the consequences are costly. They must be devastating."

He concluded by saying "The bedrock of the future force is good people and the military must offer good pay and good living conditions. Our military culture must reward new thinking, innovation, and experimentation. Congress must give defense leaders the freedom to be innovative instead of micromanaging the Defense Department. Every service and every constituency of the military must be willing to sacrifice some of their own pet projects. Our war on terror cannot be used to justify obsolete bases, obsolete programs, or obsolete weapons systems. Every dollar of defense spending must meet a single test: It must help us build the decisive power we will need to win the wars of the future."

# Leadership Notes
# Army Intelligence Master Plan
### AIMP: The View from the Future
### Army Intelligence Transformation

by Keith J. Masback

*(Note: The Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP) supports the senior Army Intelligence leadership by envisioning and documenting the future. The AIMP brings vision to reality by developing assessments and roadmaps to transition the current force to the future force. These assessments and roadmaps, taken collectively, form an Army Intelligence Synchronization and Action Plan that addresses the doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, soldier, and policy (DTLOMS-P) implications of the envisioned future. The Army Intelligence Vision complements and supports the Army Vision while the practical aspects of its development are drawn from soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers conducting intelligence operations around the world. Inherent in the challenge of "visioning" is developing a view with enough substance to make it real, yet sufficiently broad to cover unforeseen changes in the operating environment or threat.*

*At its core the AIMP constantly seeks to answer the twin questions of "Where are we going?" and, "How do we get there?" The AIMP is about change and for most people, change is hard. This is the first in a continuing series of articles from the Director of the Army Intelligence Master Plan that seeks to lay out how the AIMP Directorate sees the future and what some of the more controversial aspects of getting to that future might be.)*

In support of senior Army Intelligence leadership and the Army's Transformation Plan, the AIMP recently published a vision and implementation plan to transform Army Intelligence. The Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan (AI-TCP) establishes a common framework for understanding and guiding Army Intelligence Transformation. Army Transformation drives and is the focus of the AI-TCP, which responds directly to the Objective Force requirement for near-perfect situational awareness to enable decisive operations. It presents a set of high-level goals as the conceptual framework for the coherent transformation of Army Intelligence. The AI-TCP adds substance to vision via a detailed analysis of the ability of Army Intelligence to support Objective Force operations. Current Intelligence Discipline Assessments (CIDAs) add detail to the AI-TCP.

CIDAs define discipline-specific Army Intelligence concepts and capabilities on the strategic planning horizon as they respond to and integrate national security strategy (NSS), national military strategy (NMS), and Intelligence Community planning with emerging Army doctrine. The individual assessments trace changing capabilities from the current baseline through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the 2015 Army Intelligence force, to realization of Army Objective Force capabilities.

In the Objective Force era, Army Intelligence will be a globally focused, rapidly deployable, knowledge-based force composed of expert personnel harnessing the collaborative, analytical, communications, and presentation power of modern in-



Figure 1. Army Intelligence Transformation Supports Army Transformation.

formation technology to support leaders at the point of decision. Army Intelligence core competencies consist of—

❑ **Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration and synchronization** of all ISR sensors to build the enemy forces, terrain, and weather pictures.

❑ Unique **collection** to cover information gaps.

❑ **Analysis** to transform data into information and information into knowledge.

❑ **Presentation** of knowledge in a format and manner that enables the commander's understanding.

❑ Full-dimension **protection** of physical and cyber domains.

World-class soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and Defense contractors are the foundation of transformed Army Intelligence. The energy and vision to transform depends on Army Intelligence sustaining the world's premier workforce. Transformed Army Intelligence conducts sustained, continuous, real-world intelligence operations in collaboration with joint, national, and combined intelligence organizations to build the knowledge base and establish the context for future force employment. On a daily basis, the Army Intelligence force develops the knowledge required to enable Objective Force success. Upon notification of impending force deployment, the effort focuses on rapidly assembling knowledge by linking relevant tactical through national intelligence providers in virtual collaboration. Army Intelligence leaders at all levels adaptively force package intelligence capabilities in response to requirements forward.

Ironically, the scheduled major public unveiling of the Army Intelligence transformation vision and associated campaign plan by the Army's G2 (Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence [DCSINT]), Lieutenant General

Robert W. Noonan, Jr., was to be at the Army Worldwide Intelligence Conference on 11 September 2001. The attack by transnational terrorists on the United States caused the scaling back of the public unveiling as attentions and interest rapidly refocused on the changed operational environment. In the aftermath of September 11, the AIMP Directorate was charged with evaluation of the Army Intelligence Vision for its applicability to the changed environment and in particular to the Homeland Security challenge. The AIMP rapidly convened Homeland Security Conferences at both the action officer and retired/former Army Intelli-

In order to accomplish this, I directed publication of a second edition of the AI-TCP, which is now in progress. The AIMP Directorate is hard at work on that product as I write this article in early January 2002.

The Army Intelligence Vision and AI-TCP language are in wide use by Army Intelligence senior leaders. They represent and reflect the revolutionary changes occurring at every level of Army Intelligence. The Vision and Plan bind together the Army Intelligence action centers, as their individual activities become understandable as separate parts of a broader tapestry. At the direction of the DCSINT, the



**Figure 2. The Army Intelligence Transformation Is All About People.**

gence senior leader levels. As a result of our post-September 11 activities, we concluded that the Army Intelligence Vision was broad enough to cover the changed circumstances but that we would need to reinterpret its elements to focus specifically on—

❑ Combating the asymmetric threat.

❑ Defeating transnational terrorism.

❑ Providing intelligence support to Homeland Security.

AIMP Directorate has constructed an internally consistent and cohesive strategic communications plan to get the word out. You can expect to see our articles regularly in any number of professional military publications in addition to the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*. However, I cannot emphasize strongly enough that what we need more than anything else is feedback from the field. We want to know what you think. Please take the time to tell us. Send us an E-mail, call if you can, and if you are

## Future Collaborative Environment

**Turns a team of experts into an expert team focused on the Unit of action**

**Decision superiority**

- Goal – 360° complete intuitive understanding
- Expert personnel
- Knowledge projection at the point of decision ... linked to operational task and purpose
- Adaptive forward footprint
- Focused on support forward
- Fully enabled transport/communications layer

*Integration occurs at every echelon*

Key
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
INSCOM - U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
JAC - Joint Analysis Center
JIC - Joint Intelligence Center
KC DIA - Knowledge Center, Defense Intelligence Agency
NGIC - National Ground Intelligence Center
NIMA - National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NSA - National Security Agency

**Figure 3. Army Intelligence Vision—Focus on Support of Forces Forward.**

in the Washington, D.C. area, set aside time to exchange ideas with us in person. The Army Intelligence vision belongs to the men and women of the Army Intelligence team. Our vision is strong because the team is strong. With your help we can improve our product and make it more meaningful to you out on the intellectual and physical front lines.

Army Intelligence is transforming in support of Army Transformation with a clear focus on the Objective Force requirements. The AI-TCP lays out both a vision for transformed Army Intelligence and an action plan methodology to achieve that vision. In the future, I will lay out how the Army Intelligence vision fits current operations in support of the War on

Transnational Terrorism and of Homeland Security.

I will also address the developing responsibilities and challenges associated with ISR synchronization. In the meantime, if you would like to send me your thoughts or engage the AIMP in substantive discussions on the future of Army Intelligence, drop us an Internet E-mail at aimp@hqda.army.mil and visit the AIMP Website on SIPRNET (http://aimp.dami,army. smil.mil). I look forward to hearing from you.

*Mr. Keith Masback is a Senior Intelligence Professional serving as Director, Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT). During his active Army service, Mr. Masback was an Infantry officer with the Berlin Brigade, transitioned to the Military Intelligence Branch, and then served with the XVIII Airborne Corps. He served in the HQDA ODCSINT Initiatives Group and as the Military Assistant to the DCSINT. In his final position as an active duty officer, he managed requirements and resourcing for the Army's Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Program. Most recently, Mr. Masback served as the Deputy Director of the Director's Initiatives Group at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Gettysburg College and has completed the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Readers can reach Mr. Masback via E-mail at keith.masback@hqda.army.mil and by telephone at 703-824-4003.*

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## OMPF Online Expands To Include All Records By June

Army News Service, by Staff Sergeant Marcia Triggs, 31 January 2002

Captains and staff sergeants under consideration for promotion this spring and summer will soon be able to review their Official Military Personnel Files (OMPFs) online. OMPF Online, which kicked off in November for sergeants first class, is expanding to serve more of the force. Captains considered for promotion will be able to look at their records online beginning 1 February 2002, and staff sergeants considered by the June board will be able to look at their records online beginning 1 March. The goal is for the entire Army to be able to view military records online by June 2002.

In the past three months, OMPF Online has already proven to be a cost-savings initiative for the Army. *"About 10 percent of the 20,000 sergeants first class that reviewed their records online opted not to request their microfiche,"* according to Colonel Howard Olsen, the Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center (EREC) Commander. *"It costs about $1.40 to produce a microfiche, so just multiply that by 2,000."* EREC's goal by fiscal year 2003 is to eliminate the need for soldiers to request microfiche, which will save the Army an enormous amount of money annually.

# Distance Learning

### by Thomas Daley

A visit to the Military Intelligence (MI) Distance Learning Office (DLO) website at www.dl.army.mil shows the many courses and lessons available to civilian and military visitors. There is a wide range of subject matter offering something for everyone. This article provides an overview of use of the site and some of the most popular interactive courseware.

## Development of the Courseware

We develop MI Distance Learning courseware both to inform and to teach. Studies have shown that the more a student can interact with the lesson, the more effective the learning experience will be. As the amount of interaction increases, so does the retention of the material.

It is a fairly easy process to deliver a slide presentation over the web, but creating interactive courseware presents a different set of challenges. The obvious challenge is the technical aspect—but how do you know that the student is learning the right task? Having the student actually execute the task successfully confirms that he understands the learning objectives. "Learning by doing" is an important part of classroom instruction, and it also plays a very big role in the development and delivery of MI Distance Learning products.

The philosophy of the DLO is to present courseware that is available anytime and anywhere for the intended audience. Some of our material is targeted for a general audience while other training is specific to a military occupational specialty (MOS). We offer a variety of courses, and strive to have the student learn by doing whenever that is appropriate. The best place to start with any self-directed lesson is with the tutorial or the help menu. Learning by

"doing," especially when one is trying to apply knowledge of a regulation or task, is hard to do without a basic understanding of what is expected. Some of our best sellers include the Intelligence Cycle, Operational Security, Intelligence Oversight, the HTML Portal, and the Digital Tactical Operation Center.

## What Is a Plug-In?

A "plug-in" is a file that you must install on your computer to allow some programs to work correctly. It is usually for a very specific program, and you may have to install more than one just to be able to view parts of a website. One of the more common plug-ins allows you to view "Flash" files. Because of the type of material we present to the student, several of our lessons require the user to load the plug-ins before starting the lesson. Links to the plug-ins are on our site, as are the system requirements for each lesson. The good news with plug-ins is that you only have to load them once.

## Most Popular Courses

The **Intelligence Cycle.** This course offers a guided tour of the Intelligence Cycle according to **FM 34-1, Intelligence Operations.** It is an excellent primer for the soldier wanting to understand one of the most critical processes used by the intelligence professional. The user will need the Macromedia Shockwave plug-in to view this lesson, and the link to that plug-in is right there in the link to the lesson.

**Operational Security (OPSEC).** Good OPSEC is a concern for everyone, and it is an annual training requirement for soldiers and civilians. This course presents seven vignettes that have the student perform OPSEC checks on a building, while in garrison, and a company

area in a tactical environment. While the facilities are fairly secure, according to **AR 530-1, Operational Security**, you have to do better than just fairly well. You use your mouse to realistically "walk" in and out of virtual facilities to perform the OPSEC checks. With this course, you are actually "learning by doing." Before you walk through the virtual facilities, you must load the Viscape and Toolbook Neuron plug-ins. We recommend you keep track of your progress and take the performance assessment at the end.

**Intelligence Oversight.** This course supports the training requirement to apply **Army Regulation 381-10, Intelligence Oversight**, in our daily duties. It is another great example of putting the student into a "realistic" situation to learn the course material. Student have seven different assignments and must apply their knowledge of the regulation to make the correct decision for each situation. The DLO based the scenarios on real-world situations with text-book solutions, and the courseware offers kudos for the right decision and consequences for bad decision-making. You actually learn the scope of the regulation while solving the problems. After answering the questions with each scenario, take the comprehensive performance assessment at the end to see how well you understand **AR 381-10**. This lesson requires the Toolbook Neuron plug-in, but if you loaded it to take the OPSEC lesson, you do not need to load it again.

The **HTML Portal.** We designed this portal to take full advantage of the many HTML tutorial sites already posted on the web and constructed and posted it to the DLO website to enhance the web knowledge of our MI instructors. One can literally learn

how to code in HTML, design a site, and learn advanced web programming from this portal. Since this site directs users out to the web, plug-ins are not necessary to visit the portal.

**Digital Tactical Operation Center (D-TOC).** You may have seen the D-TOC facility as a student or visitor to Fort Huachuca in the last year. The D-TOC facility represents the layout and equipment of the future TOC. We offer a virtual tour of the D-TOC, including the welcome brief and a description of the various stations.

You will need to load the Viscape plug-in to view this lesson.

## Final Comments

There are more than one hundred separate lessons posted on the DLO website. We have listed just a few.

One ongoing project is assembling an electronic "Smart Book." If you have a job aid or tool that has helped you with any of the Intelligence processes, forward it to dlo@hua.army.mil and we will add it to the electronic version of that paper Smart Book in your pocket. We will post

the Smart Book this year, and let everyone benefit from the wealth of knowledge MI professionals have developed.

In our next article, we will review other projects that are in development. We will also describe some of the new courseware added to our website.

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*Tom Daley is a Training Specialist in the Fort Huachuca Distance Learning Office. Readers can reach him via E-mail at dlo@hua.army.mil and by telephone at 520-538-1012 or DSN 879-1012.*

## MOS 97L, Translator/Interpreter: The Current Situation
### by Peter A. Shaver (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired)

The Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) are continuing their collaboration on a wide range of language training issues. These include the Reserve Component (RC) Translator/Interpreter (military occupational specialty [MOS] 97L), the Language MOS Enhancement Program (LMEP), Project Mercury, and future language training products that will incorporate broadband technology.

Addressing the DLI Foreign Language Center (FLC) and USAIC&FH Language Conference in November 2001, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT), discussed our critical need to understand the enemy's capabilities in this new age of asymmetrical warfare. According to Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan, Jr., we must know the enemy's language and culture to anticipate his next movements and then act first instead of reacting. The DCSINT stated that we must raise the 2/2-language proficiency standard to the 3/3 level to meet today's Army mission requirements in concert with the implementation of new technology for the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR).

Elimination of the 97L MOS would deprive the Army and Department of

Defense of trained translators and interpreters, especially if they migrate to 97E (Human Intelligence Collector). The capabilities of the previous translator MOS, O4B, transferred to the interrogation MOS and over the years lost its translator and interpreter skill set. It became so diluted that eventually there was no comparison to the original MOS training (which, by the way, did not teach the same principles as the present 97L); a similar situation would occur with 97L.

Since DLI began instructing the 97L10 course (USAIC&FH is still the proponent), the Army has seen unprecedented growth in the numbers of qualified Military Intelligence (MI) linguists who earned the MOS. The RC has more than 600 trained 97Ls. If these 97Ls move to the 97E program, the 97L10 DLI training would probably cease over time; many would view it as resource-inefficient to add additional training to the 97E Advanced Individual Training, which would likely result in MOS 97L succumbing to the same fate as O4B. Further, some would say that translation and interpretation are just other language skills where linguists only require language proficiency and a good dictionary. Nothing could be further from realty. I challenge any military linguist who has not studied translation and interpretation techniques to translate or interpret at the same level as a 97L.

Military linguists who have taken the 97L10 training will attest that translation and interpretation are distinct skills requiring specific training. This training will perish if 97L migrates into any existing MOS.

The recent language conference offered presentations and discussion of heritage speaker issues and a variety of job-related language training products and programs. Participants from the government, industry, and academia demonstrated products ranging from voice-recognition software to language-sustainment programs and computer-assisted translation systems. Additional information on the November 2001 Conference presentations and attendees is available at http://usaic.hua.army.mil/112web/aics/aics%20web/langconference.htm.

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*Pete Shaver is the Chief, Training, Analysis, Development Division Language Branch, at USAIC&FH and the 97L Course Manager. He can be reach at (520) 538-1042/DSN 879-1042 or E-mail peter.shaver @hua.army.mil.*

# Doctrine Corner

## INSCOM Intelligence Support to the Tactical Commander

### by Staff Sergeant John H. Girardeau

While the role of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) intelligence support is primarily focused at the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) level, it also participates in the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, and National Intelligence Activities. Part of its larger effort is to provide intelligence support to the lowest possible tactical echelon. Therefore, it is important that S2s at maneuver brigade and battalion levels are aware of the capabilities that the INSCOM and its ASCC intelligence support brigades and groups bring to the "fight." In addition, it is also important that these S2s know how to leverage these capabilities to support their commanders' priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR).

Within each unified command, INSCOM intelligence support serves as the primary conduit for intelligence information between the tactical commander and national and other military services' intelligence organizations. Additionally, the Army tailored the theater intelligence brigades and groups specifically to meet the requirements of the various ASCC commanders and to support the various unified commanders. Therefore, each brigade or group organization includes varying amounts of counterintelligence (CI), human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) based on the intelligence requirements for a given geographical region. The Brigade or Group organization would also take into account the intelligence capabilities already present in the region. For example, while the echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence brigade in the Republic of Korea has an organic aerial reconnaissance battalion, the EAC intelligence group in Europe does not. This is because one is already present within the corps military intelligence brigade. However, commanders can easily adjust this mix of assets and capabilities to meet sudden changes in mission requirements.

Regardless of each EAC brigade or group's organization, all are extremely capable of conducting unique and specialized intelligence collection, analysis, and production. With their added flexibility and ability to interface directly with national agencies and intelligence organizations of the other Services, EAC intelligence brigades and groups can provide an intelligence support capability that tactical units do not have. However, when maneuver brigade and battalion S2s effectively leverage these capabilities, they are able to significantly increase the intelligence support they can provide to their commanders.

The primary means of exploiting this capability is through the use of effective requirements management. According to **FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning**, requirements management (RM) is "*the consolidation and prioritization of all intelligence requirements, determining what specific information will satisfy that requirement, and when and where to collect it.*" In addition, **FM 34-2** defines mission management (MM) as "*determining the best collection strategy and mix of assets to accomplish collection.*" MM also tasks and requests collection and continually monitors resource readiness and performance. Within this context, collection refers not only to the tasking of organic assets but also to requests for information (RFIs) to lateral and higher echelons.

Therefore, by effectively using RM and MM, any unit, regardless of echelon, can enhance its intelligence support potential through the capabilities found at INSCOM. Although a maneuver brigade or battalion cannot directly task an EAC intelligence support element, it can leverage its capabilities through the RFI process. According to **JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations**, RFIs respond to customer requirements, ranging from dissemination of existing products through the integration or tailoring of on-hand information to the scheduling of original production or collection. An element that cannot satisfy requirements submits them to the next higher echelon.

However, this is not to say that the S2s of maneuver brigades or battalions can submit RFIs directly to INSCOM intelligence units. They must still submit them to their next higher headquarters for validation. **JP 2-01** explains that validation is the process that confirms that a requirement is appropriate and has not previously been satisfied. Therefore, once the next higher headquarters has validated

the RFI and determined that it is unable to satisfy it, it will then forward it to the next higher level.

The content and format of the RFI will vary according to unit standing operating procedures (SOPs). Common to every SOP is a description of the required information, the format needed for the response, and the time the requestor must receive the information, also known as latest time information is of value (LTIOV).

One common problem with RFIs is that the request is too vague to answer; for example: *"need the current location, disposition, and intent of the 32d Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment."* A reply to this RFI may be the unit location of the regimental main command post and the location and strength of each subordinate motorized rifle battalion, followed by a narrative explaining that the regiment is building combat power for future operations. The unit that received the request sends out the response believing that it has adequately answered the question.

The S2 of the requesting unit receives the response to the RFI and now discovers that what he really needed to request was the information on the units located within his sector, down to company level. As a result, he must now submit a new RFI, while having lost valuable time necessary to incorporate this information into his IPB products.

A technique to remedy the situation in the preceding example is to give the same clarity and completeness articulated in the PIR to the RFI. A clearly stated request including the "who, what, when, and where," also tied to either a current PIR, IR, or commander's decision point, lessens the chance for incorrect interpretation of your requirement.

To further ensure that you receive useable information in the response to the RFI, include the desired level of classification with the format you require. These factors, taken together, can assist you in receiving the requested information completely and quickly.

Recently, MSNBC reported a situation that demonstrates what happens when a request for information lacks specificity. A U.S. Army Special Forces unit was preparing for deployment and requested information on Atta Mohammed, a local opposition force commander with whom they were to link up with once they arrived in Afghanistan. What they received instead was information on Mohammed Atta, one of the hijackers who died in the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center. Although the news report did not go into specifics as to why this happened, it is probably likely that the unit requested information on Atta Mohammed without any further information to clarify on whom specifically they wanted information. Although situations such as this are generally the exception rather than the rule, they still happen frequently. As a result, the requesting unit is unhappy because they did not receive the information they believed they had requested and they wasted valuable time in the process.

Although it may seem out of reach, it is possible for maneuver brigade and battalion S2s to leverage the resources of INSCOM intelligence units. However, as with any tasking or request, it is a matter of asking the right question to get the right answer. If one does not take the time and effort to draft a realistic request, then all he has done is waste time and fail to meet the commander's intelligence requirements.

*Staff Sergeant John Girardeau is a Signals Intelligence Analyst (98C), currently serving as a writer and doctrine developer within the Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Readers can contact him via E-mail at john.girardeau@hua.army.mil or telephonically at 520-538-0956 or DSN 879-0956.*

## MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Military Intelligence Corps accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame (HOF). Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position with the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.

The OCMI provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact Jim Chambers at U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CDR (Mr. Chambers), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000, or call commercial (520) 533-1178 or DSN 821-1178, or via E-mail at james.chambers@hua.army.mil.

# Force Design

## Force Design Update: Theater Intelligence Brigades/Groups

### by Stanley M. Walthall

As a result of the Force Design Update 00-1, each of the five Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) will have a dedicated intelligence brigade or group. The new structure will replace the current force protection brigades. Force Design Division, Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), in coordination with the Requirements Documentation Directorate (RDD) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) are developing more than 70 tables of or-ganization and equipment (TO&Es) for brigade headquarters to team level. The TO&E development process includes establishment of mission and employment statements, documenting personnel requirements with appropriate Standards of Grade (SOGs), and determining equipment requirements. The Brigades and Groups will be multicomponent with the USAR resourcing a Theater Support Battalion for ARCENT (U.S. Army Central Command), USAREUR (United States Army, Europe), USFK (United States Forces, Korea), and USARPAC (United States Army, Pacific). USARSO (United States Army Forces Southern Command) Group Headquarters will be multicomponent as a USAR command. The 501st and 513th MI Brigades and the 500th MI Group will start to convert to the new design starting in the fiscal year 2003. ✳

*Stan Walthall works in the Force Design Division, DCD, USAIC&FH. Readers may contact him via E-mail at stanley.walthall@hua.army.mil and by telephone at 520-538-2124 and DSN 879-2124.*

# Proponent Notes

### by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Fatzinger

While we do not anticipate that things will ever get back to the way they were before September 11, we are starting to see some "normalization" of the personnel management system. We have taken many of the short-term actions necessary to meet and adjust to the War on Terrorism. The Army has made and implemented immediate stop-loss decisions, where appropriate, while additional stop-loss discussions are anticipated. We have made some staffing manning adjustments in support of the warfighting effort and others are ongoing. Everything is moving forward as smoothly as one could expect under the present circumstances. Therefore, our focus is now returning to the longer range planning necessary for managing and building the right-sized force for the transformed 21st century Army.

By the time you read this, we will be heavily engaged with finalizing our Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) input for fiscal year 2002 (FY02). Resubmission of the military occupational specialty (MOS) 98Y (Signals Collector/Analyst) proposal is at the top of the list. Warrant Officer (WO) accessions continue to be a priority challenge and we are working hard in this area. Resolution of officer intermediate-level education issues may be at hand, especially where it concerns functional area (FA) qualifications. The Army Staff should make decisions before the end of this year. We will continue our active involvement in this for both the Military Intelligence (MI) area of concentration (AOC) (35) and FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence). This office will monitor these decisions closely. *The Director, Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI), is Lieutenant Colonel Eric W. Fatzinger.*

## Enlisted Actions

**Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) Update.** One of the most repeated questions we have received lately concerns the status of MOS 98Y merger proposal. In a previous issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)*, we noted that we had submitted the 98Y proposal in FY01 but that it had been returned for further study because of the anticipated significant impact on the Army's transient, trainee, holdover, and student (TTHS) account. This review continues but we remain on track for FY02 MOCS submission and inclusion of the 98Y proposal.

**98Y History.** Since the focus of this *MIPB* issue is on echelons above corps (EAC), and since the two combining MOSs in the 98Y proposal reside predominately at the EAC level, some extended discussion of this topic is appropriate. The two MOSs are 98K, (Signals Collection/Identification

Analyst) and 98J (Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analyst).

The initial study effort to determine which signals intelligence (SIGINT) MOSs would be good candidates for merger identified three general functional categories for consideration. These were signals analytic, signals externals exploitation, and signals internal exploitation. When the U.S. Army Intelligence Center looked closely at 98J and 98K and the signal characteristics on which they focus, we saw them easily falling into the exploitation category for signals externals. Other SIGINT MOSs such as 98G (Cryptologic Linguist) and 98H (Communications Interceptor/ Locator) predominately fell into the internals exploitation realm, and of course 98C (Signals Intelligence Analyst), and parts of 98J and 98K fell into the analytic realm. This commonality of 98J and 98K functions ultimately became the basis for merger discussions. The initial studies, discussions, and decision papers highlighted the fact that the 98Y merger would not be easy to accomplish. Nevertheless, the consensus of all of those studies and papers was that it could and should be done. Countless discussions later, the concept has now taken the form of a proposal in the MOCS process.

Ultimately, discussions on the 98Y merger lead to the bottom line question of "What does the field get out of this merger?" The answer is clear. The 98Y soldiers will provide greatly increased flexibility in both mission management and dealing with a rapidly changing signals environment. It is our hope

that commanders will be better able to react quickly and surge capability as needed when faced with unexpected missions. More importantly, the new multiskilled 98Y soldier will be readily adaptable to technology changes in the collection, analysis, and reporting equipment of our trade.

**STAR MOSs.** In past issues of the *MIPB*, the Proponent Office has often highlighted the need to address the STAR MOS issue. In this column, we would like to provide some insight on why we are so concerned about these MOSs.

By definition, a STAR MOS is one that has unfilled noncommissioned officer (NCO) authorizations at the Sergeant and Staff Sergeant levels, while having an inventory of non-boarded Specialists and Sergeants who meet the time-in-service and time-in-grade requirements for a recommendation of promotion. When we identify an MOS as meeting this criteria, we are concerned for three reasons:

❑ Important NCO positions are remaining unfilled.

❑ There is a direct, negative impact on soldier morale and retention when otherwise qualified soldiers are not receiving promotions.

❑ The ability of the Army to successfully function with these positions unfilled implies to some that the positions may not, in fact, be necessary as NCO positions.

Taken together, the effect on the health of our MOSs is direct and immediate.

The preferred method for filling NCO ranks in any MOS is to gradually "grow" soldiers with the appropriate technical and leadership skills to best serve the Army. When faced with long-term NCO shortages in STAR MOSs, however, the Proponent is forced to look at other potential solutions to filling these NCO positions, primarily the Bonus Extension and Retention (BEAR) program. While this answers the need, and many of our best NCOs certainly come out of the BEAR program, it is not the preferred method. As leaders, we must make certain that all of our fully qualified soldiers go before a promotion board as soon as they are ready and eligible. *The point of contact for enlisted actions is Sergeant Major Crossman at E-mail walter.crossman@hua.army.mil.*

## Warrant Officer Actions

Two studies affecting the Army Warrant Officer (WO) Corps are currently ongoing. Their purpose is to identify changes required to ensure that the WO Corps is well-positioned to support the Army of the 21st century. These are the first in-depth studies to look at the Army WO Corps since the mid-1980s. We are anticipating a number of positive results from these efforts and will keep you informed in this department as the Army approves and implements these recommendations.

**ADS XXI.** The Army Development System XXI (ADS XXI) began in November 1999. The Warrant Officer Personnel Management Study Group, operating under this pro-

| Major: | 16 April to 17 May 2002 |
|---|---|
| Career Field Designation (CFD) Year Group 1992: | 28 May to 7 June 2002 |
| Lieutenant Colonel: | 26 February to 29 March 2002 |
| Colonel: | 30 July to 23 August 2002 |

Figure 1. Tentative Dates for FY02 Selection Boards.

gram, identified several initiatives subsequently approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). These initiatives are—

- ❑ Tailor technical training to units and assignments.
- ❑ Publish a WO professional development policy and update other WO policies.
- ❑ Provide force development specialty training to WOs in those positions.
- ❑ Roll back Active Component (AC) WO grade structure.
- ❑ Assign AC WOs by grade.
- ❑ Develop a WO tenure program.
- ❑ Expand technical WO accession base.
- ❑ Access technical WO at five to eight years of active federal service.
- ❑ Educate officers and NCOs on the roles of Warrant Officers.

We have been actively addressing all of these issues with the Army. The Warrant Officer Training Branch, Fort Huachuca, has been conducting a thorough "cradle to grave" (C2G) study for each of our WO MOSs to identify where we can use assignment-oriented training. OCMI is also in the process of evaluating the rollback of the AC warrant officer grade structure. This is a good thing for MI since we have far too many Chief Warrant Officer Four (CW4) slots and not nearly enough CW2/3/5 slots. This restructure will actually improve promotion potential because CW3 will no longer be a bottleneck.

We are expanding the accession base through offering AOC 351E (Human Intelligence Collection Technician) to qualified 98G applicants. Additionally, we will soon offer 350D (Imagery Intelligence Technician) to qualified 96H (CGS Operator) applicants. The Army will modify the 350L (Attaché Technician) prerequisites in order to offer the MOS to those soldiers who meet all accession requirements except Defense Attaché Service (DAS) experience if they possess appropriate Bachelors degrees.

**ATLDP.** The Army Training and Leadership Development Panel (ATLDP), Warrant Officer Study, is the third phase of another CSA- directed effort intended to assess the state of training and leader development in the Army. As in the Officer and NCO Studies already completed, and the Army Civilian Study that will follow, we are assessing training and leader development requirements of the Objective Force. The WO portion of this study has been ongoing since October 2001 and will be complete in March 2002. All of our WOs should have had the opportunity to provide input either through study team visits to their organizations and installations or through surveys mailed to each WO. Again, we will be providing additional information as it becomes available during the next several months. *The point of contact for Warrant Officer actions is CW5 Castleton at E-mail lon.castleton@ hua.army.mil.*

## Officer Actions

**Intermediate-Level Education (ILE).** TRADOC continues to work on the revised ILE program. While a number of issues remain to be resolved, a couple of points are becoming clearer. There will be two phases. The first phase will consist of a three- to four-month course that is mandatory for all officers. This will be the part of the course that actually produces the military education level four (MEL-4) and joint professional military education level 1 (JPME-1). Phase I, as it is called, will not necessarily be in residence at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We anticipate that there will be various options such as correspondence courses, the Total Army School System (TASS) distributed classrooms, and possibly at extended Command and General Staff College (CGSC) campus sites the Army may establish. Phase II will vary depending on the Career Field (CF). Operations CF officers will all most likely attend the resident Advanced Operations Warfighting Course (AOWC) sponsored by CGSC. Officers in other career fields may or may not attend AOWC since each FA will develop specific training for its own officers. Today, the plan is for FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence) officers to continue to attend both the Strategic Intelligence Officer Course (SIOC) and the Postgraduate Intelligence Program (PGIP). We are actively engaged in providing input for an Army decision sometime in the near future. *The point of contact for Officer actions is Ms. Borghardt at E-mail charlotte. borghardt@hua.army.mil.*

**Upcoming Selection Boards.** The tentative dates for the FY02 selection boards are shown in Figure 1. Remember, it is essential that you have an up-to-date photograph in your files—do **not** wait until the last minute.

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*You can access the OCMI website by going to the Intelligence Center Homepage at http://usaic.hua.army. mil and then linking to OCMI with the "Training/MI Professionals" button. You will be able to find information on issues ranging from enlisted CF overviews to officer, warrant officer, and civilian updates.*

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# TSM Notes
## ASAS Block II Fielding Update

by Michel M. Strack

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) has two systems in the process of being fielded or issued to the Army: ASAS Remote Workstation (RWS) Block II and the ASAS-Light (ASAS-L). As units in the field take delivery of these systems, they also receive a complete training package. This training provides the units with the baseline skills to operate the systems and integrate them into their operations.

The ASAS New Equipment Training (NET) Team provides training for both the RWS and ASAS-L. The NET Team is from the 306th MI Battalion at Fort Huachuca, and takes its daily direction from TSM ASAS. Fielding for the RWS Block II Version 4 (V4) is about 75 percent complete. Most of the Active Component (AC) now has the RWS Block II, although fielding to the Reserve Component (RC) will continue into fiscal year 2003 (FY03). ASAS-L is still pending a final fielding decision, but several AC and RC units have already received it. Both of these systems will migrate to the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) Version 6 software during the next year. RWS Version 6 testing should occur in late FY02 or early FY03.

Units receiving RWS training from the NET Team can expect an in-depth four-week training program. The largest portion is a three-week operator course. During these three weeks, the operators learn how to operate the RWS, and participate in a series of practical exercises to apply these skills. During the final week of operator training, the unit's senior soldiers assemble for a weeklong leaders course on the RWS and digital operations. Leader training provides the same system training as that of the operators, but the pace is quicker, and there are no practical exercises. The intent is to provide an overview of the system's capabilities and functions. Leaders also receive a daylong block of instruction on the overall concept behind the ABCS, and how the Army will integrate and use digital systems in intelligence operations. During the fourth and final week of training, the operators and leaders complete a collective training exercise. The collective exercise uses a series of vignettes to reinforce and further apply RWS skills in a realistic intelligence situation.

Training for ASAS-L is a little shorter than RWS training. Units receiving ASAS-L can expect to receive a two-week NET program; unlike the RWS training, there are no separate training blocks for ASAS-L. Both leaders and operators undergo training in system operations, digital operations, and a final daylong practical exercise.

New systems and software versions require constant modification of ASAS training programs. Both RWS and ASAS-L will upgrade to fully compatible ABCS software in FY03. This will cause changes to both training programs, and a potential expansion to a three-week ASAS-L program. In addition, we will test several ASAS counterintelligence and human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) subsystems in FY02 and potentially field them in FY03. These systems, the Individual Tactical Reporting Tool (ITRT), the CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS), and the CI and Interrogation Operations Workstation (CI&I Operations Workstation) currently have separate training programs. The training program that supports the fielding of these systems will likely combine training for all systems into a single month.

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## UAV/ACS Update
## Aerial ISR Systems and the Future

by Colonel Steven H. Nichols

### Unmanned Systems

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Aerial Common Sensor (UAV/ACS) has been supporting the ongoing testing of the Shadow 200 Tactical UAV (TUAV) with the Program Manager, Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (PM TUAV), the tester, and the evaluator. The Shadow 200 TUAV system and the 104th Military Intelligence Battalion's TUAV Platoon underwent a three-day operational

tempo (OPTEMPO) exercise at Fort Hood, Texas, in October 2001. This exercise addressed the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) requirement for sustained operations of 12 hours' duration in 24 hours. In November, the unit and system demonstrated the surge OPTEMPO required of the system for five days, demonstrating 12, 18, 18, 18, and 8 hours per day of operations within five consecutive 24-hour periods. The Army completed a Winter Assessment in early December as part of the criteria to proceed to the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) scheduled for 23 April 2002 at Fort Hood. Throughout the exercises, the system and unit have demonstrated excellent progress in meeting warfighter requirements.

Per guidance from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), TSM UAV/ACS developed the division/corps TUAV requirement within the TUAV ORD under TRADOC's Tier One UAV Integrated Concept Team (ICT). This requirement falls within the vision of a "One TUAV System" for the U.S. Army. The division/corps TUAV requirement (as an annex to the TUAV ORD) went to Headquarters, TRADOC, in early December. More will follow in the next issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (*MIPB*) on this exciting direction to support the warfighter.

On 29 August 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved the Joint UAV in Time-Sensitive Operations (JUAV-TSO) Joint Feasibility Study as a Joint Test and Evaluation (JTE) and granted a fiscal year 2002-2004 (FY02-04) charter. The goal of the JUAV-TSO JTE is to examine how the Services can "operationalize" UAVs to better support the joint warfighter. We expect to gain new insights and ideas on using UAVs in different environments and to document specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), which will lead

to more realistic doctrinal products. The JTE will not test any specific UAV systems, but rather will use existing UAV capabilities and surrogates to replicate the Services' systems in various test events during the JTE. The Navy is the lead Service for this JTE; in the next few months, the Army will assign six soldiers to the Joint Test Force at Naval Air Station Fallon, located east of Reno, Nevada.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) hosted a "kick-off" meeting for the Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) on 5 December. This meeting confirmed the TSM UAV/ACS role as the deputy operational manager charged with developing system requirements, missions, scenarios, measures of effectiveness, concepts of operation, and TTP for the MAV system. The TSM UAV/ACS will also provide oversight to the MAV ACTD experimentation program. In January 2002, the TSM hosted a MAV ACTD meeting to work on the ACTD Management Plan and to conduct the first meetings of the ACTD technical, transition, and operations and demonstrations integrated product teams (IPTs).

## Manned Systems

The TSM UAV/ACS has been conducting concept exploration of the program in conjunction with the Product Manager, Aerial Common Sensor, and three industry teams for the past 18 months. Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman, and Raytheon led the industry teams, which included representatives from other U.S. defense contractors. Government personnel participated on each of the industry teams in an effort to make the industry-government partnership a success and to gain maximum benefit from the concept exploration effort. During this phase of the

ACS acquisition, each team constructed a model of its system concept and "flew" this model in a virtual environment that simulated Objective Force conditions and concepts. Lessons learned from these simulation runs will be included in future updates to the ACS ORD. The simulation runs allowed the Army to evaluate the performance of each team's system concept prior to entering the component advanced development (CAD) phase of the acquisition efforts. We anticipate a decision on which team(s) enter the CAD phase at the end of the second quarter, FY02.

Per guidance from the OSD, the ACS program was required to use a communications intelligence (COMINT) payload jointly developed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy. The Air Force was the executive agent for the development of the Joint Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Avionics Family (JSAF) Low-Band Subsystem (LBSS) program. Due to technical, schedule, and cost issues, the Air Force terminated work on the existing LBSS program in July 2000. Because the Army has unique experience in multiplatform cooperative SIGINT collection that will be critical to the success of future network-centric warfare, negotiations are now underway with OSD for the Army to take the lead on joint LBSS development efforts as part of the ACS acquisition.

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# Professional Reader

## The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization
by Thomas L. Friedman (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 475 pages, $15.00, ISBN 0-385-49934-5

When a new book claims many of our nation's top policy-makers as disciples, we ought to pay attention. When the Army's top intelligence officer, Lieutenant General Robert Noonan, says that military intelligence (MI) professionals should read this book, we should head to the bookstore to see what is causing such a commotion. Such a book is Thomas Friedman's **The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization**.

As the top foreign affairs correspondent for **The New York Times**, Friedman has spent two decades cultivating relationships with dozens of heads of state and chief executive officers of various multinational corporations. Friedman weaves their insights into his own theories that expose the new and often hidden forces in world affairs. Since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, these forces have accelerated the pace of change in the world and exacerbated the success or failure of governments, corporations, and international organizations.

The unusual title of the book includes two metaphors of contrary global forces. The "Lexus" represents a nation-state's quest for improvement and modernization. It also includes the global markets, financial institutions, and computer technologies used to pursue higher living standards for its people. The "Olive Tree" includes the unique cultural identity and bonds among a group of people. A proper balance of the two forces is necessary to achieve sustained prosperity. For example, the eth-

nic conflicts between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes in Rwanda show the gnarled roots of the Olive Tree choking one another, without any of the progress identified by the Lexus. Those fearful that the Internet or new technologies will threaten their way of life are worried about the Lexus forces run amok.

The subtitle, "Understanding Globalization," is certainly of interest to MI professionals. In our MI community and other professions dealing in global affairs, we often hear the term "globalization" used as a softheaded blandishment and instant response to difficult questions about the geopolitical realities that affect our operations. Are you not sure why the Albanians are stirring or the Korean students are protesting? It probably has something to do with globalization. Friedman's account—through interesting stories and an eye for the details of economic and political interconnections—will help us make more sense of the "big picture" of our operations.

The author introduces interesting new ways of thinking about global affairs in this book. The "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention" states that no two countries that have McDonald's fast-food networks will wage war against each other. According to this postulate, the presence of McDonald's in a country is an indicator that the population has reached a critical mass of prosperity where waging war opposes its self-interests.

**The Lexus and the Olive Tree** is an important book, but it does have weaknesses. While the book

is useful for MI professionals, parts of several chapters seem more intended for international bankers or venture capitalists, given the detailed explorations into monetary policy and the greater viscosity of global capital pools. He could have made his points just as well in one-hundred fewer pages. Indeed, the first three parts of the book are excellent, but the quality tapers towards the end as Friedman's writing shifts from colorful descriptions of global trends to banal prescriptions for social justice and successful nation-states. Still, not since Robert Reich's 1991 **The Work of Nations** has a book been able to bring utterly complex global affairs so comfortably within our grasp.

**Captain Franklin D. Rosenblatt**
505th PIR, 82d Airborne Division
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

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We welcome reviews of books related to intelligence professional development or military history. Please mail or E-mail your book reviews to michael.ley@hua.army.mil or mail them to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-FDR-CB (Ley), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

# Our MI Heritage

## Oscar Koch:
## An Unsung Hero Behind Patton's Victories

by Major Kevin Dougherty

Colonel Oscar W. Koch served as the G2 for Lieutenant General (LTG) George S. Patton, Jr., from February 1944 through the end of World War II. LTG Patton's biographer, Herbert Essame, calls COL Koch "*the spark plug of the Third Army*" and says he was "*in the field of intelligence, probably the most penetrating brain in the American Army.*" Essame goes on to say, "*this scholarly, self-effacing and incredibly industrious man was to prove himself to be the most brilliant and original member of Patton's command team.*"[1] In **Eisenhower's Lieutenants**, Russell Weigley calls Koch "*consistently effective.*"[2] COL Koch is lauded everywhere as one of the unsung heroes behind Patton's genius.

What traits did COL Koch have that singled him out for such praise? What can we learn from his example? At least three characteristics reveal themselves in Koch's case: his amazing situational awareness, his keen analytical sense, and his unwavering moral courage.

### Situational Awareness

In February 1944, COL Koch arrived at Peover Hall, which was to be LTG Patton's headquarters in England. He immediately began setting up LTG Patton's War Room, a facility that came to be the center of both COL Koch's and LTG Patton's exceptional situational awareness. Again Mr. Essame is lavish with his praise, calling the War Room "*unquestionably the most comprehensive and spectacular in the American, British, and Canadian Armies.*" The War Room centered on a 1:250,000-scale map showing the situation of the entire Western Front down to division-level formations. On the flanks of this centerpiece were two 1:100,000-scale maps, one showing the Eastern Front and the other Third Army's zone, depicting units down to battalion level. Additional tools included more maps, terrain models, charts, graphs, and orders of battle (OBs). The result was accurate, up-to-date information at a glance.[3]

COL Koch's War Room allowed him to maintain situational awareness of their entire battlespace, not just in their own front.[4] Another of LTG Patton's biographers, Ladislas Farago, describes COL Koch as "*snooping all the time, and far beyond the area of [Third Army's] own responsibilities.*" Colonel Koch's battlespace extended 150 miles to the north and south of Third Army's flanks. This distance derived from two crucial considerations: it represented a day's maximum march by the enemy motorized troops that could reach Third Army's front, and it marked the limits of the Armys tactical air reconnaissance.[5]

Such situational awareness paid great dividends for COL Koch in the winter of 1944. As early as October, he began noticing a buildup in the German reserves along the front of the neighboring First Army. On 9 December, he briefed LTG Patton that the conditions were right for a German attack on the Ardennes front.[6] Few others saw what COL Koch saw, though; this aspect of his effectiveness will be discussed later. Suffice it to say, when Hitler launched the Ardennes offensive—later known as the "Battle of the Bulge"—LTG Patton was ready. He was prepared because of COL Koch's comprehensive situational awareness.

COL Koch did not rest on his laurels. Even as the battle raged, he continued to update his analysis of the situation. Additionally, between 18 and 23 December, COL Koch prepared and distributed hundreds of thousands of maps and terrain analyses of the ever-changing area, drew up new estimates of the enemy situation, and maintained a current OB file. The work of COL Koch and his staff made LTG Patton so situationally aware that he was able to maneuver his force entirely by telephone.[7]

### Analysis

Often, however, situational awareness is just information, not processed intelligence. What allowed LTG Patton to be ready for the German attack was how COL Koch took the collected information, identified critical indicators, and produced intelligent analysis. Among the key indicators COL Koch noticed in November 1944 were the facts that a number of German units were leaving Westphalia and that German armor units were moving away from Third Army's front. Additionally, heavy traffic was reportedly observed moving toward the Eifel region of Germany, just to the east of the Ardennes. COL Koch concluded that a major force, consisting mostly of Panzer (armored) units, must be assembling somewhere in that region. On 23 November, he reported his analysis, stating that a strategic reserve, a "*powerful striking force, with an estimated 500*"

**Brigadier General Oscar W. Koch.**

sumed that the northern assembly area was a decoy because the Germans were occupying it by day but were then stealthily moving into the southern assembly area under cover of darkness. He assessed that the German attack would be north of the Third Army's zone of advance, but might be large enough to affect Third Army as well.[9, 10]

COL Koch's briefing made a marked impression on the assembled staff and caused LTG Patton to put into motion several contingency plans to deal with a possible attack on VIII Corps' front. The plans would not only protect the Third Army's northern flank but also included a counterstrike to the north. Patton wanted to ensure that *"We'll be in a position to meet whatever happens."*[11]

More indicators followed. On 16 December, signals intelligence (SIGINT) reported enemy units leaving an assembly area north of Trier and then going to radio silence. COL Koch predicted, *"I believe the Germans are launching an attack, probably at Luxembourg."* Patton was convinced. He added specific guidance to the planning he had initiated on 12 December, telling his staff to *"start making plans for pulling the Third Army out of its eastward attack, change their direction 90 degrees, moving into Luxembourg, and attacking north."*[12]

Another of General Patton's biographers, Ian Hogg, says that it was *"because of Koch's pre-vision"* that Patton was in fact ready when Hitler launched his Ardennes offensive.[13] His earlier planning guidance became his famous 90-degree turn from the Saar bridgehead to the Ardennes. Likewise, John Vermillion, in an analysis of the contribution of staffs, is quick to remind us that Patton's preparedness *"was made possible by a dutiful staff officer. It was Koch who persuaded his commander before the fact, that planning should commence at once to deal with the situation."*[14] It was only through thor-

tanks, was being held for future employment and that could possibly be a key element in a 'coordinated counteroffensive.'"* More reports followed; then on 11 December, COL Koch boldly stated that *"the massive armored force the enemy has built up in reserve gives him the definite capability of launching a spoiling offensive to disrupt Allied plans."* COL Koch specifically noted that the VIII Corps, in the sector to the north, faced two and one-half more divisions than the entire Third Army and three and one-half more than the

Seventh Army faced. Why was this 3 to 1 preponderance of enemy strength in front of a single corps? Adding to this concern were the facts that there were few natural obstacles in front of VIII Corps and that the Corps consisted of two green divisions and two other divisions resting after suffering serious casualties in earlier battles.[8]

COL Koch templated two German assembly areas, one in the north and west of the Rhine between Dusseldorf and Cologne, and the other further south around Gerolstein. He as-

ough analysis that COL Koch was in a position to make such a recommendation.

## Moral Courage

However, what perhaps sets COL Koch apart even more than his remarkable situational awareness and keen analytical skills, was his moral courage. When he began reporting that the German Army was far from destroyed and even capable of counterattacking, his was clearly a voice in the wilderness. Even General Eisenhower's G2, Major General Kenneth Strong, was reporting that "*The August battles have done it and the enemy has had it... [T]he end of the war in Europe [is] within sight, almost within reach.*"[15] Likewise, while COL Koch was suggesting caution, Patton was busy planning an offensive scheduled to begin 19 December. It would involve a gigantic double envelopment designed to eliminate German combat power west of the Rhine.[16]

It should be noted that initially LTG Patton was skeptical of COL Koch's analysis. With his characteristic optimism and enthusiasm, LTG Patton told COL Koch, "*it appears to me that there is no real threat against us from anywhere so long as we do not let imaginary dangers worry us.*"[17] COL Koch knew that these were not imaginary dangers, and he kept reporting indicators until he eventually convinced LTG Patton. To offer a view that contradicted his higher headquarters and at the same time brought him into opposition with as strong a personality as Patton's required great moral courage on COL Koch's part. Farago perhaps overstates the case, but his point is well taken. He writes that "*For his study, Koch deserved the Medal of Honor, for it represented a courageous deed far, far beyond what other men in his position would have regarded as their call of duty.*"[18]

## Conclusion

While LTG George Patton is remembered as one of the war's great heroes, COL Oscar Koch remains relatively unknown. Such is the nature of behind-the-scenes staff work. Yet it was COL Koch's situational awareness, his analytical skill, and his moral courage that provided General Patton with the intelligence he needed to make his decisions. These same characteristics will allow today's intelligence staff officers to serve their commanders as well as COL Koch served LTG Patton. He was a true intelligence hero.

### Endnotes

1. Essame, Herbert, **Patton: A Study in Command** (NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), page 122.

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3. Essame, pages 122-124.

4. Ibid, page 215.

5. Farago, Ladislas, **Patton: Ordeal and Triumph** (NY: Van Obolensky, 1964), page 695.

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8. Hogg, Ian, **The Biography of General George S. Patton** (London: Bison Books, 1982), page 125.

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10. **Warrior: The Story of General George S. Patton, Jr.**, edited by the editors of **The Army Times** (NY: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1967), page 153.

11. Essame, pages 216 and 217.

12. Farago, pages 697 and 698.

13. Hogg, page 128.

14. Vermillion, John, "The Pillars of Generalship," in **Parameters**, Summer 1987, page 3-9.

15. Farago, pages 373 and 374.

16. Warrior, page 154.

17. Farago, page 574.

18. Ibid, page 573.

## Noble Eagle Website

Breaking news, command messages, and guidance for the Army family are now available on a new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command-sponsored website at http://tradoc.monroe.army.mil/nobleeagle. (The code name "Operation NOBLE EAGLE" designates the recent call-up of military Reservists.) Activated 19 September, the new site will focus on current news stories about recovery operations, world events, and Army activities resulting from the recent terrorist attacks along the northeastern U.S. coast. Linked pages carry information on hotlines and websites connected with recovery operations, family readiness, and frequently asked questions addressed via a message board. A guidebook for effective command information and Army policy messages is also available to Army leaders on a password-protected page of the website. To gain access to this area, contact the website administrator at (757) 788-4462 or via E-mail at buffettp@monroe.army.mil.

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imagery support that is so critical on the modern battlefield. Finally, forging a link between the strategic, EAC, and tactical intelligence organizations, is the process of *Intelligence Reach*. This process and tool allows intelligence analysts at all echelons to access, to pull, or to request intelligence and products directly from intelligence organizations from "mud to space."

From JIC to Joint Task Force (JTF) to the Division Analysis and Control Element (ACE) to the Brigade Analysis and Control Team (ACT) to the maneuver battalion S2, tools and enablers are in place within our formations to make this "mud to space" leverage happen. We teach this at *your* school here at Fort Huachuca. It is core to what our intelligence soldiers and leaders in the field are practicing today. It is the combination of military art and science that comprises our contribution to the fight. You are doing it today in every unit in the Army, in the joint world, in our JTFs.

However, within this task lies a challenge. We all must be aware of it, face it, and defeat it. Here is our challenge: overcome the misconception that intelligence equals latency. There is a perception that if intelligence folks work intelligence from "mud to space," the intelligence they produce will be late; it will not contribute to the fight.

While objective representations of many warfighting experiences are the basis of these claims, my charge to you as an intelligence professional is "*do not let intelligence equal latency*." Do not let the difficulties of our efforts detract from our contributions. Do not allow anyone in your unit or any unit you support to label our efforts as "*latent*." Work hard to prevent it. Understand that intelligence contributes when it is timely and relevant. Intelligence must enable the commander to visualize the battlefield **before** the fight. I challenge you to work this hard.

Remember, leveraging intelligence, being both a producer and a consumer of intelligence, is de-

manding. You did not become an intelligence professional because you wanted easy work. You became an intelligence professional because you wanted the challenge. Well, you got it. Use intelligence, all of it, from "mud to space." Bring the fight to the threat; make it tough on them. Equip your commanders with the most complete intelligence, with the right intelligence at the right time.

Thanks for your great efforts during this period of challenge. *"To whom much is given, much is expected."* You have received the best training; you are led by the best NCOs and officers in uniform; you are enabled by unprecedented technologies. You will perform. We expect much of you. Our Global War on Terrorism continues. Soldiers continue to bring the fight to our enemy. Our core of intelligence professionals has never been more relevant or needed. Refine your skills; keep your head in the game and watch your lane.

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# 102d Military Intelligence Battalion

*The distinctive unit insignia for the 102d Military Intelligence Battalion is a gold-color metal and enamel device consisting of a shield design divided into sections symbolizing weather and terrain. The oriental blue and silver are the traditional colors of the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps. The black mountains represent the steep mountainous terrain of Korea. The wavy blue water under the gray signifies the unit's deployment overseas. The scarlet sword represents the enemy, and the lightening flash crossing the sword signifies speed and accuracy in seeking, gathering, and disseminating intelligence data. It further denotes the constant vigilance inherent in the mission of MI. The unit's motto, "Knowledge for Battle," underscores the design on a gold ribbon.*

The 102d Military Intelligence Battalion can trace its roots back to the 2d MI Company and the 329th Army Security Agency (ASA) Company. On 18 September 1981, the Army constituted the 102d Military Intelligence Battalion from these two companies, both of which began during World War II. Today, the 102d MI Battalion provides intelligence and electronic warfare support to the warriors of the 2d Infantry Division (2ID) (Light).

Following the June 1950 invasion of South Korea, the nation once again called on the 102's parent units to provide intelligence support, this time to the soldiers of Eighth Army. The 2d Counterintelligence (CI) Corps Detachment (formerly the 2d MI Company) participated with distinction in all ten of the Korean War campaigns. Meanwhile, the 329th Communications Reconnaissance Company, heir to the mantle of the 3016th Signal Service Platoon, performed fledgling tactical signals intelligence and reconnaissance operations.

The Army redesignated the 2d Counterintelligence Corps Detachment as the 2d Military Intelligence Detachment, and assigned it to Fort Benning, Georgia, with a force protection mission. The 329th Combat Reconnaissance Company deactivated in 1957 and remained in that status until 1975 when it reactivated as the 329th ASA Company.

Continuing tensions along the heavily fortified border between North Korea and South Korea, and lessons learned in Vietnam validated the requirement to provide intelligence support **directly** to the division commanders. In 1975, to facilitate this effort, the 329th ASA Company received the mission of providing signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic warfare (EW) support to 2ID (L). Likewise, on 20 February 1976, the 2d MI Company deployed to Korea and provided counterintelligence support and intelligence analysis to the 2 ID (L). However, this separation of intelligence collectors did not last long. The Intelligence Operations and Stationing Study (IOSS) showed that intelligence collection assets needed unification under a single command to eliminate redundancy and provide a unity of effort for the division's intelligence collection mission. This resulted in the Army's combining the two companies to form the 102d MI Battalion, organic to the 2d ID. The 102d MI Battalion constituted on 18 September 1981 and during the twenty years that followed, underwent a number of significant transformations. These include the addition of a long-range surveillance (LRS) element, the reconfiguration of selected subordinate companies into direct support companies, and the activation of the Analysis and Control Element (ACE). Today the 102d MI Battalion continues a proud tradition, providing multidiscipline intelligence collection, EW, and intelligence analysis across the full spectrum of conflict. Poised for the future, but ever mindful of the past, the "Stalkers" of the 102d MI Battalion continue to serve the warriors of the 2d Infantry Division (Light).

Currently the 102d MI Battalion defends Freedom's Frontier on a daily basis while also conducting "MI Gunnery" twice a year to test their ground surveillance operators, analysis and control teams, and collection and jamming teams on their ability to conduct their missions. We base MI Gunnery on the combat arms gunnery in the sense that they use practice and live tables. The teams receive scores based on how many "hits" they have, whether that is acquiring a target and distinguishing what type of target it is, or acquiring a target and collecting intelligence data.

**Knowledge for Battle!**

# INTELLIGENCE



## Eyes Across the Battlefield